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Abstract
Data about individuals are collected on a regular basis by governments and compa-
nies for a variety of purposes. These data stores are valuable resources, and there is
a growing demand to access them. However, the dissemination of data about indi-
viduals is a controversial task. On the one side, there is a demand to access accurate
data; on the other side, there is a risk of disclosing confidential information about
specific individuals. Protecting individuals’ privacy usually entails some degree of
data modification, which decreases the utility of the output. Finding a good balance
between privacy and utility is of the utmost importance in data dissemination.
The suitability of an anonymization method depends on several aspects of the data
release: the type of release (e.g. microdata file, statistical table, on-line database),
the specificities of the data (e.g. numerical, nominal, ordinal), and the desired level
of disclosure limitation. Regarding the level of disclosure limitation, the privacy
guarantees offered by anonymization methods have evolved with time. The initial
approach by the statistical community focused on masking confidential data (us-
ing either a perturbative or a non-perturbative masking), but no formal privacy
guarantees were offered. Later, the computer science community developed several
privacy models that offer more abstract privacy guarantees; for instance, by hiding
each individual within groups of indistinguishable individuals, or by limiting the
information that may be gained from accessing the released data.
We take the approach of the computer science community. The focus lies on two
mainstream privacy models: k-anonymity and ε-differential privacy. Once a privacy
model has been selected, the goal is to enforce it while preserving as much data
utility as possible. The main objective of this thesis is to improve the data utility
in k-anonymous and ε-differentially private data releases.
k-Anonymity is a widely accepted privacy model for the anonymization of microdata
sets; however, it has several drawbacks. On the disclosure limitation side, there is a
lack of protection against attribute disclosure and against informed intruders. On
the data utility side, dealing with a large number of quasi-identifier attributes is
problematic. The first contribution of this thesis is a relaxation of k-anonymity that
improves protection against informed intruders, as well as data utility in case of
multiple quasi-identifier attributes.
Differential privacy limits disclosure risk through noise addition. The Laplace dis-
tribution is commonly used for the random noise. We show that the Laplace dis-
tribution is not optimal: the same disclosure limitation guarantee can be attained
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by adding less noise. In this thesis, optimal univariate and multivariate noises are
characterized and constructed.
Differential privacy seeks to limit the contribution of any single individual on the
response to a query. However, the expected response usually depends on the user’s
prior knowledge. Common mechanisms to attain differential privacy do not take into
account the users’ prior knowledge; they implicitly assume zero initial knowledge
about the query response. As a consequence, the response provided may not be
very accurate for users with substantial initial knowledge. We propose a mechanism
that focuses on limiting the knowledge gain over the prior knowledge.
k-Anonymity and ε-differential privacy are often seen as opposed privacy notions.
Supporters of ε-differential privacy present k-anonymity as an old-fashioned pri-
vacy model that offers only poor disclosure limitation guarantees, while supporters
of k-anonymity claim that the damage done to the original data when enforcing
ε-differential privacy is too large. The last contribution of this thesis shows that
microaggregation-based k-anonymity and ε-differential privacy can be combined to
produce microdata releases with the strong privacy guarantees of ε-differential pri-
vacy and improved data accuracy.
2
Resum
Els governs i les corporacions recullen de manera habitual dades sobre individus per
a una varietat de propòsits. Aquestes dades són un recurs valuós i hi ha una demanda
creixent per accedir-hi. Amb tot, la disseminació de dades sobre individus és una
tasca controvertida. D’una banda hi ha una demanda d’accés a dades acurades; de
l’altra, cal tenir present el risc de revelar informació confidencial sobre algun dels
individus. La protecció de la privadesa dels individus implica una modificació de les
dades abans de llur publicació, cosa que en redueix la utilitat. És fonamental trobar
un equilibri adequat entre privadesa i utilitat.
La conveniència d’un mètode d’anonimització depèn de diversos aspectes: el ti-
pus de publicació (microdades, taules, base de dades interactives), les especificitats
pròpies de les dades (numèriques, nominals, ordinals, etc.) i el nivell de protecció
desitjat. Pel que fa al nivell de protecció, les garanties que ofereixen els mètodes
d’anonimització han anat evolucionat. Inicialment, el procediment proposat per
la comunitat estadística buscava emmascarar les dades confidencials (mitjançant
tècniques pertorbatives o no pertorbatives), però sense oferir garanties formals de
privadesa. Més tard, la comunitat informàtica va desenvolupar diversos models que
ofereixen garanties de privadesa més abstractes; per exemple, amagar els individus
dins de grups d’individus indistingibles, o limitar la contribució que cada individu
pot tenir en la resposta a una consulta.
Aquesta tesi adopta el punt de vista de la comunitat informàtica. Ens centrem
en dos models de privadesa àmpliament acceptats: el k-anonimat i la privadesa ε-
diferencial. Un cop triat el model de privadesa, l’objectiu passa a ser complir-ne els
requisits, alhora que preservar la màxima utilitat possible en les dades resultants.
L’objectiu principal d’aquesta tesi és la millora de la utilitat en la publicació de
dades k-anònimes i ε-diferencialment privades.
El k-anonimat és un model de privadesa per a fitxers de microdades àmpliament
acceptat. No obstant, presenta alguns problemes. Pel que fa al risc de revelació, no
protegeix contra la revelació d’atributs ni contra intrusos informats. Pel que fa a
la utilitat de les dades, tractar amb fitxers amb un nombre elevat d’atributs quasi-
identificadors pot ser problemàtic. Proposem un nou model basat en la relaxació
dels estrictes requeriments d’indistingibilitat que estableix el k-anonimat però que,
alhora, manté la mateixa probabilitat de re-identificació. Aquest nou model permet
de millorar la protecció contra intrusos informats, alhora que millora la utilitat de
les dades en presència de múltiples atributs quasi-identificadors.
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La privadesa diferencial limita el risc de revelació afegint un soroll aleatori al resultat
de les consultes. Habitualment, es fa servir la distribució de Laplace per al soroll
aleatori. A la tesi, mostrem que aquesta distribució no és òptima: es poden complir
els requeriments de la privadesa ε-diferencial afegint sorolls més petits. A més,
caracteritzem i construïm les distribucions òptimes (univariant i multivariant).
La privadesa diferencial busca limitar l’efecte que cada individu té sobre la resposta
a una consulta. La resposta que un usuari espera depèn del coneixement previ
que té de la base de dades. Malgrat això, els mecanismes habituals per obtenir
privadesa diferencial no tenen en compte el possible coneixement previ dels usuaris;
implícitament, se’ls suposa un coneixement nul. Per a un usuari amb un coneixement
previ elevat, la resposta obtinguda pot ser poc precisa. Proposem un mecanisme
basat a limitar el guany de coneixement de l’usuari respecte del seu coneixement
inicial.
El k-anonimat i la privadesa ε-diferencial es presenten sovint com a models con-
traposats. D’una banda, els partidaris de la privadesa ε-diferencial presenten el k-
anonimat com un model ja superat que ofereix unes garanties de privadesa pobres;
d’altra banda, els qui recolzen el k-anonimat argumenten que la privadesa diferencial
provoca danys massa importants a les dades. La darrera contribució d’aquesta tesi
mostra que la privadesa ε-diferencial i el k-anonimat no són conceptes completament
inconnexos: si es pren com a punt de partida per obtenir privadesa ε-diferencial un
conjunt de dades k-anònim (obtingut mitjançant un cert tipus de microagregació),
la quantitat de soroll necessari es veu reduïda significativament.
4
Resumen
Los gobiernos y las corporaciones recogen regularmente datos sobre individuos para
gran variedad de propósitos. Estos almacenes de datos son unos recursos valiosos,
cosa que provoca una creciente demanda de acceso a los datos. Sin embargo, la
diseminación de datos sobre individuos es una tarea controvertida. Por un lado,
hay una demanda de acceso a datos precisos; por otro lado, existe el riesgo de rev-
elar información confidencial sobre algún individuo específico. La protección de la
privacidad de los individuos acarrea normalmente la modificación de los datos orig-
inales, reduciéndose así la utilidad de los datos publicados. Es primordial encontrar
un equilibrio adecuado entre privacidad y utilidad.
La conveniencia de un método de anonimización depende de varios aspectos: el
tipo de publicación (microdatos, datos agregados, bases de datos interactivas), las
especificidades propias de los datos (numéricos, nominales, ordinales) y el nivel de
protección deseado. En relación al nivel de protección, ha habido una evolución
en las garantías que ofrecen los métodos de anonimización. Inicialmente, el pro-
cedimiento propuesto por la comunidad estadística se centraba en enmascarar los
datos confidenciales (mediante técnicas perturbativas o no perturbativas), pero sin
ofrecer garantías formales de privacidad. Más tarde, la comunidad informática de-
sarrolló varios modelos que ofrecen unas garantías de privacidad más abstractas;
por ejemplo, esconder a los individuos en grupos formados por varios individuos
indistinguibles, o limitar el incremento de información que proporcionan los datos
publicados.
Adoptamos aquí el proceder de la comunidad informática y nos ocupamos de dos
de los principales modelos de privacidad: k-anonimato y privacidad ε-diferencial.
Una vez seleccionado un modelo de privacidad, el objetivo pasa a ser cumplir con
sus requisitos, a la vez que se trata de preservar la máxima utilidad posible para los
datos. El objetivo principal de la presente tesis es la mejora de la utilidad de los
datos en publicaciones k-anónimas y ε-diferencialmente privadas.
El k-anonimato es un modelo de privacidad para ficheros de microdatos ampliamente
aceptado; sin embargo, presenta algunos problemas. En relación a la limitación del
riesgo de revelación, no protege contra la revelación de atributos, ni contra intrusos
informados. En relación a la utilidad de los datos, tratar con ficheros que tienen
un número elevado de atributos cuasi-identificadores es problemático. En esta tesis
proponemos un nuevo modelo basado en la relajación del requisito de indistinguibil-
idad que establece el k-anonimato pero que mantiene la misma probabilidad de
re-identificación. Este nuevo modelo nos permite aumentar la protección contra
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intrusos informados, a la vez que mejora la utilidad de los datos en presencia de
múltiples atributos cuasi-identificadores.
La privacidad diferencial limita el riesgo de revelación añadiendo un ruido aleatorio
al resultado de las consultas. Habitualmente se utiliza la distribución de Laplace
para generar dicho ruido. En esta tesis mostramos que la distribución de Laplace
no es óptima para obtener privacidad diferencial: los requisitos de la privacidad
diferencial se pueden cumplir introduciendo menos ruido. Asimismo, caracterizamos
y construimos las distribuciones óptimas (univariante y multivariante).
La privacidad diferencial busca limitar el efecto que cada individuo tiene en la
respuesta a una consulta. La respuesta que los usuarios esperan depende del
conocimiento previo que tienen. Sin embargo, lo mecanismos usuales para obtener
privacidad diferencial no tienen en cuenta este conocimiento previo; implícitamente,
se supone un conocimiento nulo. Como consecuencia, la respuesta puede ser poco
precisa cuando el usuario tiene un conocimiento previo elevado sobre ella. Pro-
ponemos un mecanismo para obtener privacidad diferencial orientado a limitar la
ganancia de conocimiento del usuario con respecto a su conocimiento previo.
El k-anonimato y la privacidad ε-diferencial son a menudo presentados como no-
ciones de privacidad contrapuestas. Por un lado, quienes apoyan la privacidad ε-
diferencial presentan el k-anonimato como un modelo de privacidad obsoleto que
ofrece unas garantías pobres; por otro lado, quienes apoyan el k-anonimato argu-
mentan que la privacidad diferencial daña demasiado los datos. En la última con-
tribución de esta tesis, mostramos que la privacidad ε-diferencial y el k-anonimato
no son nociones completamente inconexas: tomando como datos de partida para
obtener ε-privacidad diferencial un conjunto de datos k-anónimo (construido medi-
ante un cierto tipo de microagregación) se reduce la cantidad de ruido necesaria y
se mejora la utilidad de la información.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The collection of personal information has traditionally been limited to surveys
(where information about a specific topic is collected from a sample population)
and client-provider relationships (where transactions carried out are recorded). One
remarkable characteristic of such situations is that the individual whose information
is collected is aware of it. Nowadays, the advances in information technologies
have dramatically changed the state of things. Information gathering has become
pervasive: vast amounts of data are collected by governments and corporations on
a daily basis, most of the times without the consent of individuals who may even be
unaware of it. For instance, Internet stores gather data from everything that happens
in their sites [5, 6, 54]; not only do they keep track of the items you buy, but also of
the ones you browse but do not buy. Their objective is the generation of a detailed
profile of each individual; they can exploit this information to guide personalized
commercial communication actions, but also to guide the strategic planning of the
firm. Internet firms have long recognized that the information they collect from
customer interaction offers them a competitive advantage over traditional firms.
As a valuable resource, there is a growing demand to access the collected data. For
instance, many firms base their marketing and strategic plans on publicly released
census data [37]. However, when data about individuals or entities are to be dis-
seminated for secondary use, special care must be taken to avoid privacy violations.
Some popular attacks against publicly released data include: the uncovering of the
medical records of the governor of Massachusetts in the data released by the Group
Insurance Commission (GIC) [97], the uncovering of identities in a de-identified data
set containing a list of 20 million web search queries collected by AOL [12], and the
de-anonymization attacks conducted against the Netflix Prize data set [69].
The goal of Statistical Disclosure Control (SDC) or Statistical Disclosure Limitation
(SDL) is to allow the release of data while preserving the privacy of individuals.
SDC techniques work by masking the original data or statistics to be released.
While reducing the risk of disclosure, the masking also reduces the utility of the
published data. This is a fundamental trade-off that cannot be avoided: finding a
balance between privacy and utility, so that individuals’ privacy is protected and
data are still useful, is the primary objective of disclosure limitation techniques.
SDC has traditionally evaluated the level of disclosure limitation experimentally;
for instance, by trying to re-identify records in the released data. In the last few
7
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years, the computer science community has proposed several privacy models that
try to bring formal privacy guarantees into the field. Usually these privacy models
seek to introduce uncertainty in the outcome of the attacks against the privacy of
individuals. The suitability of such privacy models depends on several aspects of
the data dissemination under consideration: the type of data being released, the
required level of disclosure risk limitation, etc. When a privacy model is judged
to offer enough disclosure limitation, the next goal is to generate a data set that
satisfies the selected model and maximizes data utility. In this thesis, we focus on
two mainstream privacy models: k-anonymity, a model used to limit the risk of re-
identification in microdata releases; and ε-differential privacy, a privacy model for
interactive databases that seeks to limit the knowledge gain that can be extracted
from query responses. We mainly focus on data utility: we aim at providing methods
to satisfy those models, while offering improved data utility; but we also aim at
finding a link between those models.
1.2 Contributions
We revisit two mainstream privacy models, k-anonymity and ε-differential privacy,
and we propose several improvements. These are mainly on the data utility side,
but also on the disclosure limitation guarantees for the case of k-anonymity. Our
main contributions are:
1. Probabilistic k-anonymity. The k-anonymity model, although widely accepted,
suffers from certain limitations that affect both data utility and disclosure
limitation. We propose a relaxation of the k-anonymity model where the
requirement for indistinguishability of records in terms of quasi-identifiers is
removed, but the same probability of uncovering a confidential attribute in the
released data set is retained. The new proposal offers two advantages. First
of all, by removing the indistinguishability requirement, the range of feasible
methods widens, and we can thus search for a method that offers improved
data utility. Apart from the improvement in data utility, the fact that we no
longer have a fixed partition in sets of indistinguishable records opens the door
to improvements on disclosure limitation against informed intruders.
2. Optimal data-independent noise for ε-differential privacy. ε-Differential pri-
vacy is an output perturbation methodology; therefore, to improve the accu-
racy of the responses, the magnitude of the perturbation must be reduced.
We focus on data-independent noises, which are more frequently used due to
their simplicity, and state a strict optimality criterion for the perturbation in
terms of the concentration of the probability mass around the zero. To show
the validity of our optimality criterion, we justify that a noise that is optimal
under this criterion must be optimal under any sensible criterion (those that
prefer that less distortion is introduced). We show that the commonly used
8
1.2 Contributions
Laplace distribution is not optimal, and optimal univariate and multivariate
distributions are built.
3. Considering prior knowledge in ε-differential privacy. ε-Differential privacy
guarantees that the knowledge gain that can be extracted from the response
to any query is limited by a factor of exp(ε). Such guarantee must be enforced
independently of the prior knowledge that a particular user has. The usual
approach is to assume that the user has zero prior knowledge, and to limit
the knowledge gain to exp(ε) over it. While doing so, the knowledge gain is
limited to exp(ε) independently of the prior knowledge that a particular user
may have. For a user with some prior knowledge, the response may be less
than optimal in terms of accuracy. We propose a novel approach towards ε-
differential privacy where, for each query, database users also send their prior
knowledge; a knowledge gain of exp(ε) is then enforced over prior knowledge.
We also show that the greater interaction between the database and the users
that results from the communication of the prior knowledge does not open the
door for any attack.
4. Improving the utility of ε-differentially private data releases by prior microag-
gregation-based k-anonymity. Although it was introduced as a disclosure lim-
itation methodology for interactive databases, ε-differential privacy is general
enough to be used in microdata releases. However, due to the large amount
of noise introduced, general-purpose mechanisms to generate ε-differentially
private data have not been developed; the focus has been on the generation of
data sets that preserve the utility for specific families of functions. A general
approach towards the construction of ε-differential private data sets consists in
querying for the attributes’ value of each individual; however, due to the large
sensitivity of such queries, this general approach turns out to be infeasible.
Our proposal employs a prior microaggregation step to reduce the sensitivity
of those queries. Not all microaggregation algorithms offer the reduction in
the sensitivity that we seek; we provide a characterization of those which do.
5. Differential Privacy via t-Closeness in Data Publishing. Differential privacy
and k-anonymity are often presented as antagonistic privacy models. The guar-
antees offered by such models are quite different: whereas k-anonymity seeks
to limit re-identification, ε-differential privacy seeks to limit the knowledge
gain that users get from query responses. However, t-cloness, an improvement
over k-anonymity to limit attribute disclosure, offers privacy guarantees that
are closer to those of differential privacy. We show that under specific con-
ditions (using a specific distance function for t-closeness and given a specific
users’ prior knowledge) t-closeness implies ε-differential privacy. A method to
attain t-cloness for such conditions (and thus also ε-differential privacy) is pro-
vided. It is worth noting that unlike other approaches to differential privacy,
which output a random sample from a differentially private distribution, our
proposal fits the distribution in each of the k-anonymous groups of records
to the differentially private distribution by selecting the individuals that must
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belong to each of the groups. Thus not only we achieve ε-differential privacy,
but also preserve the thruthfulness of the data inside each of the k-anonymous
groups.
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2.1 The right to privacy: a brief history
Although nowadays it is considered a fundamental right [50, 99], the “right to pri-
vacy” is a quite recent concept. It was coined by Warren and Brandeis, back in 1890,
in an article [101] published at the Harvard Law Review. Warren and Brandeis pre-
sented laws as dynamic systems for the protection of individuals whose evolution is
triggered by social, political, and economic changes. In particular, the conception of
the right to privacy is triggered by the technical advances and new business models
of the time. To quote Warren and Brandeis:
Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the
sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical
devices threaten to make good the prediction that "what is whispered in
the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops."
Warren and Bradeis argue that the “right to privacy” was already existent in many
areas of the common law; they only gathered all these sparse legal concepts, and
put them into focus under their common denominator. Within the legal framework
of the time, the “right to privacy” was part of the right to life, one of the three
fundamental individual rights recognized by the U.S. Constitution.
Privacy concerns revived again with the invention of the computers [45] and infor-
mation exchange networks, which skyrocketed information collection, storage and
processing capabilities. The generalization of population surveys was a consequence.
The focus was now on data protection.
Nowadays, the concept of privacy has gained recognition and applies to a wide
range of situations such as: avoiding external meddling at home, limiting the use
of surveillance technologies, controlling processing and dissemination of personal
data, etc. Privacy is widely considered a fundamental right, and it is supported
by international treaties and many constitutional laws. For example, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (1948) devotes its Article 12 to privacy.
For a more comprehensive plot of key events in the history of privacy, see [3, 4].
In [3] key privacy-related events between 1600 (when it was a civic duty to keep an
eye on your neighbors) and 2008 (after the USA PATRIOT Act and the inception
of Facebook) are listed. In [4] key moments that have shaped privacy related laws
are depicted.
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As far as the protection of individuals’ data is concerned, privacy legislation is
based on several principles [72, 99]: collection limitation, purpose specification, use
limitation, data quality, security safeguards, openness, individual participation, and
accountability.
Among all the aspects that relate to data privacy, we are especially interested in
data dissemination. Data dissemination is, for instance, a primary task of National
Statistical Offices. These aim at offering an accurate picture of society; to that
end, they collect and publish statistical data on a wide range of aspects such as
economy, population, etc. Legislation usually assimilates privacy violations on data
dissemination to individual identifiability [1, 2]; for instance, Title 13 Chapter 1.1
of the U.S. Code states that “no individual should be re-identifiable in the released
data”.
2.2 Types of data
Among all privacy-related aspects, we are mainly concerned with disclosure risk
arising from data dissemination. The type of data being released determines the
potential threat to privacy as well as the most suitable methods to limit it. Three
types of data releases are considered:
Microdata releases The term “microdata” refers to a record that contains infor-
mation related to a specific individual. A microdata release aims at publishing
raw data; that is, a set of microdata records. This kind of data release offers
the greatest level of flexibility among all types of data releases: data recipients
are not limited to a specific prefixed view of data; they are able to carry any
kind of custom analysis on the released data. However, microdata releases
incur in the greatest threat to individuals’ privacy.
Microdata releases seek to allow data recipient on carrying custom data analysis;
however, if strong privacy guarantees are to be provided, data utility may be greatly
lowered, which may turn the released data unsuitable for specific analysis that re-
quire accurate data. In order to be able to meet the requirements for accurate
data, NSO sometimes generate two data sets: a publicly accessible data set where
privacy is prioritized over accuracy, and a data set that offers improved data accu-
racy, but accessible only to restricted to a set of users (committed to non-disclosure
agreements).
Aggregated data releases The data released do not refer to a single individual
but to a group of individuals. Contingency tables, the traditional output of
NSO, belong to this category. As only aggregated data is published, threats to
individuals’ privacy are diminished in comparison to microdata releases, but
data analysis is limited to the aggregated values being published.
Dynamic Databases Both microdata and aggregated data releases offer a static
view of the collected data. A specific data recipient may not be interested
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in all the published data, but just on a subset of them. The problem with
static approaches is that, even if not used, all the published data accounts
when dealing with disclosure risk; in other words, if a particular data recipient
were only given access to the data that are relevant to him, improved accuracy
could be provided. This is the idea that underlies dynamic databases: the user
is allowed to submit queries to the database, and data is only provided for the
submitted queries.
In the present thesis we deal with microdata releases (contributions 1 and 4) and
dynamic databases (contributions 2 and 3).
2.3 Microdata sets
A microdata set can be modeled as a table where each row refers to a different
individual and each column contains information regarding one of the attributes
collected. We use the notation T (A1, . . . , An) to denote a microdata set with infor-
mation about attributes A1, . . . , An.
The attributes in a microdata set are usually classified in the following non-exclusive
categories, according to the sensitivity of the information they convey and the risk
of record re-identification they imply:
• Identifiers. An attribute is an identifier if it provides unambiguous re-identif-
ication of the individual to which the record refers. Some examples of iden-
tifier attributes are the social security number, the passport number, etc. If
a record contains an identifier, any sensitive information contained in other
attributes may immediately be linked to a specific individual. To avoid direct
re-identification of an individual, identifier attributes must be removed or en-
crypted. We assume in the present thesis that, when dealing with microdata
releases, identifier attributes have previously been removed; that is, we assume
that T (A1, . . . , An) does not contain any identifier attribute.
• Quasi-identifiers. Unlike an identifier, a quasi-identifier attribute alone does
not lead to record re-identification. However, in combination with other quasi-
identifier attributes, it may allow unambiguous re-identification of some indi-
viduals. For example, [96] shows that 87% of the population in the U.S. can
be unambiguously identified by combining a 5-digit ZIP code, birth date and
sex. Removing quasi-identifier attributes, as proposed for the identifiers, is not
possible, because quasi-identifiers are most of the times required to perform
any useful analysis of the data. Deciding whether a specific attribute should
be considered a quasi-identifier is a thorny issue. In practice, any information
an intruder has about an individual can be used in record re-identification.
For uninformed intruders, only the attributes available in an external non-
anonymized data set should be classified as quasi-identifiers; in presence of
informed intruders any attribute may potentially be a quasi-identifier. Thus,
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to make sure all quasi-identifiers have been removed, one should remove all
attributes (!).
• Confidential attributes. Confidential attributes hold sensitive information on
the individuals that took part in the data collection process (e.g. salary,
health condition, sex orientation, etc.). The primary goal of microdata protec-
tion techniques is to prevent intruders from learning confidential information
about a specific individual. This goal involves not only preventing the intruder
from determining the exact value that a confidential attribute takes for some
individual, but preventing inferences on the value of that attribute (such as
bounding it).
• Non-confidential attributes. Non-confidential attributes are those that do not
belong to any of the previous categories. As they do not contain sensitive
information about individuals and cannot be used for record re-identification,
they do not affect our discussion on disclosure limitation for microdata sets.
Therefore, we assume that none of the attributes in T (A1, . . . , An) belong to
this category.
When publishing a microdata file, the data collector must guarantee that no sensitive
information about specific individuals is disclosed. To do so, the data collector
does not publish the original microdata set T (A1, . . . , An), but a modified version
T ′(A1, . . . , An) where the quasi-identifiers and/or the confidential attributes have
been masked. Disclosure can be classified into two categories [52]:
• Identity disclosure. The intruder is able to determine the true identity of the in-
dividual corresponding to a record in the microdata file. After re-identification,
the intruder associates the values of the confidential attributes for the record
to the re-identified individual.
• Attribute disclosure. Even if identity disclosure does not happen, it may be
possible for an intruder to infer some information for a specific individual based
on the published microdata set. For example, imagine that the salary is one
of the confidential attributes and the job is a quasi-identifier attribute; if an
intruder is interested in a specific individual whose job he knows to be “accoun-
tant” and there are several accountants in the data set (including the target
individual), the intruder will be unable to re-identify the individual’s record
based only on her job, but he will be able to lower-bound and upper-bound
the individual’s salary (which lies between the minimum and the maximum
salary of accountants in the data set).
2.4 Approaches to disclosure limitation
Given a data set that contains information about individuals —where an individual
is a person, household, company, etc.—, the goal is to provide statistical information
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(or the means to extract statistical information, in the case of microdata releases)
about the population or a subset of individuals, without disclosing confidential data
of specific individuals.
Disclosure limitation technologies were initially developed under the umbrella of
National Statistical Institutes (NSIs), which still remain a primary player, with
the denomination of Statistical Disclosure Control (SDC) or Statistical Disclosure
Limitation (SDL). Initially for tabular data releases, and later for microdata releases,
the statistical community has proposed many methods for limiting disclosure risk.
The preservation of the statistical properties of the original data has also been on the
focus of the statistical community since the very beginning of statistical disclosure
control. Good reference literature on statistical disclosure control are [7, 33, 52].
For an update on the current practices in statistical disclosure limitation at NSIs
see [104, 105, 52].
Disclosure limitation also became a topic of interest in the computer science research
community. Within the computer science community, the terms Privacy Preserving
Data Publishing (PPDP) and Privacy Preserving Data Mining (PPDM) are more
commonly used. Privacy Preserving Data Mining [11, 8] brings privacy protection
concerns into traditional data mining tasks: only the results of the data mining are
released; the original data are kept secret. A prevalent characteristic among PPDP
methods is that they are tightly coupled to the underlying data mining task. On
the other side, Privacy Preserving Data Publishing [48] focuses on the publication
of data about individuals (microdata). PPDP allows data users to carry any kind of
analysis on the released data. Although PPDM and PPDP seem to take completly
different approaches to disclosure limitation, they may take advantage of the same
anonymity models; for instance, k-anonymity can be used in both the generation of
anonymous microdata sets and in the anonymization of the results of data mining
tasks [23].
Although both pursue the same objective, the approaches towards disclosure limita-
tion taken by the statistical and computer science communities are not coincident.
The common understanding [38] is that the statistical community is usually more
concerned with the statistical validity of the data (valid inferences should be ob-
tainable) but offers only vague privacy guarantees (no formal privacy guarantees
are provided; the level of protection is evaluated a posteriori for each specific data
set). In contrast, methods developed by the computer science community seek to
attain a predefined notion of privacy; thus, they offer a priori privacy guarantees.
In this work we follow the path of the computer science community by focusing on
two mainstream privacy models.
2.5 Privacy models
The first attempt to come up with a formal definition for privacy was done by
Dalenius in [24]. Dalenius stated that access to the released data should not allow
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any attacker to increase his knowledge about confidential information related to a
specific individual. This is a very strict notion of privacy; in fact, it was shown in [39]
that Dalenius’s view of privacy is not feasible in presence of background information
(if any utility is to be provided). Privacy criteria used in practice offer only limited
disclosure limitation guarantees.
Two main notions are used when talking about privacy in data releases: anonymity
(it should not be possible to re-identify any individual in the published data), and
confidentiality or secrecy (access to the released data should not allow an attacker to
increase its knowledge about confidential information related to any specific individ-
ual). Privacy models used in practice focus on one of those two notions (anonymity
or confidentiality) and offer certain guarantees.
Preservation of individuals’ privacy entails some loss on the utility of the protected
data, in comparison to the original data. For the data to remain useful, the privacy
guarantees offered are limited. Some assumptions on the side knowledge available to
potential attackers are made, and the privacy preservation guarantees offered hold
only for such attackers.
In this thesis we focus on two mainstream privacy models: k-anonymity [77, 78],
which, based on the anonymity principle, seeks to hide individuals within groups
of indistinguishable records; and ε-differential privacy [42, 39], which, based on
confidentiality, seeks to limit the knowledge gain provided by the output data.
Despite the fact that k-anonymity is solely based on anonymity, and ε-differential
privacy is solely based on secrecy, other privacy models may mix both anonymity
and secrecy. This is the case, for instance, of l-diversity [62] and t-closseness [58]
that, similarly to k-anonymity, seek to hide each individual among a group of indi-
viduals, but, unlike k-anonymity, they also require the confidential information of
the individuals in the group to be sufficiently diverse to improve secrecy.
A great number of privacy criteria have been proposed. They differ in the kind and
strength of the disclosure limitation guarantees they offer, and in the suitability for
a certain type of data release. For a thorough review of privacy models see [100].
2.6 The privacy-utility tradeoff
Disclosure limitation in a public data release involves some degree of modification
of the data to be released. Instead of publishing the original data D, a masked
version D′ is published. The masking improves privacy but reduces the utility of
the published data, in comparison to the original data. This tension between privacy
and utility is unavoidable: privacy and utility are two different views of the same
thing, the amount of information published. By reducing the amount of information
published, privacy improves but utility decreases; and the other way round. Two
extreme cases are: publish the original data, which offers the greatest utility but
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the least privacy; and publish encrypted or random data, which incurs no disclosure
risk at all, but offers no utility.
Disclosure limitation technologies seek an equilibrium between privacy and utility:
the disclosure risk must be limited, but the data need to remain useful. Sometimes
the required equilibrium between privacy and utility does not exist; for instance,
when access to very accurate and sensitive data is required by some data recipient.
As the publication of such a data set is not feasible, data providers must rely on
other mechanisms such as data access restriction and non-disclosure agreements.
2.7 Measuring utility
Disclosure limitation entails some modifications of the original data, which decreases
the utility of the protected data; therefore, it is important to be able to assess the
quality of the protected data.
Measuring the utility of the released data is a tough task. Currently, no single utility
measure is broadly accepted [15]. The main problem with utility measures is related
to the relativity of the term “data utility” [98]: “data utility” can be seen as “fitness
for use”. In other words, a data set may be useful for some kind of analysis, but not
for others. The measurement of the data utility based on the intended data usage
is usually preferred [15], as then utility evaluation focuses on the particular type of
knowledge that is to be extracted. Often, data protection cannot be performed with
a specific data use in mind [52] (e.g data uses may be very diverse or even hard
to identify at the time of data release). For such cases, a generic measure of data
utility is required to help the data collector in assessing the damage inflicted during
the disclosure limitation process.
The suitability of a utility measure also depends on the type of data release. Mea-
sures suitable for microdata releases may not be suitable in assessing data utility in
an interactive database environment. For instance, in a microdata release we may
evaluate how well the correlation between attributes or marginal distributions are
preserved; but these utility measures are not appropriate for interactive databases.
See [52] for a thorougher review of utility measures used for microdata releases,
and [15] for utility measures used in privacy preserving data mining.
2.8 k-Anonymity
A de-identified data set is a data set that has had identifier attributes removed.
Removal of identifiers is essential to hide the individuals’ identity; however, it is
usually not enough. For instance, [96] shows that 87% of the population in the
United States can be uniquely identified by combining 5-digit ZIP, gender, date of
birth.
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To re-identify a record in a published data set, the intruder performs a record linkage
attack. In a record linkage attack the intruder tries to link the records in the released
data set to the records in a non-anonymous external data set; that is, the intruder
seeks to associate identities to the records in the released data set. This linkage
is done by matching the values of the common attributes (the quasi-identifiers). If
the linkage is correct, the attack succeeds and the intruder learns the value of the
confidential attributes for the re-identified individual.
For an attribute to be a quasi-identifier, it must be externally available in a non-
anonymous data set; otherwise it cannot be used for re-identification of records in
the released data set.
Definition 1 (Quasi-identifier). A quasi-identifier QI of T is a subset of the set of
attributes {A1, . . . , An} that is available in an external, non-anonymous data set.
A common approach to prevent record linkage attacks is to hide each individual
within a group of individuals. This is the approach that k-anonymity [78, 23] takes:
k-anonymity requires each record in the published microdata set to be indistin-
guishable from k − 1 other records based on the quasi-identifiers. This way, an
intruder with access to an external non-anonymous data set that contains the quasi-
identifiers in the released data set T ′(A1, . . . , An) is unable to perform an exact
re-identification. For any individual in the external data set, the intruder can at
most determine a set of k records in the published data set that contains the target
individual.
Definition 2 (k-Anonymity [78, 23]). A microdata set T ′(A1, . . . , An) is said to
satisfy k-anonymity if, for each record t ∈ T ′, there are at least k − 1 other records
sharing the same values for all the quasi-identifier attributes.
The determination of the attributes that are available externally in a non-anonymous
data set is a key point for k-anonymity to provide the desired protection against re-
identification. It was already acknowledged in the original proposal of k-anonymity
that it is not possible for the data holder to determine the knowledge that each of the
data recipients may have; thus, the data holder may misjudge which attributes need
to be considered as quasi-identifier attributes. In such cases the released data may
be less anonymous than initially intended. Proposed solutions [95] rely on policies,
laws, and contracts.
The original method to generate a k-anonymous data set [77] was based on gener-
alization and suppression, which continue to be the dominant techniques to achieve
k-anonymity. Generalization reduces the granularity of the information contained
in the quasi-identifier attributes, thus increasing the chance of several records shar-
ing the values of these attributes. A generalization hierarchy is defined for each of
the quasi-identifier attributes. Generalization is usually performed at the attribute
level; that is, either all or none of the records are generalized. Suppression removes
tuples from the original data set so that they are not released. Suppression is usually
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applied to remove outlier records before applying generalization. Suppresion seeks
to reduce the amount of generalization required to generate the k-anonymous data
set.
The use of generalization and suppression to enforce k-anonymity produces a data
set that is truthful, but less precise than the original data set. The objective is
to obtain a k-anonymous data set where information loss is minimized. Usually
the goal is a minimal generalization that produces a k-anonymous data set for a
given level of suppression that is considered to be acceptable. It was shown in [66]
that finding an optimal k-anonymization via generalization and suppression is a
NP-hard problem. A large number of algorithms to attain k-anonymity have been
proposed [78, 14, 56, 57, 10]; they rely on properties of k-anonymous data sets or
heuristics to reduce the amount of search, or search for sub-optimal solution.
A different approach towards achieving k-anonymity is based on microaggrega-
tion [35]. Microaggregation [30] is a family of anonymization algorithms for data
sets that works in two stages:
• First, the set of records in a data set is clustered in such a way that: i) each
cluster contains at least k records; ii) records within a cluster are as similar as
possible.
• Second, records within each cluster are replaced by a representative of the
cluster, typically the centroid record.
Clearly, when microaggregation is applied to the projection of records on their quasi-
identifier attributes, the resulting data set is k-anonymous. In [35] a simple microag-
gregation heuristic called MDAV is described, in which all clusters have exactly k
records, except the last one, which has between k and 2k − 1 records. As the inter-
nals of MDAV will be required in Section 6.2, we recall the MDAV algorithm (See
Algorithm 2.1).
Despite being a widely accepted privacy model, k-anonymity suffers from certain
limitations. The most common criticism against k-anonymity refers to the lack
of protection against attribute disclosure: if all the individuals within a group of
indistinguishable records share same value for a confidential attribute, then the in-
truder learns the confidential attribute, even without re-identification. Some refine-
ments to the basic k-anonymity model have been proposed to improve the protection
against attribute disclosure: l-diversity [62] requires the presence of l different well-
represented values for the confidential attribute in every group of records sharing
the same quasi-identifier values; t-closeness [58] requires the distribution of the con-
fidential attribute in any group of records sharing the quasi-identifier values to be
close to the distribution in the overall data set.
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Algorithm 2.1 Maximum distance to average record (MDAV)
let X be the original data set
let k be the minimal cluster size
while |X| ≥ 3k do
x←average record of X
x1 ←most distant record to x in X
x2 ←most distant record to x1 in X
Form a cluster with x1 and its k − 1 closest records
Form a cluster with x2 and its k − 1 closest records
Remove the clustered records from X
end while
if |X| ≥ 2k then
x←average record of X
x1 ←most distant record to x in X
Form a cluster with x1 and its closest k − 1 records
Remove the clustered records from X
end if
Form a new cluster with the remaining records.
Within each formed cluster, replace the values of each quasi-identifier attribute with
the average value of the attribute over the cluster.
2.9 ε-Differential Privacy
Most disclosure limitation mechanisms are specifically designed to avoid releasing
information that is known to be disclosive. Such mechanisms are instructed with the
kind of data releases that may lead to a privacy breach, and are designed to avoid
them. To determine the data releases that may lead to a privacy breach, a guess
on the amount of side information available to the intruders is usually made. As
long as this guess is accurate, the disclosure limitation mechanism accomplishes its
duty, but a privacy breach may happen if there are intruders with greater amounts
information.
The approach of differential privacy towards disclosure limitation is different. In-
stead of enforcing a pre-specified set of rules that seek to limit disclosure risk, it
limits the effect of the presence or absence of any single individual on any informa-
tion that can be extracted from the database.
The disclosure limitation guarantee provided by ε-differential privacy is similar to
that of Dalenius (see Section 2.5), being the difference that, while Dalenius com-
pared the knowledge before and after accessing the released data, differential privacy
compares the knowledge before and after a single individual contributes her data.
In other words, instead of limiting the knowledge provided by the data set, it limits
the knowledge provided by each individual in the data set.
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Differential privacy was introduced as an interactive (or query-response) mechanism,
where the database is held by a trusted party that catches the queries sent by the
database users and outputs a sanitized response. Let D be the database, and assume
that a user wants to compute the value of a function f over D. The trusted party
computes the real response to the query (that is, the value of f(D)) and masks it
before release. The end user receives κf (D), the masked response. The usual way to
compute the perturbed value κf (D) is to add a random noise to f(D) that depends
on the variability of the query response.
Differential privacy assumes that each record in the data set refers to a different
individual; thus, comparing the output of a query before and after an individual has
contributed her data is equivalent to comparing the output of that query between
data sets that differ in one record. Data sets that differ in one record are known as
neighbor data sets. Strictly speaking, a database is a data set plus some software
allowing the data to be accessed and managed. However, unless there is risk of
ambiguity, in the sequel we will use database and data set as equivalent terms.
Definition 3. [ε-differential privacy, [39]] A randomized function κ gives ε-
differential privacy if, for all data sets D, D′ that differ in one record, and all
S ⊂ Range(κ)
P (κ(D) ∈ S) ≤ eε × P (κ(D′) ∈ S) (2.1)
The randomized function κ in the definition represents the output the user gets
from the database as response to the submitted query; actually, κ(D) is the value
resulting from adding random noise to the real query response. Inequality (2.1) can
be interpreted as a bound on the knowledge gain between the responses obtained
when performing the same query on data sets D and D′.
Two approaches to the concept of “neighbor data sets” are found in the literature
on differential privacy: in [39] two data sets are said to be neighbors if one can be
obtained from the other by adding or removing a single record; in [70] two data sets
are said to be neighbors if one can be obtained from the other by modifying a single
record.
Let us shed some light on the disclosure risk limitation provided by differential
privacy. Assume that the data sets D and D′ can be obtained from one another by
adding or removing one record; the case of data sets D and D′ that can be obtained
from one another by modifying a record is similar. Let D′ = D \ {r}; that is, D
contains the record r contributed by individual ir, but D′ does not. Since D′ does
not contain ir’s data, the level of privacy for ir when querying D′ is maximum;
even if disclosure for individual ir happens, it seems unreasonable to blame the data
set D′ (it does not contain ir’s data). As differential privacy guarantees that the
knowledge gain between data sets D and D′ is limited, the disclosure risk for ir is
limited.
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To improve the accuracy of ε-differentially private responses, the magnitude of the
noise must be minimized. Several methods for calibrating the noise have been pro-
posed. We classify them in two categories, according to their dependency on the
data set: data-independent methods, such as [42], and data-dependent methods,
such as [71]. When calibrating to a data-independent noise, the distribution of
the noise is constant across data sets; on the other side, when calibrating to data-
dependent noises the distribution of the noise is adjusted for each data set. In
general, using a data-independent noise is simpler, but data-dependent noises pro-
vide a better adjustment of the noise to different degrees of variability of the query
function between neighbor data sets.
For data-independent noises, a Laplace distribution is typically used. The mean
parameter is set to zero (for the expected value of the noise to be zero), and the
scale parameter is adjusted to the largest variability of the query function between
neighbor data sets. Specifically, the density function of the Laplace noise is
p(x) = ε2∆(f)e
−|x|ε/∆(f)
To refer to the largest change of a function between neighbor data sets, the notion
of L1-sensitivity is introduced.
Definition 4. [L1-sensitivity] The L1-sensitivity of f : D → Rd is
∆f = max
D,D′
‖f(D)− f(D′)‖1 (2.2)
for all neighbor data sets D,D′.
Using Laplace-distributed noise with zero mean and ∆f/ε scale parameter provides
ε-differential privacy [42]. This result holds independently of the number of com-
ponents of f . An independent Laplace-distributed noise with zero mean and ∆f/ε
scale must be added to each of the components.
In [26, 44, 17], it was proven that if accurate responses are returned for a sufficiently
large number of count queries, then the original database can be reconstructed
with great accuracy. Initially, these results raised the belief that the generation of
protected microdata sets that preserve the utility for a large number of queries was
unfeasible. In particular, this motivated the presentation of differential privacy as
an an interactive query-response mechanism. However, it was later shown in [18,
43, 51, 22] that differential privacy could also be enforced in the non-interactive
setting and, indeed, that the generated microdata set could preserve the utility for
an arbitrary large number of queries.
There is a lack of methods to generate general-purpose ε-differentially private data
sets. Current proposals preserve utility only for restricted classes of queries (typi-
cally count queries). This contrasts with the general-purpose utility-preserving data
release offered by the k-anonymity model.
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We propose a privacy model that, similarly to k-anonymity, protects against iden-
tity disclosure (the probability of determining the true identity for a specific value
of a confidential attribute is 1/k), but offers improved data accuracy (in particular,
it behaves well in presence of multiple quasi-identifier attributes). Our proposal is
based on a relaxation of the indistinguishability requirement of k-anonymity. In-
stead of requiring records to be indistinguishable within sets of k records as far as
quasi-identifiers are concerned, we focus on the probability of re-identification. By
requiring the probability of re-identification to be 1/k at most, we achieve the same
level of protection against re-identification provided by k-anonymity, but the range
of applicable methods to implement our model is wider and hence the information
loss can be reduced.
The contents of this chapter have been published in [89, 92].
3.1 Limitations of the k-anonymity model for
disclosure limitation
Although k-anonymity is a popular privacy criterion, some criticism has been raise
against it [36]. k-Anonymity seeks to prevent identity disclosure (re-identification
is only possible with probability 1/k), but confidential information can be revealed
even if re-identification is not feasible. For example, let a medical data set contain
quasi-identifier attributes Age, Gender, Zipcode and Race, and confidential attribute
AIDS (whose values can be Yes or No). Imagine that we 3-anonymize this data
set, but a group of three records sharing a certain combination of quasi-identifier
attribute values also shares the confidential attribute value AIDS=Yes. In this case,
if the intruder can establish that her target respondent’s record lies within that
group (because it is the only group with compatible Age, Gender, Zipcode and
Race), the intruder learns that the target respondent suffers from AIDS. This kind
of disclosure is known as attribute disclosure and arises from the lack of variability
of the confidential attribute inside a group of indistinguishable records. Several
fixes/alternatives to k-anonymity which are also based on the partitioning of the
data set in groups of indistinguishable records have appeared: l-diversity [62], t-
closeness [58], etc. However, none of those alternatives is free from shortcomings
(see [36]).
23
Chapter 3 Probabilistic k-anonymity
On the data utility side, k-anonymity has been shown to provide reasonably useful
anonymized results, especially for small k, but utility degrades rapidly if the num-
ber of quasi-identifiers is increased. This is a fundamental drawback that affects
any method that is based on the partitioning of the data set in groups of indis-
tinguishable records. Even more dramatic is the effect of increasing the number of
quasi-identifiers on the utility. This issue is know as “the curse of dimensionality” [9].
There is yet another serious concern on the disclosure limitation provided by k-
anonymity: the attack model considered is weak. k-Anonymity assumes that the
data holder is capable of discerning between quasi-identifier attributes and non-
quasi-identifier attributes; that is, the data holder is supposed to be able to deter-
mine which attributes may be available externally in a non-anonymous data set. It
was already recognized, when k-anonymity was first introduced [78], that this is a
quite stringent assumption. The proposed solution was to rely on policies, laws, and
contracts, but this is not feasible if we aim at releasing the data openly.
For example, consider a data set T that holds the attributes Zipcode, Gender, Age,
Income, and Disease, where the Income and Disease attributes hold confidential
information. As Income and Disease are confidential, they should not be available
in an external non-anonymous data set; therefore, by following the usual approach,
we would take Zipcode, Gender, and Age as the quasi-identifiers. However, even if
not available in an external non-anonymous data set, Income and Disease may be
available to an informed intruder, which could use that knowledge to improve the
accuracy of the re-identification. For instance, let us assume that Alice knows that
Bob is in the released table T . By using Zipcode, Gender, and Age, Alice is able to
determine a group of k records that contains Bob’s data. Now, let us assume that,
as Alice and Bob are friends, Alice knows the value of the Disease attribute for Bob’s
record. By using this knowledge, Alice can perform a more precise re-identification,
thus learning more about Bob’s income than initially intended. The extreme case
happens when nobody else in the group of k individuals shares Bob’s disease; Alice
is then able to determine the exact value of Bob’s income with total certainty.
An even more insidious intruder can be imagined. Imagine that Alice does not
know Bob’s disease, but knows the disease of some of the other individuals that
share Bob’s combination of quasi-identifier attribute values —e.g. Alice works in
an hospital, and happens to meet those individuals. By using the quasi-identifiers,
Alice determines a set of k records that must contain Bob’s data; by using her
knowledge about the Disease attribute, Alice is then able to perform a more precise
re-identification of Bob’s record than initially intended.
For k-anonymity to offer protection against intruders with confidential information,
we have to assume that all the attributes can be used in the re-identification; in other
words, all attributes are quasi-identifiers. But we have already commented that
increasing the number of quasi-identifiers has a deep negative effect on the utility
of the released data. We will show that probabilistic k-anonymity offers improved
data accuracy in case of multiple quasi-identifier attributes; thus, probabilistic k-
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anonymity is able to provide disclosure limitation against informed intruders with
reasonable data accuracy. The improved data quality comes from the ability to use
multiple partitions of the data set.
3.2 The probabilistic k-anonymity model
k-Anonymity guarantees that, for any combination of values of quasi-identifier at-
tributes in the published microdata set T ′(A1, . . . , An), there are at least k records
sharing that combination of values. Therefore, given an individual in an external
non-anonymous data set, the probability of performing the right linkage back to
the corresponding record in the published microdata set, and thus the probabil-
ity of learning its confidential attributes, is at most 1/k. It is in this sense that
probabilistic k-anonymity is defined.
A similar relaxation of the notion of k-anonymity was presented in [106], which
partitioned the data set and applied a permutation inside each of the partition
components. This is the same strategy that we will apply in Section 3.3 to achieve
probabilistic k-anonymity. However, probabilistic k-anonymity is a more general
framework; it is not limited to permutations, although permutations are a convenient
choice to simplify probability calculations. Moreover, [106] did not address the issues
described in Section 3.1, which probabilistic k-anonymity does address.
Definition 5 (Probabilistic k-anonymity). Let T ′(A1, . . . , An) be a published data
set generated from an original data set T (A1, . . . , An) using an anonymization mech-
anism M . The data set T ′ is said to satisfy probabilistic k-anonymity if, for any
non-anonymous external data set E, the probability for an intruder I knowing T ′,
M and E to correctly link any record x ∈ E and its corresponding record (if any)
in T ′ is at most 1/k.
Note than any method used to achieve k-anonymity also leads to probabilistic k-
anonymity. In this sense, it may be said that k-anonymity provides a stronger
guarantee. However, from the point of view of the probability of re-identification,
both provide the same level of protection. Note that stating that k-anonymity is
stronger does not contradict the fact that a distinguishing feature of probabilistic
k-anonymity is to protect against informed intruders knowing some confidential
attribute values. Indeed, k-anonymity can also provide such protection, but it needs
to take all attributes as quasi-identifiers.
The advantage of probabilistic k-anonymity in comparison to k-anonymity is that, by
relaxing the indistinguishability requirements within groups of k records, the range
of eligible methods to enforce probabilistic k-anonymity is wider, and therefore we
may expect a reduction in the information loss.
We start by analyzing probabilistic k-anonymity in presence of non-informed in-
truders: confidential attributes are not available externally, so they need not be
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T (A1, . . . , An)
X ′
−→ T
′(A1, . . . , An)
Id, Rid
←− E
x1 = (qi1, c1) x′1 = (qi′1, c1) e1 = (qi1, id1)
... ... ...
x|T | = (qi|T |, c|T |) x′|T ′| = (qi′|T ′|, c|T ′|) e|E| = (qi|E|, id|E|)
Figure 3.1: Notations for probabilistic k-anonymity
considered as quasi-identifiers. As probabilistic k-anonymity is expressed in terms
of probability of re-identification, it is natural to think of the released data set
T ′(A1, . . . , An) as a perturbation of T (A1, . . . , An). We use the notations in Fig-
ure 3.1. The records xi in T have been split in two parts: the quasi-identifier
attributes qii, and the confidential attributes ci. The records in T ′ are obtained by
applying a random perturbation to the corresponding record in T : x′i = X(xi). This
perturbation affects only the quasi-identifier attributes.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the released records in T ′ correspond to
the first |T ′| records in T . If |T | = |T ′|, then all the records are released. The data
set E links the quasi-identifiers qii to the identifier idi. The functions Id and Rid
assign a record in T ′ to the records in E, thus performing the re-identification of
the records in T ′. The function Rid is the re-identification function used by the
intruder, while Id is assumed to be the correct re-identification function. If there
is no record in T ′ corresponding to the identity (i.e. the identified record) ei ∈ E,
then Id returns the empty set.
The goal of probabilistic k-anonymity is to limit the probability of performing the
right linkage to at most 1/k. With the above notations this requirement can be
stated as: for all ei ∈ E and for all Rid()
P (Rid(ei) = Id(ei)) ≤ 1
k
This formula captures the essence of the definition of probabilistic k-anonymity:
the probability of performing the right re-identification must not be greater than
1/k. However, by having the intruder use any possible function Rid() to perform
the re-identification, the details on how a rational intruder will proceed are hidden.
Given a record ei, a rational intruder selects the record xr in T ′ that has the greatest
probability given the knowledge of T ′, E andM . The following examples will clarify
how a rational intruder acts. All examples assume that E contains identities for all
records in T , which is the best possible knowledge that an intruder can have.
Example 1. Let us assume that T contains two records, and that only the first one
is included in the anonymized data set. This situation is shown in Table 3.1. From
the intruder’s point of view, x′1 corresponds to either the individual in e1 or e2. The
best the intruder can do is to select the one that has the greatest probability given
the knowledge of T ′, E, and the mechanism M used to generate T ′ from T .
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The probability that x′1 corresponds to ei equals the probability of obtaining qi′1
from qiEi , over the total probability of obtaining qi′1 from any other record in E:
P (X ′(qiEi ) = qi′1|T ′, E,M)
= P (X
′(qiEi ) = qi′1|M)∑
(qiEj ,idj)∈E P (X
′(qiEj ) = qi′1|M)
The intruder selects e1 as his guess if P (X ′(qiE1 ) = qi′1|T ′, E,M) ≥ P (X ′(qiE2 ) =
qi′1|T ′, E,M), and e2 otherwise.
Table 3.1: Data sets in Example 1
T T ′ E
x1 = (qi1, c1) x′1 = (qi′1, c1) e1 = (qiE1 , id1)
x2 = (qi2, c2) e2 = (qiE2 , id2)
In the previous example we have seen that, given a record in E, the linkage is
performed to the record in T ′ that has greatest probability. If that probability is
smaller than 1/k, then the probability of performing the right linkage will also be
smaller than 1/k, as any other linkage will indeed result in a yet smaller probability.
Therefore, to achieve probabilistic k-anonymity, we must have for all qiE ∈ E and
all qi′ ∈ T ′
P (X ′(qiE) = qi′|T ′, E,M) ≤ 1
k
(3.1)
Example 2. In this example the amount of information in T ′ has been increased,
by adding the record x′2. The new data sets are shown in Table 3.2. As E is assumed
to exactly contain the identities for the individuals in T , the intruder knows that if
one identity in E corresponds to a specific record in T ′, the other identity in E must
correspond to the other record in T ′. This must be taken into account when com-
puting the probabilities. For example, the probability P (X ′(qiE1 ) = qi′1|T ′, E,M)
that qiE1 corresponds to qi′1 equals P (X ′(qiE1 ) = qi′1, X ′(qiE2 ) = qi′2|T ′, E,M), which
can be computed as
P (X ′(qiE1 ) = qi′1, X ′(qiE2 ) = qi′2|M)∑
{i,j}={1,2} P (X ′(qiEi ) = qi′1, X ′(qiEj ) = qi′2|M)
Table 3.2: Data sets in Example 2
T T ′ E
x1 = (qi1, c1) x′1 = (qi′1, c1) e1 = (qiE1 , id1)
x2 = (qi2, c2) x′2 = (qi′2, c2) e2 = (qiE2 , id2)
The next example shows how the correct re-identification probability would be com-
puted in the most general case.
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Example 3. Assume data sets T , T ′ and E as in Table 3.3. Contrary to Example 2,
fixing a correspondence between a record in T ′ and a record in E does not completely
fix the rest of the correspondences. We still have to consider all the possible com-
binations. The probability P (X ′(qiE1 ) = qi′1|T ′, E,M) that qiE1 corresponds to qi′1
equals ∑P (X ′(qiE1 ) = qi′1, X ′(qiEi2) = qi′j2 , . . . , X ′(qiEiM ) = qi′jm|T ′, E,M), where
1 < i2 < . . . < iM ≤ N , and {j2, · · · , jM} = {2, · · · ,M}. This probability can be
computed as∑
P (X ′(qiE1 ) = qi′1, X ′(qii2) = qi′j2 . . . X ′(qiiM ) = qi′jM |M)∑
P (X ′(qir1) = qi′s1 , . . . , X ′(qirM ) = qi′sM |M)
where 1 ≤ r2 < . . . < rm ≤ N , and {s2, · · · , sM} = {2, · · · ,M}.
Table 3.3: Data sets in Example 3
T T ′ E
x1 = (qi1, c1) x′1 = (qi′1, c1) e1 = (qiE1 , id1)
... ... ...
xN = (qiN , cN) x′M = (qi′M , cM) eN = (qiEN , idN)
We have said that, to have probabilistic k-anonymity, Inequality (3.1) must hold.
However, the previous examples show that the computation of the re-identification
probability in Inequality (3.1) for an arbitrary mechanismM may be complex. In the
following section, we propose to use data swapping as M , which has the advantage
of making the computation of the re-identification probability very simple.
3.3 Probabilistic k-anonymity via microaggregation
and swapping
The proposed method consists of two main steps: (i) partition the records in T into
groups of size k and (ii) apply a permutation to the quasi-identifier attributes within
each of the groups. This method can accommodate many variations, depending on
how the partition step (i) is done.
Note that, as the same permutation is applied to all quasi-identifier attributes, the
identity of the individual is not masked. However, the quasi-identifier attributes are
dissociated from the confidential attributes, and therefore intruders can only guess
the actual values corresponding to a confidential attribute with probability at most
1/k. If leaking the mere presence of an individual in the data set is itself disclosive,
then some of the quasi-identifier attributes must be considered confidential, which
takes us to the informed intruder scenario.
We introduce first the method that offers protection against uninformed intruders.
In other words, we assume that the attributes may be quasi-identifier attributes
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or confidential attributes, but not both. Later we extend our proposal to protect
against informed intruders; assuming that confidential attributes can be employed
in the re-identification.
3.3.1 Uninformed intruders
In presence of uninformed intruders there is a clear separation between quasi-
identifier and confidential attributes. Assuming that all records in T are masked
and included in T ′, we have the data sets in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4: Data sets in the uninformed intruder scenario
T T ′ E
x1 = (qi1, c1) x′1 = (qi′1, c1) e1 = (qiE1 , id1)
... ... ...
xN = (qiN , cN) x′N = (qi′N , cN) eN = (qiEN , idN)
Selecting a random sample from T to create T ′ is a sensible approach, as it introduces
uncertainty on whether an individual whose data was collected has been included
in the published data set. However, by assuming that all the individuals in T have
been included in T ′, we provide the intruder with the best information available.
Therefore, if we achieve probabilistic k-anonymity in this scenario, then we will also
achieve it in a scenario where a random sample from T is selected.
It is easy to see that the partition and swapping method described above satisfies
probabilistic k-anonymity because
P (X ′(qiEi ) = qi|T ′, E,M) =
1/k if qi ∈ G(id(qiEi ))0 otherwise
where G(id(qiEi )) is the group of records of T that contains the record corresponding
to qiEi .
The key point in the method is the partition step. A first approach is to partition
the data set T into random groups. This leads indeed not only to probabilistic
k-anonymity, but to probabilistic |T |-anonymity, as the quasi-identifiers of a record
can be swapped with the quasi-identifiers of any other record. Moreover, the risk of
attribute disclosure is small. However, the impact on data quality can be substantial,
because very different records may be swapped.
To achieve better data quality, the groups of records must be selected to be as
homogeneous as possible, although this increases the risk of attribute disclosure. Our
proposal is to generate the groups using a microaggregation algorithm ([30, 35]) over
the quasi-identifier attributes. Microaggregation is a cardinality-constrained form
of clustering in which the number of clusters (groups) is not fixed beforehand but
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the minimum cardinality of each group is required to be k. In the section devoted
to informed intruders, there are some experimental results obtained by using the
MDAV microaggregation algorithm ([35, 53]); MDAV attempts to maximize intra-
group homogeneity using the least squares criterion and it yields groups with size
k, except perhaps one group which has size between k and 2k − 1.
Other options in the selection of the groups of records are possible. For example,
a variant of MDAV, known as V-MDAV ([86, 85]), may be used that performs
clustering in groups of variable size and that is known to reduce the information
loss in clustered data sets. The µ-Approx microaggregation heuristic [32] offers
also variable-sized groups and is proven to yield a clustering within a bound of the
optimal clustering. Another possibility is to select the groups of records in such a
way that the risk of attribute disclosure is reduced, by ensuring a certain diversity
in the values of the confidential attributes within each group.
3.3.2 MDAV microaggregation for informed intruders
Consider a data set with attributes: A0, A1, . . . , An, with A0 being a non-confidential
quasi-identifier attribute, and A1, . . . , An being confidential quasi-identifier at-
tributes. We assume the presence of several informed intruders, each of them having
knowledge of all confidential attributes except by one, whose value wants to deter-
mine. To be more specific, intruder Ii, for i = 1 to n, is assumed to know the values
of all attributes except Ai. This is not the most stringent scenario. In the worst
case scenario, intruder Ii would also have knowledge some of the values of attribute
Ai. However, we judge that the proposed intruders are already strong enough. Note
that the stronger the intruders, the lower the data utility of the protected data set.
To achieve the desired level of protection against all informed intruders, we apply
the method presented for uninformed intruders once for each informed intruder, in
order to dissociate the value of the confidential attribute unknown to this intruder
from the rest of attributes. For each informed intruder, we use the quasi-identifiers
and the confidential attribute shown in Table 3.5.
Table 3.5: Quasi-identifiers and confidential attribute for each informed intruder
Intruder Quasi-identifier attributes Confidential attribute
I1 A0, A2, . . . , An A1
I2 A0, A1, A3 . . . , An A2
... ... ...
In A0, A1, . . . , An−1 An
One difficulty that we face with the previous approach is that dealing with informed
intruders in sequence requires applying different permutations over different but
overlapping sets of attributes of the original data set T (the quasi-identifiers for
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each informed intruder). To overcome this difficulty we take the reverse approach:
instead of performing the permutation over the quasi-identifier attributes, we apply
the reverse permutation to the single confidential attribute unknown to the current
intruder. In this way, each permutation acts over a different attribute and there are
no overlaps.
3.3.3 Individual ranking microaggregation for informed intruders
The above observation regarding the application of the inverse permutation on the
single unknown confidential attribute leads to single-attribute microaggregation, also
called individual ranking microaggregation. Instead of multivariate microaggrega-
tion of quasi-identifier attributes, we do individual ranking microaggregation on the
unknown confidential attribute. By doing so, the data quality of the published data
set is increased, as the confidential attribute values are only swapped across records
with similar values (see [34] on the low information loss caused by individual rank-
ing microaggregation). It may be argued that there is an increase in the attribute
disclosure risk; however, this increase can be mitigated by increasing k.
One extra benefit of this approach is that, since microaggregation is performed on a
single attribute, there is no need to normalize attributes as required by multivariate
microaggregation to avoid scale problems.
3.4 Experimental results
We have implemented the following three methods:
• MDAV-ID. MDAV microaggregation is run on the quasi-identifier attributes
to partition the data set in groups of size k records. Within each group,
quasi-identifiers are replaced by the group centroid in order to have identical
quasi-identifiers for all records in the group. This is the procedure suggested
in [35] and it achieves the standard notion of k-anonymity proposed in [78] in
the sense that all quasi-identifiers within a group are made indistinguishable.
• MDAV-SWAP. This is the method described in Section 3.3.1 for probabilistic
k-anonymity: MDAV microaggregation on the quasi-identifier attributes plus
swapping within groups.
• IR-SWAP. This is the method described in Section 3.3.2 above for probabilis-
tic k-anonymity: individual ranking microaggregation on each confidential
attribute plus swapping within groups.
The above methods have been tested with the “Census” and “EIA” reference data
sets proposed in the European project CASC [19].
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3.4.1 “Census” data set
The “Census” data set contains 1080 records with 13 continuous attributes. Fol-
lowing the approach in [35] we consider the first 6 attributes in “Census” to be
non-confidential quasi-identifiers, and the last 7 attributes to be confidential.
To assess the data quality, we evaluate the correlations from all attributes to the
confidential attributes. As the proposed methods for probabilistic k-anonymity do
not modify non-confidential attributes, correlations between the latter have the same
value as in the original data set. Means and variances also remain unchanged for
all attributes, because swapping does not change the values taken by each original
attribute.
As an example, we computed the correlations for: i) the original data set (see
Table 3.6); ii) the k-anonymous data set resulting from MDAV-ID with k = 12 (see
Table 3.7); iii) the probabilistically k-anonymous data set resulting from MDAV-
SWAP with k = 12 (see Table 3.8); and the probabilistically k-anonymous data set
resulting from IR-SWAP with k = 12 (see Table 3.9). The values in these tables must
be taken with caution: they are results from a single execution of the algorithms, and
may change in another execution. Despite these words of caution, we observe that
MDAV-SWAP and IR-SWAP result in correlation values closer to the original data
set than those obtained with MDAV-SWAP. The results of IR-SWAP are closest to
the original correlations.
Table 3.6: Correlations to the confidential attributes in the original “Census” data
set
A7 A8 A9 A10 A11 A12 A13
A1 .0038 -.027 -.024 .031 .032 .039 .036
A2 .98 .14 .2 .73 .71 .72 .7
A3 .44 -.12 -.058 .56 .55 .56 .55
A4 .98 .2 .28 .73 .69 .71 .69
A5 .78 .27 .27 .9 .85 .88 .86
A6 .79 .13 .22 .59 .57 .57 .56
A7 1 .17 .23 .72 .7 .71 .69
A8 1 .45 -.17 -.19 -.17 -.17
A9 1 .072 .061 .70 .075
A10 1 .96 .98 .96
A11 1 .91 .89
A12 1 .97
A13 1
To obtain results with more statistical significance, we ran MDAV-ID, MDAV-SWAP
and IR-SWAP 100 times. In Table 3.10 we report the mean and the standard devia-
tion of the absolute value of the difference between the correlations to the confidential
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Table 3.7: Correlations to the confidential attributes in the data set obtained using
MDAV-ID with k = 12 (“Census” data set)
A7 A8 A9 A10 A11 A12 A13
A1 -.0035 -.035 -.055 .034 .035 .042 .04
A2 1 .18 .39 .8 .81 .8 .78
A3 .79 -.17 .084 .89 .9 .89 .89
A4 .99 .23 .45 .82 .8 .81 .8
A5 .86 .18 .4 .94 .92 .94 .93
A6 .95 .2 .43 .77 .76 .76 .75
A7 1 .2 .41 .8 .8 .79 .78
A8 1 .68 -.15 -.18 -.15 -.16
A9 1 .18 .14 .17 .16
A10 1 .98 1 .99
A11 1 .97 .97
A12 1 1
A13 1
attributes in the anonymized data set and the original data set. The better the data
quality of the anonymized data set, the closer the mean and standard deviation
to zero. A value close to one for the mean means that most of the dependencies
between attributes have been lost.
Table 3.10 confirms what had been observed from the previous tables based on
a single run: MDAV-SWAP offers better quality than MDAV-ID, but IR-SWAP
clearly offers the best quality among the three methods compared. For example, for
the data set tried, similar data quality is obtained using MDAV-ID with k = 11,
MDAV-SWAP with k = 25 and IR-SWAP with k = 300. Hence, probabilistic
k-anonymity turns out to be much more information-preserving than k-anonymity.
3.4.2 “EIA” data set
Empirical results for the “EIA” data set are more succinctly presented, because their
interpretation is parallel to the one of the “Census” results. Table 3.11 reports an
evaluation for the “EIA” data set analogous to the one reported in Table 3.10 for
the “Census” data set. Like before, we observe that MDAV-SWAP performs better
than MDAV-ID, but IR-SWAP is clearly the best of the three methods.
3.5 Conclusions
k-Anonymity is a broadly used privacy property that focuses on protection against
identity disclosure. In a k-anonymous data set, for each record there are at least
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Table 3.8: Correlations to the confidential attributes in the probabilistically k-
anonymous data set obtained using MDAV-SWAP with k = 12 (“Census” data
set)
A7 A8 A9 A10 A11 A12 A13
A1 -.0011 -.028 -.034 .032 .033 .036 .032
A2 .81 .089 .17 .69 .67 .69 .67
A3 .42 -.020 .091 .48 .47 .48 .43
A4 .77 .093 .18 .68 .65 .68 .67
A5 .72 .086 .16 .80 .76 .79 .77
A6 .64 .086 .14 .54 .52 .54 .52
A7 1 .12 .17 .69 .67 .66 .65
A8 1 .19 -.013 -.022 -.042 -.011
A9 1 .11 .10 .10 .13
A10 1 .76 .81 .87
A11 1 .72 .70
A12 1 .77
A13 1
k − 1 other records sharing the same values for all the quasi-identifier attributes.
Hence, enforcing k-anonymity implies variability loss and therefore, quality loss.
This is especially serious in a scenario with informed intruders who know the values
of some confidential attributes: the confidential attributes known by the informed
intruder can be viewed as additional quasi-identifiers. The more quasi-identifier
attributes, the more data quality loss is caused by k-anonymity.
To mitigate the above problem, we have introduced the notion of probabilistic k-
anonymity. Like standard k-anonymity, probabilistic k-anonymity guarantees that
the probability of correct re-identification is 1/k at most, but without explicitly
requiring that the quasi-identifier attributes take identical values within each group
of k records. We have presented two computational methods to reach probabilistic
k-anonymity, based on microaggregation and swapping. Experimental work shows
that, for a fixed re-identification probability 1/k, the new methods are much more
quality-preserving than standard k-anonymity enforcement.
The method based on individual ranking microaggregation is particularly interest-
ing. It builds on the fact that applying a permutation over the quasi-identifiers and
leaving the confidential attributes unmodified is equivalent to applying the opposite
permutation to the confidential attributes and leaving the quasi-identifiers unmod-
ified. Switching the focus to confidential attributes has several important benefits.
First, it prevents informed intruders from using confidential information to improve
the re-identification; the value of each confidential attribute must be dissociated
from all the other attributes. This becomes possible after switching the focus to
confidential attributes because the permutation only affects the attribute being pro-
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Table 3.9: Correlations to the confidential attributes in the probabilistically k-
anonymous data set obtained using IR-SWAP with k = 12 (“Census” data set)
A7 A8 A9 A10 A11 A12 A13
A1 .0041 -.017 -.018 .031 .038 .039 .038
A2 .98 .13 .20 .73 .71 .72 .70
A3 .44 -.12 -.041 .56 .55 .56 .55
A4 .98 .19 .27 .73 .68 .71 .69
A5 .78 .26 .26 .90 .85 .88 .86
A6 .79 -.12 .21 .59 .57 .57 .56
A7 1 .16 .23 .72 .69 .71 .69
A8 1 .42 -.17 -.19 -.17 -.17
A9 1 .077 .063 .075 .080
A10 1 .95 .98 .96
A11 1 .91 .89
A12 1 .97
A13 1
tected. Second, it allows using a different partition for each confidential attribute,
thereby boosting accuracy and utility. Obviously, the reduction in the diversity in
the confidential attribute increases the chances of attribute disclosure. Selecting
a non-optimal partition (as done in k-anonymity) does not seem to be the proper
approach. To increase the variability we advocate to increase k, or enforce addi-
tional criteria such as l-diversity or t-closeness. Third, some attributes are usually
more disclosive than others. The ability to generate a different partition for each
confidential attribute offers the possibility of selecting a different level of disclosure
limitation (the k parameter) for each of the confidential attributes.
While k-anonymity is, in principle, only concerned with the cloaking of individuals
within groups of k or more individuals (thus preventing re-identification), the level of
disclosure limitation for the confidential attribute derives from the variability within
the groups of indistinguishable records. The level of variability is not determined by
the parameter k selected; it may even happen that all the records in a group share
the same value for a confidential attribute. The criterion to generate the partition
in k-anonymity is based on the values of the quasi-identifier attributes, but there is
no way to determine the optimal partition for an arbitrary user: a user may be very
interested in preserving one specific attribute that may be meaningless for another
user. When using individual ranking for probabilistic k-anonymity, we advocate
for the best partition for each confidential attribute (grouping records according to
the value of the confidential attribute), even if that means that we get the least
variability (the least protection). It is obvious that the parameter k must be much
larger that in regular k-anonymity to prevent disclosing confidential information;
however, this approach has a great advantage: the value of k is related to the level
35
Chapter 3 Probabilistic k-anonymity
Table 3.10: Mean and standard deviation of the absolute value of the difference
between the correlations in the original and the anonymized data sets (“Census”
data set)
MDAV-ID MDAV-SWAP IR-SWAP
k mean st.dev. mean st.dev. mean st.dev.
5 .055 .064 .037 .045 .0021 .0041
7 .062 .071 .048 .056 .0022 .0039
9 .069 .078 .055 .064 .0028 .0049
11 .078 .085 .061 .070 .0038 .0068
25 .11 .11 .091 .093 .0061 .012
50 .14 .13 .13 .12 .010 .020
100 .17 .15 .19 .17 .020 .030
200 .29 .27 .31 .28 .044 .047
300 .38 .39 .37 .34 .087 .071
of confidentiality.
Future research will combine probabilistic k-anonymity with other properties like
l-diversity or t-closeness in view of reducing the quality loss incurred to protect
against attribute disclosure. As we deal with each confidential attribute separately,
the enforcement of additional properties (l-diversity and t-closeness) is relatively
easy to achieve.
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Table 3.11: Mean and standard deviation of the absolute value of the difference
between the correlations in the original and the anonymized data sets (“EIA” data
set)
MDAV-ID MDAV-SWAP IR-SWAP
k mean st.dev. mean st.dev. mean st.dev.
5 .018 .017 .017 .035 .00064 .00075
7 .02 .017 .024 .05 .0012 .0018
9 .034 .031 .028 .053 .0015 .0018
11 .039 .036 .029 .052 .0019 .0023
25 .085 .078 .043 .081 .0063 .0072
50 .13 .12 .053 .089 .011 .011
100 .15 .14 .058 .092 .029 .037
200 .19 .18 .09 .11 .093 .074
300 .2 .18 .12 .13 .14 .091
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4 Optimal data-independent noise
for ε-differential privacy
To maximize the utility of the results provided by ε-differential privacy, the mag-
nitude of the random noise should be as small as possible. Some criticisms have
appeared to the data utility that results from using Laplace noise addition as the
mechanism to obtain differential privacy [68, 83, 84]. The question of the optimality
of Laplace noise addition arises: is it possible to achieve ε-differential privacy with
substantially more data utility using other noise distributions?
Our goal is to determine the optimal distribution to achieve differential privacy with
data-independent random noise. We will limit our discussion to absolutely contin-
uous random noise distributions, as they provide the greatest level of generality.
Similar results can also be obtained for discrete random noise; however, this type of
noise is only applicable in very specific circumstances.
By using an optimal noise, the distortion required to achieve a certain level ε of
differential privacy is minimized. This may lead to under-protection if the disclosure
limitation offered by ε-differential privacy is measured by how much noise is added
to the data (as in traditional noise addition for disclosure control, see [52]), rather
than by the theoretical guarantee offered by differential privacy in terms of ε. In
what follows, we assume that a protection level ε is chosen such that the theoretical
guarantee provides sufficient protection.
We propose a general optimality criterion based on the concentration of the proba-
bility mass of the noise distribution around zero, and we show that any noise opti-
mal under this criterion must be optimal under any other sensible criterion. We also
show that the Laplace distribution, commonly used for noise in ε-differential privacy,
is not optimal, and we build the optimal data-independent noise distribution. We
compare the Laplace and the optimal data-independent noise distributions. For uni-
variate query functions, both introduce a similar level of distortion; for multivariate
query functions, optimal data-independent noise offers responses with substantially
better data quality.
The contents of this chapter have been accepted for publication in [87].
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4.1 Optimal data-independent noise
To improve the utility of the outputs provided by an ε-differentially private access
mechanism, the random noise must be adjusted to minimize the distortion to the
real query result. When using Laplace noise, the scale parameter is set to ∆f/ε
(see Section 2.9); this yields a noise distribution optimal within the class of Lapla-
cian noises, because a smaller scale parameter would no longer satisfy ε-differential
privacy. However, the question of the optimality of the Laplace distribution itself
within all possible noise distributions has not been addressed in the literature: can
we improve the utility of the output by using a different noise distribution? The
answer to this question is deferred until Section 4.3. In this section we tackle a more
fundamental issue: the concept of optimality for a random noise.
Deciding which among a pair of random noises, Y1 and Y2, leads to greater utility is
a question that may depend on the users’ preferences. The goal of this section is to
come up with an optimality notion that is independent from the users’ preferences:
if Y1 is better than Y2 according to our criterion, any rational user must prefer Y1 to
Y2. Later, in Section 4.4, we will determine the form of all optimal random noises
that provide ε-differential privacy to a given query function.
Let Y1 and Y2 be two random noise distributions. If Y1 can be constructed from Y2
by moving some of the probability mass towards zero (but without going beyond
zero), then Y1 must always be preferred to Y2. The reason is that the probability
mass of Y1 is more concentrated around zero, and thus the distortion introduced by
Y1 is smaller. A rational user always prefers less distortion and, therefore, prefers
Y1 to Y2.
We use the notation 〈0, α〉, where α ∈ R, to denote the interval [0, α] when α ≥ 0,
and the interval [α, 0] when α ≤ 0. If Y1 can be constructed from Y2 by moving some
of the probability mass towards zero, it must be P (Y1 ∈ 〈0, α〉) ≥ P (Y2 ∈ 〈0, α〉)
for any α ∈ R: otherwise, some of the probability mass that Y2 had in 〈0, α〉 would
have been moved outside 〈0, α〉, which is not possible. This leads to the following
definition.
Definition 6. Let Y1 and Y2 be two random noise distributions on R. We say that Y1
is smaller (or better) than Y2, denoted by Y1 ≤ Y2, if P (Y1 ∈ 〈0, α〉) ≥ P (Y2 ∈ 〈0, α〉)
for any α ∈ R. We say that Y1 is strictly smaller than Y2, denoted by Y1 < Y2, if
some of the previous inequalities are strict.
For α = (α1, . . . , αd) ∈ Rd, we use 〈0, α〉 to denote the set 〈0, α1〉 × . . . × 〈0, αd〉.
Consider a set S ⊂ Rd such that for every point x ∈ S we have 〈0, x〉 ⊂ S, and a
pair of random noises Y1 = (Y 11 , . . . , Y 1d ) and Y2 = (Y 21 , . . . , Y 2d ) such that Y1 can be
constructed from Y2 by moving some probability mass towards zero. It is obvious
that we must have P (Y1 ∈ S) ≥ P (Y2 ∈ S): if that was not the case, it would
mean that some of the probability mass that Y2 had in S has been moved outside
S, which is not possible because of the form of S. This leads to the definition for
the multivariate case.
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Definition 7. Let Y1 and Y2 be two random noise distributions on Rd. We say that
Y1 is smaller (or better) than Y2, denoted by Y1 ≤ Y2, if P (Y1 ∈ S) ≥ P (Y2 ∈ S)
for every set S ⊂ Rd such that for any x ∈ S we have 〈0, x〉 ⊂ S. We say that Y1
is strictly smaller than Y2, denoted by Y1 < Y2, if some of the previous inequalities
are strict.
Definitions 6 and 7 induce an order relationship between random noises. We use
that order relationship to define the concept of optimal random noise.
Definition 8. A random noise distribution Y1 is optimal within a class C of random
noise distributions if Y1 is minimal within C; in other words, there is no other random
Y2 ∈ C such that Y2 < Y1.
As stated in the previous definition, the concept of optimality is relative to a specific
class C of random noise distributions. In Section 4.4 we will determine the form of
all optimal symmetric random noise distributions that provide ε-differential privacy
to a specific query function f ; to do so, we will take C to be the class of all symmetric
random noise distributions that provide ε-differential privacy for f .
4.2 Characterization of differential privacy in terms of
the density function
To build the optimal data-independent random noise distribution satisfying differ-
ential privacy, we will have to analyze the properties that such a distribution must
satisfy. The first step to perform this analysis is to express the condition in the
definition of differential privacy in terms of the random noise. Assuming a data-
independent random noise Y , if we let κ = f + Y then Inequality (2.1) becomes
P (Y ∈ S − f(D)) ≤ eεP (Y ∈ S − f(D′))
As this inequality holds for all S, we can think of S as being of the form S+ f(D).
P (Y ∈ S) ≤ eεP (Y ∈ S + (f(D)− f(D′))) (4.1)
For the case of absolutely continuous random noise, the characterization in Inequal-
ity (5.3) can be expressed in terms of the density function fY of Y . To simplify the
notation, we will assume that Y takes values in R. Consider that fY is continuous
except for a finite or countable set of removable discontinuities and a finite or count-
able set of jump discontinuities. If the set of jump discontinuities is countable, we
will assume that it has no accumulation points; that is, around any jump disconti-
nuity point in R we assume we can find an interval with no other jump discontinuity
points. If fY has removable discontinuities we will modify fY to remove them. As
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we are modifying fY in at most a countable set, the modification will not affect the
distribution of Y .
Let x be a continuity point of fY such that x + d is also a continuity point, where
d = f(D) − f(D′) for some data sets D and D′ that differ in one row. Let I be
an interval of size m centered at x such that fY is continuous in I and I + d. We
know that such I exists because there are no accumulation points in the set of jump
discontinuities. We can upper- and lower-bound the integrals by multiplying the
maximum and minimum by the size of the interval:
m× infI(fY ) ≤
´
I
fY ≤ m× supI(fY )
m× infI+d(fY ) ≤
´
I+d fY ≤ m× supI+d(fY )
As fY is continuous in I, the limit of infI(fY ) and supI(fY ) as the size m of I goes to
zero is fY (x). In the same way, as fY is continuous in I + d, the limit of infI+d(fY )
and supI+d(fY ) as m tends to 0 is fY (x + d). Dividing both expressions by m and
taking limits as m goes to zero, we have
fY (x) ≤ limm→0
´
I fY
m
≤ fY (x)
fY (x+ d) ≤ limm→0
´
I+d fY
m
≤ fY (x+ d)
Hence, combining the above limits and Expression (5.3) we have
´
I fY
m
≤ eε ×
´
I+d fY
m↓ ↓
fY (x) eε × fY (x+ d)
Thus for all x ∈ R continuity point of fY , if x+ d is a continuity point we have
fY (x) ≤ eε × fY (x+ d), d = f(D)− f(D′) (4.2)
It is immediate to see that, if Inequality (4.2) holds, by integrating it over a set we
recover Inequality (5.3). Hence, Inequality (4.2) is in fact an equivalent definition
of differential privacy for the case of a.c. random noise.
4.3 Non-optimality of the Laplace noise
Since the inception of differential privacy up to now [42, 40], Laplace noise addition
has been proposed as a method to achieve ε-differential privacy for an arbitrary
function f in terms of its L1-sensitivity. Also, as we said in the introduction, this
practice has raised some criticisms.
In this section we show, for a univariate function f with values in R, that the
Laplace distribution is not optimal in the sense of Definition 8. To that end, we
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build another distribution, based on the Laplace distribution, that still fulfills the
conditions of differential privacy and has its probability mass more concentrated
towards zero, that is, it is strictly smaller than Laplace according to Definition 6.
Although the distribution we build is optimal, we leave the formal proof of this
assertion for Section 4.4.
The basic idea is to concentrate the probability mass around 0 as much as possible.
This can only be done to a certain extent, because Inequality (4.2) limits our capa-
bility to do so. For example, increasing the value of the density at a point x may
increase the minimum value that fY may take in the interval [x−∆f, x+ ∆f ].
In the construction of the distribution we will split the domain of fY into intervals
of the form [i∆f, (i + 1)∆f ] where i ∈ Z. For each interval we will redistribute
the probability mass that fX assigns to that interval. The new density function f˜Y
will take only two values (see Figure4.1): max[i∆f, (i+1)∆f ] fX at the portion of the
interval closer to zero and min[i∆f, (i+1)∆f ] fX at the portion of the interval farther
from zero. The result is an absolutely continuous distribution where the probability
mass has clearly been moved towards zero. We still have to check that it fulfills the
conditions of ε-differential privacy.
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Figure 4.1: Construction of the new distribution based on the Laplace(0,1) distri-
bution
To simplify, we will detail the argument only for intervals at the right of zero (positive
reals); the argument for intervals at the left of zero is symmetrical. The probability
mass at [i∆f, (i + 1)∆f ] is e−iε 1−e−ε2 . The maximum value of the density of the
Laplace distribution, εe−iε2∆f , occurs at the beginning of the interval and the minimum,
εe−(i+1)ε
2∆f , occurs at the end. Let us determine the sizemi of the interval portion where
the new density will be set to the maximum.
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Since the probability mass of the interval must be preserved, we have
εe−iε
2∆f mi +
εe−(i+1)ε
2∆f (∆f −mi) = e
−iε1− e−ε
2
By solving for mi in the above equality, we obtain:
mi =
∆f
ε(1− e−ε)(1− e
−ε − εe−ε)
The important fact about mi is that it does not depend on i. Also, note that the
maximum density of the current interval is equal to the minimum density of the
previous interval. This way, by joining the portion of the previous interval which
evaluates to the minimum with the portion of the current interval which evaluates to
the maximum, we obtain an interval of size (∆f−mi−1)+mi = (∆f−mi)+mi = ∆f
which evaluates to a constant density value (such joined intervals are depicted as
horizontal segments in Figure 4.1. Thus, except for the maximum of the first interval,
we have split the domain of the density function into intervals of size ∆f such
that the density function evaluates to εe−iε2∆f . This clearly satisfies the density-based
characterization of differential privacy specified by Inequality (4.2).
4.4 Optimal noise for univariate queries
Section 4.3 has shown that the Laplace noise distribution is not optimal to achieve
differential privacy. A new distribution has been built that satisfies differential
privacy and has its probability mass more concentrated towards zero. This section
will determine the optimal data-independent absolutely continuous random noise
distribution to achieve ε-differential privacy for any univariate function with finite
L1-sensitivity. Optimal noise distributions need not be symmetric; however, we
focus on the symmetric case, because it is the most usual one.
Showing that optimal absolutely continuous noise distributions are of a certain form
requires using some properties that will be stated as lemmata. Some of the proofs
place additional regularity requirements on the noise distribution, beyond being ab-
solutely continuous. These additional requirements are hardly a limitation as they
are satisfied by any practical distribution, and can be overlooked if the reader is
not interested in the proofs. In particular, we restrict the discussion to absolutely
continuous random noises, Y , whose density function, fY , is continuous except for
a finite or countable set of jump or removable discontinuities, with the set of jump
discontinuities having no accumulation points. To avoid being unnecessarily cum-
bersome, we will not mention this again in the sequel.
It was shown in Section 4.2 that for a.c. noise distributions the definition of ε-
differential privacy can be stated in terms of the density function. Now we show
that if the inequality in terms of the probability function is satisfied at the extreme,
it also must be the case for the inequality in terms of density functions.
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Lemma 1. Let Y be an a.c. noise random variable that provides ε-differential
privacy to a function f with a given L1-sensitivity. Consider an interval I = [i0, i1] ⊂
R. Then P (Y ∈ I+∆f) = e−εP (Y ∈ I) if and only if fY (x+∆f) = e−εfY (x), ∀x ∈
I, except at those points x ∈ I such that fY is not continuous at x or at x +
∆f . Similarly, P (Y ∈ I − ∆f) = e−εP (Y ∈ I) if and only if fY (x − ∆f) =
e−εfY (x), ∀x ∈ I, except at those points x ∈ I such that fY is not continuous at x
or at x−∆f .
Proof. We will prove the first claim; the second one is completely symmetric. The
proof of (⇐=) is straightforward by computing the probability as the integral of
the density function. We will focus on the (=⇒) implication. By the ε-differential
privacy condition we know that fY (x+∆f) ≥ e−εfY (x). Assuming that the implica-
tion does not hold, a continuity point a ∈ I exists such that fY (a+∆f) > e−εfY (a).
Because of the constraints on the set of discontinuity points, an interval [a0, a1] ⊆ I
exists such that fY (x + ∆f) > e−εfY (x)∀x ∈ [a0, a1]. Now we can decompose the
probability as follows
P (Y ∈ I) =
ˆ a0
i0
fY (x)dx+
ˆ a1
a0
fY (x)dx+
ˆ i1
a1
fY (x)dx
P (Y ∈ I + ∆f) =
ˆ a0
i0
fY (x+ ∆f)dx+
ˆ a1
a0
fY (x+ ∆f)dx+
ˆ i1
a1
fY (x+ ∆f)dx
Since fY (a + ∆f) ≥ e−εfY (a) and, for x ∈ [a0, a1], fY (a + ∆f) > e−εfY (a), we
have P (Y ∈ I + ∆f) > e−εP (Y ∈ I) , which is a contradiction that comes from the
assumption that a continuity point a ∈ I exists such that fY (a+∆f) > e−εfY (a).
We are trying to find the optimal a.c. noise distribution that provides ε-differential
privacy. The goal is to concentrate as much probability mass around the mean as
possible; ε-differential privacy limits our capability to do so. We will see how the
probability mass must be distributed to achieve the optimal random noise.
Lemma 2. Let Y be a symmetric a.c. noise random variable with zero mean that
satisfies ε-differential privacy for a function f . If Y is optimal at providing ε-
differential privacy, then for all i ∈ Y
P (Y ∈ [(i+ 1)∆f, (i+ 2)∆f ]) = e−εP (Y ∈ [i∆f, (i+ 1)∆f ])
P (Y ∈ [−(i+ 2)∆f, −(i+ 1)∆f ]) = e−εP (Y ∈ [−(i+ 1)∆f, −i∆f ])
The second claim is completely symmetric to the first one; a symmetric distribution
that satisfies the first claim will also satisfy the second one. We will show that, if
the claims do not hold, we can build another distribution that fulfills ε-differential
privacy and has its probability mass more concentrated towards zero.
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Proof. We will assume that the claim for Y does not hold and we will build another
distribution Y˜ that provides ε-differential privacy and has Y˜ ≤ Y . If the claim held,
by Lemma 1, it would be fY (x+ ∆f) = e−εfY (x), ∀x ∈ R where x and x+ ∆f are
continuity points. Let i0 ≥ 0 be the index of the first interval [i∆f, (i+ 1) ∆f ] such
that fY (x + ∆f) = e−εfY (x) does not hold for all x in the interval. Let f˜i0 be the
function defined as follows
f˜i0 (x) =

e−εfY (x+ ∆f) x ∈ [− (i0 + 1) ∆f,−∆f ]
fY (x) x ∈ [−∆f, +∆f ]
e−εfY (x−∆f) x ∈ [∆f, (i0 + 1) ∆f ]
Since f˜i0 has been defined in such a way that the decrease of the density between
points at distance ∆f , as we move away from zero, is maximum, it is clear that we
will have fY > f˜i0 . As both fY and f˜i0 are symmetric, we will only consider the points
on the right of zero; the same transformations must be applied to the points on the
left. For each x ∈ [∆f, (i0 + 1) ∆f ] we will consider ex = fY (x)− f˜i0 (x), the excess
density of fY over f˜i0 . We will build another function fi0 by distributing ex among
the points {x+ i∆f : 0 ≤ i ≤ i0} in such a way that the new function concentrates
as much as possible around the mean, and ε-differential privacy is satisfied. The
density added to f˜i0 at x+ i∆f will be αxe−iε where αx is determined by imposing∑
i=0,...,i0 αxe
−iε = ex. Note that fi0 still satisfies that images of points at distance ∆f
exponentially decrease as we move away from zero, that is fi0(x+ ∆f) = e−εfi0(x).
It is important to note that the new function fi0 satisfies ε-differential privacy in
the range [−i0∆f, i0∆f ]. We will show that ε-differential privacy is satisfied in the
interval [−∆f,∆f ]; then by using that the images by fi0 of points at distance ∆f
exponentially decrease as we move away from zero, ε-differential privacy will be
satisfied in [−i0∆f, i0∆f ]. In fact we will only check that ε-differential privacy is
satisfied in [0,∆f ]; if it is so, by the symmetry of fi0 , differential privacy will be
satisfied in the whole interval [−∆f,∆f ].
We must check that fi0(x+δ) ≤ eε×fi0(x) for all x ∈ [0,∆f ] and all δ ∈ [−∆f,∆f ].
Let us assume that there exist x ∈ [0,∆f ] and δ ∈ [−∆f,∆f ] such that the condition
is not satisfied, that is, fi0 (x+ δ) > eεfi0 (x). If x + δ ∈ [∆f, 2∆f ], by multiplying
by e−(i0−1)ε we have that x + (i0 − 1)∆f , the corresponding point in the interval
[(i0 − 1) ∆f, i0∆f ], does not fulfill the ε-differential privacy condition, but this is
not possible as we had fY (x+ i0∆f) ≤ eεfY (x+ (i0 − 1)∆f) and when building f0
we have increased the value at x+ (i0− 1)∆f and decreased the value at x+ i0∆f .
If x + δ ∈ [0,∆f ], by multiplying by e−i0ε we have that the corresponding point
in the interval [i0∆f, (i0 + 1) ∆f ] does not satisfy the differential privacy condition.
This is impossible as we know that f˜i0 and fY do satisfy it and that fi0 lies between
them; therefore fi0 must also satisfy the differential privacy condition. In the case
x+δ ∈ [−∆f, 0], the justification is different. The point−x−δ belongs to the interval
[0,∆f ] and, by the symmetry of fi0 , we have fi0(−x − δ) = fi0(x + δ); therefore,
as we have already checked that the condition is satisfied when x + d ∈ [0, ∆f ], it
must also be satisfied when x+ d ∈ [−∆f, 0].
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Now we iterate this process and define functions fi, i ∈ N. To be able to do this, it
is important to note that, when defining fi, we are reducing the density amount in
the interval [i∆f, (i+ 1) ∆f ] and that f˜i+1 is defined in [(i+ 1) ∆f, (i+ 2) ∆f ] by
reducing the value in the previous interval as much as possible while still satisfying
ε-differential privacy. This means that fY > f˜i+1 at [(i+ 1) ∆f, (i+ 2) ∆f ] and thus
we can compute the excess and distribute it among the corresponding points in the
previous intervals.
The resulting f˜∞ satisfies the ε-differential privacy condition. By construction it
also satisfies fY (x + ∆f) = e−εfY (x)∀x ∈ R which by integration over the desired
intervals leads to the claim of the lemma. Moreover, as all the probability mass
translation has been done towards zero, we have Y˜ ≤ Y .
Corollary 1. Let Y be a symmetric a.c. noise random variable with zero mean
that provides ε-differential privacy to a function f . If Y is optimal at providing
ε-differential privacy then
fY (x+ ∆f) = e−εfY (x) ∀x ≥ 0
fY (x−∆f) = e−εfY (x) ∀x ≤ 0
when the points x and x + ∆f in the first equality above and x and x −∆f in the
second equality are continuity points of fY .
Proof. The proof follows from Lemmata 1 and 2.
Now we will show that for any symmetric a.c. noise distribution that provides ε-
differential privacy for a function f we can find another noise distribution, similar to
the one used in the proof that the Laplace distribution is not optimal, that performs
at least as well according to Definition 6.
Theorem 1. Let Y be an a.c. noise random variable with zero mean that provides ε-
differential privacy to a query function f . Then there exists a noise random variable
Y˜ with density function f
Y˜
of the form
f
Y˜
(x) =

M0e
−iε x ∈ [−d− (i+ 1) ∆f,−d− i∆f ] , i ∈ N
M0 x ∈ [−d, 0]
M0 x ∈ [0, d]
M0e
−iε x ∈ [d+ i∆f, d+ (i+ 1) ∆f ] , i ∈ N
that provides ε-differential privacy to f and satisfies Y˜ ≤ Y as per Definition 6.
Proof. We will assume that Y is optimal and that its density function is not of the
form of f
Y˜
for any M0 and d. The goal is to build another distribution Y˜ from Y
such that the density f
Y˜
(x) is as stated above and satisfies Y˜ ≤ Y . Note that, from
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the definition of f
Y˜
(x), the condition of ε-differential privacy immediately holds for
f .
Since Y fulfills the conditions of Corollary 1, we have
fY (x+ ∆f) = e−εfY (x) ∀x ≥ 0
fY (x−∆f) = e−εfY (x) ∀x ≤ 0
Now we apply the same procedure we used in Section 4.3 for the Laplace noise. First
we split the domain of fY into intervals of the form [i∆f, (i + 1)∆f ] where i ∈ Z.
At a given interval, we redistribute the probability mass that fY assigns to that
interval. The new density function f
Y˜
(x) takes only two values: max[i∆f,(i+1)∆f ] fY
at the portion of the interval closer to zero and min[i∆f,(i+1)∆f ] fY at the portion of
the interval farther from zero. The result is an absolutely continuous distribution
Y˜ with Y˜ ≤ Y .
To make sure that the distribution Y˜ has the specified form, and thus satisfies ε-
differential privacy, it remains to check that the length of the interval where we
assign maximum value is constant across intervals.
The probability mass at [i∆f, (i+ 1)∆f ] is e−iε 1−e−ε2 . It is clear from fY (x+ ∆f) =
e−εfY (x), ∀x ≥ 0, that the maximum and the minimum of each interval, Mi and mi
respectively, satisfyMi = e−iεM0 and mi = e−iεmo. Let di be the size of the interval
where the new density evaluates to the maximum. We have
e−iεM0 × di + e−iεmo × (∆f − di) = e−iε1− e
−ε
2
This formula leads to di = 1−e
−ε−2m0∆f
2(M0−m0) which does not depend on i, as we wanted
to see.
Theorem 1 states that, for any random noise that provides ε-differential privacy
to f , we can find another random noise distribution, of the specified form, that is
smaller. However, we still have to prove that such a distribution is optimal.
Theorem 2. Let Y be a random noise distribution with a density function fY of the
form specified in Theorem 1. Then Y is optimal at providing ε-differential privacy.
Proof. To prove that Y is optimal, we have to show that if we move some probability
mass of Y towards zero then ε-differential privacy no longer holds. We only show it
for the probability mass to the right of zero; a symmetric argument can be used for
the probability mass to the left of zero.
First of all, we must show that it is not possible to move any probability mass from
an interval Ii = [i∆f, (i+ 1)∆f ] to an interval Ij = [j∆f, (j+ 1)∆f ] with 0 ≤ j < i.
This is straightforward: as the density fY specified in Theorem 1 has the maximum
decrease rate between consecutive intervals compatible with the constraints of ε-
differential privacy, moving probability mass from Ii to Ij would break ε-differential
privacy.
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To conclude the proof, we need to check that it is not possible to redistribute the
probability mass within an interval Ii so that it gets closer to zero. Within the
interval Ii, the density function fY takes values M0 exp(−iε) at I li (the left portion
of the interval) and M0 exp(−(i+ 1)ε) at Iri (the right portion of the interval). We
cannot move any probability mass from Iri towards zero, because the density would
go below M0 exp(−(i + 1)ε) and, thus, ε-differential privacy would not hold. We
cannot move any probability mass from I li towards zero, because the density would
go above M0 exp(−iε) and, thus, ε-differential privacy would not hold.
Although the theorems above are stated in terms of a fixed query function f , the
optimal distribution depends only on ∆f ; hence, all query functions with the same
L1-sensitivity share the same optimal noise distribution.
The values of M0 and d can be freely chosen according to the user’s preferences.
In fact the two parameters M0 and d of the optimal family of distributions can be
reduced to one because
d = 1− e
−ε − 2M0e−ε∆f
2(1− e−ε)M0
For instance, let us assume that the user prefers to minimize the noise variance. We
compute the variance of candidate optimal distributions in terms of the parameters
d and M0, and find the values that yield the minimum:
V (Z) = 2M0
ˆ d
0
x2dx+ 2M0e−ε
∑
i=0...∞
e−iε
ˆ d+(i+1)∆f
d+i∆f
x2dx
The variance can be computed by performing the integrals and calculating the sum of
the power series. Figure 4.2 shows the variance obtained in terms of the parameter
d for the case of ε = 1 and ∆f = 1. In this case, the minimum is reached at
d = 0.416737 and the variance is 1.9181. This is below 2, the variance of the
Laplace noise with scale parameter 1.
Table 4.1 shows a comparison of the variance achieved by the Laplace distribution
and the optimal a.c. random noise with minimum variance, for different values of
ε when ∆f = 1. The table shows that the Laplace variance is only slightly greater
than the minimum variance; we may say that, for a single univariate query, although
the Laplace distribution is not optimal, it is near-optimal. Therefore, if the utility of
the differentially private answer to a single univariate query obtained using Laplace
noise is poor, not much improvement can be expected from using a data-independent
variance-optimal random noise distribution.
Assume now that the user wants the noise distribution that minimizes the size of
the symmetric confidence interval around the differentially private query answer that
contains the real query value at 95% confidence level. In this case, we must solve a
minimization problem, as before, but now the objective function is the size of the
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Figure 4.2: Variance for ε = 1 and ∆f = 1
Table 4.1: Variance comparison between Laplace random noise and a.c. optimal
random noise with minimum variance, for ∆f = 1
ε = 0.1 ε = 0, 5 ε = 1
Laplace distribution 200.00 8.00 2.00
Optimal a.c. noise with min. var. 199.92 7.92 1.92
confidence interval in terms of the parameters d and M0. Figure 4.3 shows the size
of the confidence interval, when ∆f = 1 and ε = 1, in terms of parameter d. The
minimal length for this case is achieved for d = 0.993, approximately; in general,
however, the actual value of d where the minimum is reached depends on ∆f and ε.
Table 4.2 shows a comparison between the optimal lengths of the confidence intervals
at 95% confidence level for several values of ε when ∆f = 1. As expected, the results
obtained from the Laplace distribution are worse but close to those obtained using
the optimal distribution.
Table 4.2: Comparison of the size of the symmetric 95% confidence interval be-
tween Laplace random noise and a.c. optimal random noise with minimum con-
fidence interval, for ∆f = 1
ε = 0.1 ε = 0, 5 ε = 1
Laplace distribution 59.91 11.98 5.99
Optimal a.c. noise with min. conf. int. 59.91 11.97 5.98
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Figure 4.3: Size of the 95% symmetric confidence interval centered at zero
4.5 Optimal noise for multivariate queries
In Section 4.4 we worked out the optimal a.c. random noise for a query with values
in R. We deal here with multiple queries or with a single query whose response is
a value in Rd: both cases are equivalent, because d queries with answers in R can
be viewed as a single query with answer in Rd. Determining the form of all optimal
multivariate a.c. random noises is out of scope; we restrict to a class of noise
distributions whose density consists of several steps (as was the case for optimal
univariate distributions) and show that they are optimal. The optimal distributions
constructed will be shown to be substantially better than Laplace. Hence, while
Laplace is near-optimal in the univariate case, in general it is far from optimal for
multivariate or multiple queries.
We will be less formal here and, to simplify even more, examples will be presented
for the case of two queries/two dimensions, that is, d = 2; generalization to arbitrary
d is easy.
For the case of a.c. random noise for a single query, it was shown in Section 4.2
that the ε-differential privacy condition can be expressed in terms of the density
function. The result is easily generalizable to greater dimensions, and therefore here
we can also express the condition in terms of the density function.
Proposition 1. Let Y = (Y1, . . . , Yd) be an absolutely continuous random noise that
provides ε-differential privacy to a query f : D → Rd. Then ε-differential privacy
can be characterized in terms of the density function as:
fY (x) ≤ eε × fY (x+ d), d = f(D)− f(D′)
for all x and x+ d continuity points of fY , where D and D′ differ in one row.
Similarly to the case of a single univariate query, we will construct a noise density
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with several steps, which reaches its maximum all over a set that contains zero and
decreases by a factor e−ε as we move away from it.
The main difference with other, non-optimal distributions, such as multivariate
Laplace noise, is that the various components (dimensions) of the random noise
do not need to be independent. This allows more freedom in the definition of the
distribution, which we will employ to achieve a finer calibration to the query func-
tion. This is illustrated below in an example, but prior to it we define a set that
will be repeatedly used in the remainder of this section.
Definition 9. Let f : D → Rd be a query function. The set of differences between
neighbor data sets is defined as
Sf =
⋃
D,D′
〈0, f(D)− f(D′)〉
where D and D′ data sets that differ in at most one row.
The set Sf contains all possible variations in f when one record changes. The
boundary of Sf can be seen as a generalization of the L1-sensitivity used in the
univariate case. Instead of summarizing the variability of f with a single figure, as
L1-sensitivity does, Sf keeps track of the maximum variability in each direction.
Example 4. Consider a query function f = (f1, f2) such that Sf = [−1, 1]× [−1, 1].
From Definition 4, the L1-sensitivity of f is
∆f = sup
D,D′
‖f(D)−f(D′)‖1 = sup
D,D′
(|f1(D)−f1(D′)|+ |f2(D)−f2(D′)|) = 1+1 = 2
As stated in Proposition 1, the density of the random noise, fY , in each of the
points of the set [−1, 1] × [−1, 1] must be in the range [e−εfY (0), eεfY (0)]. When
using independent Laplace-distributed components with zero mean and ∆f/ε scale
parameter, the top value for the density is reached at zero, and it decreases expo-
nentially as we move away from it. Points with density e−εfY (0) are those that have
L1-norm equal to ∆f . Figure 4.4 depicts Sf as a gray shaded box. If all points in Sf
are protected with independent Laplace-distributed random noise components, all
points within [−1, 1]× [−1, 1] must have density within the range [e−εfY (0), fY (0)].
As it can be appreciated in Figure 4.4, to satisfy ε-differential privacy at points
(1, 1), (1,−1), (−1,−1) and (−1, 1) with independent Laplace noise addition for
each dimension, we are overprotecting those points with L1-norm less than or equal
to ∆f = 2 that do not belong to [−1, 1] × [−1, 1]; the density at these points is
greater or equal to e−εfY (0), while this is not a requirement of ε-differential privacy
(which only requires a density greater or equal to e−εfY (0) for the points in Sf ).
The ratio between the size of the overprotected region and the size of Sf may become
still larger if the variability of one of the components is greater than the variability
of the other. Figure 4.5 illustrates the case of Sf being the set [−1, 1]× [−10, 10].
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Figure 4.4: Achieving ε-differential privacy by Laplace noise addition for Sf =
[−1, 1]× [−1, 1]. The shaded box represents the possible differences in the query
result between data sets that differ in one record. Differential privacy requires the
density of the noise in the shaded box to be within a factor in [exp(−ε), exp(ε)]
of the density at zero. The square that encloses the shaded box represents the
points that satisfy the previous condition when using Laplace noise.
In the construction of the piecewise constant noise density, we will fix a set S0 ⊂ Sf
with 〈0, x〉 ⊂ S0 for all x ∈ S0, where the maximum density will be reached. From
this S0, we will define Si as the set that contains the points that are reachable from
Si−1 in one step, that is, by adding a value from Sf :
Si = {x ∈ Rd|x = z + δ, z ∈ Si−1, δ ∈ Sf} \ ∪i−1j=0Sj
The density value over the points in Si will be e−ε times the density value over the
points in Si−1. Therefore, for x in Si it will be
fY (x) = Me−iε
The value M must be calibrated so that the total probability equals 1. Such cali-
bration is possible because the density function decreases exponentially as i grows.
The following theorem shows that the constructed distribution is optimal at provid-
ing ε-differential privacy to the function f .
Theorem 3. Let f = (f1, . . . , fd) be a query function with values in Rd. Let Y =
(Y1, . . . , Yd) be an a.c. random noise with density
fY (x) =
∑
i≥0
M exp(−iε)ISi(x)
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Figure 4.5: Achieving ε-differential privacy by Laplace noise addition for Sf =
[−1, 1]× [−10, 10] The shaded box represents the possible differences in the query
result between data sets that differ in one record. Differential privacy requires the
density of the noise in the shaded box to be within a factor in [exp(−ε), exp(ε)]
of the density at zero. The square that encloses the shaded box represents the
points that satisfy the previous condition when using Laplace noise.
where ISi(x) is the indicator function for set Si and M has been calibrated to adjust
the total probability mass to one. If the following conditions hold, then Y is optimal
at providing ε-differential privacy to f:
• S0 ⊂ Sf
• 〈0, x〉 ⊂ S0 for all x ∈ S0
• Si+1 = (Si + Sf ) \ ∪i−1j=0Sj for all i ≥ 0
Proof. First of all we check that Y satisfies the ε-differential privacy condition as
stated in Proposition 1. Consider x ∈ Rd and δ ∈ Sf . The sets Si form a cover of
Rd; therefore we have x ∈ Si for some i ∈ N. For x+ δ we have one of the following
possibilities: x + δ ∈ Si−1, x + δ ∈ Si, or x + δ ∈ Si+1. The value of the density
function will, respectively, be Me−(i−1)ε, Me−iε, or Me−(i+1)ε; in all three cases, the
ε-differential privacy condition is satisfied.
To show that Y is optimal at providing ε-differential privacy to f we have to check
that if we move some probability mass towards zero, the resulting random noise
does not provide ε-differential privacy to f . We partition Rd and check, for each set
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in the partition, that it is not possible to move any probability mass towards zero
and still satisfy ε-differential privacy. The partition is {Sif , i ≥ 1} where S1f = Sf
and Si+1f = (Sif + Sf ) \ ∪ij=1Sjf .
We start by checking that it is not possible to move any probability mass contained
in S1f towards zero and still satisfy ε-differential privacy. The density fY in S1f can
be expressed as
fY (x) = M × IS0(x) +M exp(−ε)× IS1f\S0(x)
Note that fY already has the maximum change in the density that ε-differential
privacy allows: exp(ε). In other words, if we increase the density above M or
decrease it below M × exp(−ε), ε-differential privacy will not hold. Let U ⊂ S1f be
the set that will have its probability mass reduced. It must be U ⊂ S0; otherwise
some points would have their density reduced below M × exp(−ε), which is not
possible. Now, as we have 〈0, x〉 ⊂ S0 for all x ∈ S0 (i.e for any point in S0 the
points closer to zero are already in S0), if we move probability mass from U towards
zero, this probability mass must go to a set of points U ′ contained in S0. This
way the density of points in U ′ would be greater than M , which would also break
ε-differential privacy.
To conclude the proof we have to check that it is not possible to move any probability
mass belonging to a set Si+1f with i ≥ 1 towards zero and still satisfy ε-differential
privacy. Note that the density function fY decreases as fast as possible as we move
away from S0: according to proposition Proposition 1 the density at a point y reach-
able from a point x by adding a value from Sf must satisfy fY (y) ≥ exp(−ε)fY (x).
We have set the density fY at Si+1 to be exp(−ε) times the density at Si; that is,
the minimum value that satisfies ε-differential privacy.
To move some probability mass belonging to Si+1f towards zero we must select a set
U ⊂ Si+1f and reduce its probability mass. In other words, the density function in
the points in U is to be reduced. But this is not possible, if we want to preserve
ε-differential privacy.
Example 5. Let f be a function with Sf = [−1, 1] × [−10, 10], and take ε =
1. Hence, the sensitivity of f is ∆f = 1 + 10 = 11 and ε-differential privacy
with two independent Laplace-distributed random noise components requires these
components to have zero mean and 11/ε scale parameter. Our proposal to achieve
ε-differential privacy is to use the piecewise constant density construction by setting
S0 = [−0.1, 0.1]×[−1, 1]. Figure 4.6 shows the density function of both distributions.
Note that with the Laplace distribution the noise densities for both components of
f decrease at the same rate, even if the second component of f has ten times the
sensitivity of the first one.
It is easily appreciated in the figure that the piecewise constant distribution has
much more probability concentrated around zero, which agrees with our optimality
definition in Section 4.1. To compare both distributions, we compute the variance
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Figure 4.6: Density functions of the Laplace and piecewise constant noise distribu-
tions required to achieve 1-differential privacy for a bivariate function f = (f1, f2)
with ∆f1 = 1 and ∆f2 = 10
of the components, and the minimal size of a confidence region at some confidence
levels.
For Laplace-distributed random noise (Y1, Y2), the computations are easy. Since we
know that Y1 and Y2 follow a Laplace distribution, their variance is twice the square
of the scale factor
V ar(Y1) = 242
V ar(Y2) = 242
With the Laplace-distributed random noise (Y1, Y2) points with equal L1-norm are
assigned the same noise density. Therefore the confidence region with minimal size,
for a given confidence level is of the form {x| ‖x‖ ≤ α}. Table 4.3 shows the size of
the confidence region for several confidence levels.
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Table 4.3: Minimal size of the confidence region for two-dimensional Laplace-
distributed random noise with scale parameter 11
Confidence level α Size
0.99 73.02 10663
0.95 52.18 5445
0.90 42.79 3662
Computing the variance of the components of the piecewise constant distribution
will be done in terms of the sets Sf and S0. If we let Sf = [−s1, s1]× [−s2, s2] and
S0 = [−z1, z1]× [−z2, z2] then the density of the components Y1 and Y2 is
fY1(x) = 2Me−i1ε × (z2 + s2i1 + s2/(eε − 1))
fY2(x) = 2Me−i2ε × (z1 + s1i2 + s1/(eε − 1))
where i1 = b(|x| − z1)/s1 + 1c is the index of the first set Si such that (x, 0) belongs
to it, i2 = b(|x| − z2)/s2 + 1c is the index of the first set Si such that (0, x) belongs
to it, and M is a constant adjusted so that the random distribution (Y1, Y2) has
probability mass one. Figure 4.7 compares the first and second components of the
Laplace and the piecewise constant random noise. Note that the piecewise constant
distribution seems to slightly underperform Laplace for the second component, but
it clearly outperforms Laplace for the first component.
Since the mean of the components is zero, their variance can be computed by inte-
grating
´
R x
2fYi(x)dx, which results in:
V ar(Y1) = 4.0338
V ar(Y2) = 403.38
Compared to the variances obtained for the Laplace-distributed random noise, we
observe that the variance for Y2 when using the piecewise constant distribution
is about twice as big as when using Laplace distribution. On the other side, the
variance of Y1 is much smaller when using the piecewise constant distribution. These
results are consistent with the previous observation about Figure 4.7.
We compute now confidence regions for the piecewise constant distribution. To
obtain a confidence region with minimal size, we make sure to include all the points
in Si before including any point in Si+1. We will consider confidence regions of the
form [−z1 − βs1, z1 + βs1] × [−z2 − βs2, z2 + βs2]. Table 4.4 shows the confidence
regions obtained. By comparing with Table 4.3, it can be observed in the table that
the minimal size for a confidence level is much smaller when using the piecewise
constant distribution.
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Figure 4.7: Comparison of the Laplace and the piecewise constant random noise
distributions required to achieve 1-differential privacy for a bivariate function
f = (f1, f2) with ∆f1 = 1 and ∆f2 = 10. Top, comparison for the first component;
bottom, comparison for the second component.
Note that in Example 4 we considered Sf to be the product of two intervals. This
case models the situation where the query function components are independent, in
the sense that we can achieve any possible combination of values for the difference
of the query function. That is, Sf = [−1, 1] × [−1, 1] means that, for any [δ1, δ2] ∈
[−1, 1]× [−1, 1], we can find two data sets D and D′ differing in one row such that
f1(D) − f1(D′) = δ1 and f2(D) − f1(D′) = δ2. Taking Sf to be the product of
intervals is the natural option in the case of an interactive mechanism [42], where
we get to know each of the components of the query function (i.e. each successive
query if we view the multivariate query as a group of queries) at different times.
In an interactive mechanism it is not possible to construct the distribution that
best matches the multiquery function f , because at the time of the first query we
only know f1. Clearly, it is possible to achieve a better noise calibration for a non-
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Table 4.4: Minimal size of the confidence region for the piecewise constant noise
distribution needed for a bivariate function f = (f1, f2) with ∆f1 = 1 and ∆f2 =
10
Confidence level β Size
0.99 6.99 1790.2
0.95 4.79 916.6
0.90 3.90 611.2
interactive query than for an interactive one, but using independent Laplace noise
addition for each component fails to exploit non-interactivity.
4.6 Conclusions
Our goal in this chapter was to analyze the optimality of data-independent random
noise distributions to achieve ε-differential privacy. The first step was to define the
concept of optimal distribution as a distribution that concentrates the probability
around zero as much as possible while ensuring differential privacy. This criterion led
to a family of optimal distributions, which can be refined by using additional criteria.
In the examples, we have computed optimal distributions using as additional criteria
the minimization of the response variance or the minimization of the size of the
confidence interval around the response.
For a single univariate query, the optimal absolutely continuous noise distributions
to achieve ε-differential privacy were built; as a result, we obtained a family of piece-
wise constant density functions. The comparison with the Laplace noise distribution
showed that Laplace performs only slightly worse than the optimal absolutely con-
tinuous distributions. Comparison figures were provided for the variance and the
size of the confidence interval.
For a multivariate query or multiple queries, a piecewise constant construction simi-
lar to that of a single query was presented. Comparisons in terms of variance and of
size of the minimal confidence interval showed that, for multivariate and/or multiple
queries, the Laplace distribution is far from being optimal. Given the popularity of
the Laplace distribution, this is a very relevant result. We also observed that the
proposed mechanism provides better responses for non-interactive queries, as it is
able to exploit the global knowledge on the query function. This is not possible for
mechanisms that assume the components of the query function to be independent,
as it is the case for Laplace noise addition.
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5 Sensitivity-independent differential
privacy via knowledge refinement
Differential privacy states that the probability for a query response to belong to
any subset of the query domain must be similar regardless of presence or absence
of any specific individual in the data set (dee Definition 3). A usual approach to
satisfy such condition is noise addition: first, the real value of the query response
is computed and, then, a random noise is added to mask it. A Laplace distribution
with zero mean and a scale parameter that depends on the variability of the query
function is commonly used for noise addition.
Our proposal is not based on masking the true value of the response by adding
some noise, but on modifying the prior knowledge that the database user has on the
response. When a query is submitted to the database, the user submits at the same
time her knowledge/beliefs about the response. We think of this prior knowledge as
the probability distribution that the user expects for the response.
Our mechanism is shown to have several advantages over noise addition: it does
not require complex computations, and thus it can be easily automated; it lets the
user exploit her prior knowledge about the response to achieve better data quality;
and it is independent of the sensitivity of the query function (although this can be a
disadvantage if the sensitivity is small). Furthermore, we give a general algorithm for
knowledge refinement and we show some compounding properties of our mechanism
for the case of multiple queries; also, we build an interactive mechanism on top of
knowledge refinement and we show that it is safe against adaptive attacks. Finally,
we give a quality assessment for the responses to individual queries.
The contents of this chapter have been published in [88, 90].
5.1 Refining prior knowledge
Our proposal to attain ε-differential privacy is not based on masking the true value
of the response by adding some noise, but on modifying the prior knowledge of
the database user on the response. When a query is submitted to the database,
the user submits at the same time her knowledge/beliefs about the response. We
think of this prior knowledge as the probability distribution that the user expects
for the response. For example, in case the user has absolutely no idea about the
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possible result for a query f , the probability distribution to be used is the uniform
distribution over the range of f (assuming that this range is bounded). The access
mechanism modifies this prior knowledge to fit the real value of the response as
much as possible given the constraints imposed by differential privacy.
Definition 10. Given a query function f , the prior knowledge about the response
f(D) is the probability distribution Pf , defined over Range(f), that the user expects
for the response to f .
The more concentrated the probability mass of Pf around the real value of the
response to f , the more accurate is the user’s prior knowledge. In general, as the
user knows the query f and the set of possible databases D, one may expect her to
have some prior knowledge about the response f(D). The better the knowledge the
user has on the actual database D, the more accurate is the prior knowledge the
user can provide to the response mechanism. If the user’s prior knowledge is wrong,
the accuracy of the response may suffer. However, whatever the prior knowledge,
the refinement procedure guarantees that the output is more accurate than the prior
knowledge.
Some users may be reluctant to provide detailed prior knowledge, because they
regard doing so as giving information about themselves to the database. We should
usually think of the prior knowledge as the information about the response that
is publicly available. Providing the database with such a prior knowledge reveals
nothing about the database user. If the database user has information that is not
publicly available, she must decide whether to use it as prior knowledge or not; the
more accurate the prior knowledge, the more accurate the response will be. We
will see in Section 5.5 that, even when little prior knowledge is assumed, knowledge
refinement may be superior, in terms of data quality, to noise addition approaches.
Therefore, it may make sense to use knowledge refinement even if the database user
is not willing to provide all her actual prior knowledge.
If the query function f has multiple components (dimension n > 1), the joint prob-
ability distribution must be provided. If the components of f are independent,
specifying the marginal distribution for each component is enough to compute the
joint distribution. This will also be the case if the components are not independent
but the user has no knowledge about the relationship among them.
The access mechanism is run by the database holder as follows:
• Receive the query f and the prior knowledge Pf from the database user.
• Compute the actual value of the query response, f(D).
• Modify Pf to adjust it to f(D) as much as possible, given the constraints
imposed by differential privacy.
• Randomly sample the distribution resulting from the previous step, and return
the sampled value as the response to f evaluated at D.
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Even though knowledge refinement works by adjusting the prior knowledge, the out-
put is not the adjusted distribution but a sample from it. This is the usual approach
in differential privacy; only a sample from the output distribution is returned. Re-
turning the output distribution itself would leak too much information; in some
cases, it could be used to determine the exact value of the query response.
Note that the user cannot pretend to have more knowledge than she actually has:
sending a guess as Pf will most likely be wrong and worsen the response quality.
Also, we show in Section 5.4 that using several different (fake) prior knowledge
distributions to mount adaptive attacks does not succeed in breaking ε-differential
privacy.
The critical step is the adjustment of the prior knowledge to the real query response.
To perform this adjustment, we distinguish two types of queries: statistical queries
and individual queries. We call statistical queries those whose outcome depends
on multiple individuals, while individual queries are those that depend on a single
individual. It will be shown below that a finer adjustment of the prior knowledge
is feasible for individual queries. We start by focusing on statistical queries, but,
before formally specifying the response mechanism, we give an example to illustrate
what we intend to do.
Example 6. Assume a query function f that is known to return a value within the
interval [0, 1]. Assume also that the database user has no further knowledge about
the query response, i.e. her prior knowledge is the uniform distribution over [0, 1].
To refine the prior knowledge, we modify its density by applying two multiplicative
factors: αu ≥ 1 to the points near f(D), and αd ≤ 1 to the points farther from
f(D). In this way, the probability of obtaining as the response a value near the
actual response f(D) is increased with respect to the prior knowledge, while the
probability of obtaining a distant value is decreased. Figure 5.1 shows the probability
distribution resulting from applying the procedure described above for a pair of
neighbor data sets D and D′.
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Figure 5.1: Distributions for the response to f(D) (left) and to f(D′) (right)
To obtain ε-differential privacy, the density at a given point for the response to
f(D) must be a factor within the interval [e−ε, eε] of the density at the same point
63
Chapter 5 Sensitivity-independent differential privacy via knowledge refinement
for the response to f(D′). Check, for example, the point 0.6 in Figure 5.1: on the
left-hand side distribution, the point is far from the real response and thus a factor
αd is applied; on the right-hand side distribution, the point is near the real response
and the factor applied is αu. For the ε-differential privacy condition to hold, it must
be αu/αd ≤ eε. We can also think in the reverse way: given two constants αu ≥ 1
and αd ≤ 1, the level of differential privacy achieved by this response mechanism is
ε = ln(αu/αd).
Note that, to obtain a valid density function from the above modification, the set of
points over which each of the factors αu and αd are applied must be selected in such
a way that the total probability mass of the resulting distribution equals 1. If we
denote by Uu the set over which we apply the factor αu, for the total probability mass
of the adjusted distribution to be 1, we must have αuPf (Uu) + αd(1− Pf (Uu)) = 1.
If the prior knowledge is an absolutely continuous distribution, as in Example 6, for
any pair of values αu ≥ 1 and αd ≤ 1 it is possible to select a set Uu in such a way
that αuPf (Uu) + αd(1 − Pf (Uu)) = 1 is satisfied. The reason is that we can select
the set Uu to have any probability mass between 0 and 1. If the prior knowledge
distribution is not absolutely continuous, it may not be possible to find a set Uu with
the required probability mass for the given values αu and αd. This section assumes
that such a set Uu exists. In Section 5.2, we specify a general algorithm that works
for any prior knowledge distribution.
The following proposition formalizes the ideas discussed in the previous example.
Proposition 2. Let f : D → Rn be a query function and let Pf be the prior
knowledge for f(D). Let αu ≥ 1 and αd ≤ 1 be such that αu = eεαd. Let Uu be
an environment of f(D) satisfying αuPf (Uu) + αd(1 − Pf (Uu)) = 1. The response
mechanism that returns a value randomly sampled from the distribution obtained by
modifying Pf through multiplication of the probability mass of the points in Uu by αu,
and multiplication of the probability mass of the points outside Uu by αd, satisfies
ε-differential privacy.
When the query f returns a value related to a single individual, the mechanism in
Proposition 2 can be improved. In that case, there are only two possibilities for
the response: (i) if the individual we are asking about is not in the database, the
distribution of the response equals the prior knowledge distribution, and (ii) if the
individual is in the database, the distribution for the response will be the result
of refining the prior knowledge. To satisfy ε-differential privacy, we only need to
guarantee that the distribution resulting from (i) and (ii) does satisfy the limitation
on the knowledge gain imposed by differential privacy. In other words, the output
distribution need only be compared to the prior knowledge. The conditions that
must hold are 1 ≤ αu ≤ eε and e−ε ≤ αd ≤ 1.
Note that, by choosing αu = eε and αd = e−ε, the level of differential privacy that we
can guarantee for a statistical query function (depending on multiple individuals) is
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2ε, while for an individual query (whose outcome depends on a single individual),
we double the guarantee to ε.
Proposition 3. Let f : D → Rn be an individual query in the above sense and let
Pf be the prior knowledge distribution for f . Let αu = eε and αd = e−ε. Let Uu be
an environment of f(D) satisfying αuPf (Uu) + αd(1 − Pf (Uu)) = 1. The response
mechanism that returns a value randomly sampled from the distribution obtained by
modifying Pf through multiplication of the probability mass of the points in Uu by αu,
and multiplication of the probability mass of the points outside Uu by αd, satisfies
ε-differential privacy.
5.2 A general algorithm for knowledge refinement
Propositions 2 and 3 above state that, given appropriate factors αu and αd and a set
Uu with the required probability mass, the knowledge refinement mechanism satisfies
ε-differential privacy. However, some details were left aside in the previous section:
(i) how is the set Uu selected?, and (ii) can we still apply knowledge refinement if
a set Uu with the required probability mass does not exist? This section gives a
more detailed view of the knowledge refinement mechanism and answers the two
aforementioned questions.
Knowledge refinement works by increasing the probability mass of the points near
f(D), and by decreasing the probability mass of the rest of points in such a way
that the total probability mass equals one. In Example 6 there was a natural way to
determine the set Uu: the points closest to f(D) in absolute value. However, such a
natural way does not always exist, as illustrated in the next example.
Example 7. To determine the form of the set Uu for a query function with two
components, say f = (f1, f2), we use a distance function defined over the range
of f , namely d : Range(f1) × Range(f2) → [0,∞). If d does not treat f1 and f2
symmetrically, then one component is given priority over the other. In fact, there is
no natural way to define d and hence Uu. Such definitions are application-dependent.
Table 5.1 shows some distance functions that are appropriate for a query with a
single component in terms of the type of the result. We do not provide any distance
for multivariate queries because such distances are very application-dependent, as
pointed out in Example 7.
Note that when we feed the knowledge refinement algorithm with a certain distance
function, we are instructing it with the sets that we want to favor. Given a value
f(D), we modify the probability that the prior knowledge assigns to the points in
Range(f) according to the distance d. If a point at distance r is being applied a
factor α1, all points at distance r must be applied the same factor, and points at a
shorter distance must be applied a factor α2 with α2 ≥ α1. Therefore, the set Uu of
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Table 5.1: Example distance function for univariate query functions depending on
the type of the query result
Query result Range(f) distance
continuous R d(x, y) = |x− y|
nominal {c1, . . . , cn} d(ci, cj) =
0 i = j1 i 6= j
ordinal {c1, . . . , cn} d(ci, cj) = |i− j|
points that has its probability increased must be of the form U1f(D),r or U2f(D),r, for
some r ∈ [0,∞), where:
U1f(D),r = {x ∈ Range(f) : d(f(D), x) ≤ r}
U2f(D),r = {x ∈ Range(f) : d(f(D), x) < r} (5.1)
The set Ud of points that has its probability decreased is the complement of Uu, that
is, Ud = Range(f) \ Uu.
We want to choose two multiplicative factors αu and αd to modify the probabil-
ity mass of Uu and Ud, respectively. Factors αu and αd must be selected so that
differential privacy holds and the total probability mass of the resulting modified
distribution equals one.
Table 5.2 shows the form of factors αu and αd for the two types of queries considered
in Section 5.1: individual and statistical. For the case of individual queries, the
differential privacy condition need only hold between the distribution of the response
and the prior knowledge.
Any pair of values αu ∈ [1, eε] and αd ∈ [e−ε, 1] yields ε-differential privacy; however,
αu = eε and αd = e−ε yield the greatest knowledge gain.
For statistical queries, the condition must hold for each pair of distributions for the
response to the query over data sets that differ in a single record. Therefore, we
must have αu/αd ≤ eε. Same as for individual queries, the greatest knowledge gain
is achieved when αu/αd = eε. The actual values of αu and αd must belong to the
intervals [1, eε] and [e−ε, 1], respectively, but they can be freely chosen, as long as
αu/αd ≤ eε holds and the total probability mass is one:
αuPf (Uu) + αdPf (Ud) = 1 (5.2)
For statistical queries, the specific values selected for αu and αd determine the max-
imum knowledge gain for the points in Uu and Ud, where the gain is understood as
the modification w.r.t. the prior knowledge Pf . Assuming that αu/αd = eε holds,
a greater value for αu provides increased knowledge gain for the points in Uu, but
it also results in a greater value for αd, because otherwise αu/αd ≤ eε would not
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Table 5.2: Form of the factors αu and αd for individual and statistical queries
Type of query Factors
individual αu = eε, αd = e−ε
statistical αu ∈ [1, eε], αd ∈ [e−ε, 1] with αu/αd = eε
be satisfied; this implies decreasing the knowledge gain for the points in Ud with
respect to the prior knowledge.
For fixed values of the factors αu and αd, from Equation (5.2) and Pf (Ud) = 1 −
Pf (Uu), we have:
Pf (Uu) = αu−1αu−αd
Pf (Ud) = 1−αdαu−αd
For continuous prior knowledge, it is always possible to select sets Uu and Ud with
the above probability masses. In this case, the knowledge refinement mechanism is
very simple: apply factor αu to Uu and factor αd to Ud, as stated in Propositions 2
and 3.
For other kinds of prior knowledge, the sets Uu and Ud with the required probability
masses may not exist. In such cases, we still want to apply the factor αu to the
greatest possible set of points closest to f(D), and the factor αd to the greatest
possible set of points farthest from f(D), thus achieving the maximum knowledge
gain at such points. We denote U ′u the set that is applied factor αu, and U ′d the set
that is applied factor αd. For the remaining points we adjust their factor to have
a total probability mass of one. See Algorithm 5.1 for a detailed description of the
process; this algorithm is run by the database holder.
It is easy to check that the total probability mass of the distribution equals one, no
matter whether the then or the else option of the if statement of Algorithm 5.1
is taken. Regarding the differential privacy condition, we have already seen that it
holds for the then case. For the else case, differential privacy also holds, because
αud belongs to the interval [αd, αu].
Differential privacy is usually criticized for the low utility of the results it pro-
vides [68, 83, 84]. Several relaxations of ε-differential privacy have been proposed;
in particular, the authors of [41] propose (ε, δ)-differential privacy (a.k.a (ε, δ)-
indistinguishability), and (ε, δ)-probabilistic differential privacy. The former prop-
erty relaxes the strict requirement of differential privacy by adding a non-zero δ.
The latter property allows arbitrarily large knowledge gains within probability δ.
Let us briefly review (ε, δ)-privacy and sketch how prior knowledge refinement can
achieve it.
Definition 11. A randomized function gives (ε, δ)-differential privacy if, for all data
sets D1, D2 such that one can be obtained from the other by adding or removing a
single record, and all S ⊂ Range(κ)
P (κ(D1) ∈ S) ≤ exp(ε)× P (κ(D2) ∈ S) + δ (5.3)
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As ε-differential privacy implies (ε, δ)-differential privacy, Algorithm 5.1 can be used
to obtain (ε, δ)-differential privacy. However, a simple modification to Algorithm 5.1
can offer better data utility while still satisfying (ε, δ)-differential privacy (but no
longer ε-differential privacy). We do not provide a formal algorithm with the re-
quired modifications, but the idea is to use the extra margin δ to increase the
probability at f(D) and reduce it at the points farthest from f(D).
Just like it happened for ε-differential privacy, the improvement of (ε, δ)-privacy for
individual queries is greater than for statistical queries. For an individual query, we
only need to compare the distribution of the response with the prior knowledge (see
Figure 5.2). As the prior knowledge is not modified, we can modify the response
by adding δ to the probability mass of f(D), and subtract δ from the tails of the
distribution.
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Figure 5.2: Distribution of the response to a individual query when f(D) = 0.5,
for ln 2-differential privacy (left), and (ln 2, 0.2)-differential privacy (right)
For a statistical query, we also want to increase the probability mass of the actual
response f(D), while reducing the probability mass of the set S ′f(D) of points farthest
from f(D). Although other schemes are possible, a sensible choice is to have the
probability mass of f(D) increased by the same amount δ′, whatever the data set
D. As we have to keep the total probability mass equal to one, we must decrease
the probability of S ′f(D) by δ′. Now, since we can select data sets D1 and D2 such
that f(D1) belongs to S ′f(D2), for Inequality (5.3) to hold for S
′
f(D2), it must be
δ′ = δ/2 (it can also be δ′ < δ/2, but then we are not taking advantage of the whole
δ margin).
5.3 Differential privacy in multicomponent queries
The knowledge refinement mechanism as introduced in Section 5.1 is independent
of the number of components of the query function. However, for the case of multi-
component queries, we can relate the level of differential privacy for the multicom-
ponent query to the level of differential privacy of the components. If we have a
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Figure 5.3: Distribution for the response to a statistical query when f(D) = 0.166
(left) and f(D) = 0.833 (right), for ln 2-differential privacy (top) and (ln 2, 0.2)-
differential privacy (bottom)
query f = (f1, . . . , fn) and for each of the components, fi, we get an εi-differentially
private response, then we get a ∑ni=1 εi-differentially private response for f . This is
in fact a property of ε-differential privacy, hence a proof for our specific mechanism
is not required (see [65]).
The above result on multicomponent queries can be improved when each of the
queries refers to a disjoint set of individuals. For the noise addition mechanism, it
easy to see that, when performing queries f1, . . . , fn that refer each to a disjoint set
of individuals, the global sensitivity equals the maximum of the sensitivities of the
individual queries [42]. The reason is that, by adding or removing a single individual
from the data set, only one of the queries is affected. This is a good property, as
it guarantees max{εi}-differential privacy instead of ∑ εi-differential privacy. Our
goal is to show that this property can also be achieved for our proposal. In fact, we
will show further on that this is also a general property of differential privacy. We
start with an example.
Example 8. Let D be a database with two attributes: an identifier ID and a
Boolean attribute B. Let f1 and f2 be queries that return the value of B for in-
dividuals 1 and 2, respectively. Let the prior knowledge for both queries be the
independent uniform distribution over the set {0, 1}, which assigns a prior proba-
bility 0.5 to each of the possible outcomes for each query. To respond to f1 in an
ε-differentially private way with ε = 1, we select factors αu = eε and αd = e−ε that
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modify the prior knowledge. The same factors are selected for f2. Now we want
to check whether the combination of responses to f1 and f2 is still ε-differentially
private.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that both individuals are in D, and that
f1(D) = 0 and f2(D) = 0. For the rest of cases we would proceed in a similar way.
Figure 5.4 shows the prior knowledge and the output distribution for both query
functions f1 and f2. Indeed, by setting αd = e−ε and adjusting the probability mass
to one instead of setting αu = eε, we have
P (Kf1(D) = 1|f1(D) = 0) = P (Kf1(D) = 1|f2(D) = 0) =
= 0.5αd = 0.5e−1 = 0.1839
P (Kf1(D) = 1|f1(D) = 1) = P (Kf1(D) = 1|f2(D) = 1) =
= 1− 0.5αd = 0.8161
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Figure 5.4: Prior knowledge about attribute B and distribution of the ε-
differentially private response to query functions f1 and f2, assuming that the
actual value for attribute B is 0
Table 5.3 shows the joint distribution for the output of (f1, f2), which is obtained
by multiplying the output distributions for f1 and f2.
For ε-differential privacy to hold for the two-component query f = (f1, f2), the
ratio of the response distribution at D and the response distribution at any D′
that results from D by adding or removing a single individual must be within the
range [e−ε, eε]. As f1 and f2 are related to individuals 1 and 2, any modification
to D that does not affect the records for those individuals leaves the distribution
of responses unchanged. As we are assuming that individuals 1 and 2 are in D,
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Table 5.3: Distribution of the differentially private response to the two-component
query (f1, f2) when the true values are f1(D) = f2(D) = 0
0 1
Kf1 1− 0.5αd 0.5αd
Kf2
0 1− 0.5αd (1− 0.5αd)2 (1− 0.5αd)0.5αd
1 0.5αd (1− 0.5αd)0.5αd 0.25α2d
the only modifications to be considered are the removal of one of these individuals.
Table 5.4 shows the distributions of responses when individual 1 or 2 are removed.
We use Kf to denote the distribution of the response to query f . It can be seen that
the respective ratios between the distribution in Table 5.3 and the ones in Table 5.4
are within [e−ε, eε] = [e−1, e]; specifically, the ratios take only two values, αd = e−1
and 2− αd = 2− e−1.
Table 5.4: Distribution of the response to query f = (f1, f2) when either individual
1 is missing (top) or individual 2 is missing (bottom), and when the attribute value
for the non-missing individual is 0.
0 1
Kf1 0.5 0.5
Kf2
0 1− 0.5αd 0.5(1− 0.5αd) 0.5(1− 0.5αd)
1 0.5αd 0.25αd 0.25αd
0 1
Kf1 1− 0.5αd 0.5αd
Kf2
0 0.5 0.5(1− 0.5αd) 0.25αd
1 0.5 0.5(1− 0.5αd) 0.25αd
We now state and prove in general the property illustrated in the previous example.
Proposition 4. Let D be a data set and let (f1, . . . , fn) be a set of query functions
related to disjoint sets of individuals. Let Kfi be a random variable that provides
εi-differential privacy for fi, and assume that Kfi is independent from Kfj for any
i 6= j. Then (Kf1 , . . . , Kfn) provides max{εi}-differential privacy for (f1, . . . , f2).
Proof. Let D′ be a data set obtained from D by adding or removing a single user.
We want to check that the following inequalities hold for any subset S of the range
of (Kf1 , . . . , Kfn):
e−max{εi} ≤ P ((Kf1(D), . . . , Kfn(D)) ∈ S)
P ((Kf1(D′), . . . , Kfn(D′)) ∈ S)
≤ emax{εi}
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It is easy to show that the above inequality holds for the case of S being the Cartesian
product of sets Si, with Si a subset of the range of Kfj(D), or when the probability
distribution of (Kf1 , . . . , Kfn) is absolutely continuous. For a general set S and a non
absolutely continuous distribution, the inequalities still hold. However, we restrict
the proof for S = S1 × . . .× Sn.
The probabilities P ((Kf1(D), . . . , Kfn(D)) ∈ S) and P ((Kf1(D′), . . . , Kfn(D′)) ∈ S)
can be written as the product of probabilities ∏P (Kfi(D) ∈ Si) and ∏P (Kfi(D′) ∈
Si), respectively. By adding or removing a single individual, only one of the queries
is affected. Say the affected query is fj for some j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. By removing the
factors that are both in the numerator and the denominator, the inequalities that
we need to check become
e−max{εi} ≤ P (Kfj(D) ∈ Sj)
P (Kfj(D′) ∈ Sj)
≤ emax{εi},
which holds because Kfj satisfies εj-differential privacy, and εj ≤ max{εi}.
5.4 Interactive queries and adaptive attacks
Differential privacy is usually presented as an interactive query-response mechanism
where the data set is held by a trusted party to whom users send their queries.
Despite this claimed interactivity, the formal definition of differential privacy (Def-
inition 3) is based on a single query, thereby removing the complexities that in-
teractivity would introduce. Malicious users may try to use interaction to exploit
potential vulnerabilities of the access mechanism. When using Laplace noise addi-
tion the user can, for example, use the knowledge acquired from previous answers to
forge the new query. For knowledge refinement the problem is even more compelling,
since, besides the query function, the user also feeds the access mechanism with a
prior knowledge distribution and optionally with a distance function.
5.4.1 Interactive access mechanisms
To implement interactivity, a protocol is built on top of the non-interactive access
mechanism. The idea is quite simple; when a query is submitted, the access mech-
anism analyzes if answering the query is too disclosive, in which case the query is
simply discarded. To determine if answering a new query is too disclosive, all the
queries submitted by a user so far, including the new query, are treated as a single
multicomponent query and ε-differential privacy is enforced for it. Protocol 1 de-
scribes the protocol for the interactive Laplace noise access mechanism introduced
in [42]; in the protocol, ∆(·) stands for sensitivity.
We now present an interactive knowledge refinement mechanism parallel to the
Laplace-based one. As knowledge refinement does not depend on the sensitivity
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of the query function, our interactive mechanism does not need to compute sensi-
tivities and is therefore simpler than the Laplace-based one. Also, we will allow
the database user to select the amount of leakage εi independently for each query
fi. The only requirement is that the access mechanism will refuse answering query
fi (and successive queries) if the leakage of the multicomponent query (f1, · · · , fi)
exceeds ε.
If the d-th query is the last query answered by the interactive mechanism of Proto-
col 2, by construction the user obtains at most a knowledge gain ε for (f1, · · · , fd).
This holds regardless of the prior knowledge distributions and distance functions
chosen by the user for each query.
By submitting the desired level of leakage εi for each query, in Protocol 2 the
database user is allowed to trade more accurate answers in some queries for less
accurate answers in other queries. Protocol 1 could be modified to permit such
flexibility as well: the user could be asked to choose the noise parameter λi for the
i-th query, and the condition checked by the access mechanism would become
i∑
j=1
∆(fj)/λj ≤ ε
Since ∆(f1, · · · , fi) ≤ ∆(f1)+· · ·+∆(fi), when λ1 = · · · = λi the modified condition
above may result in less queries being answered than the condition in Protocol 1.
5.4.2 Adaptive attacks
The interactive mechanisms of Protocols 1 and 2 guarantee, respectively for Laplace
noise and knowledge refinement, that the responses to any sequence of adaptive
queries (q1, · · · , qd) will not violate ε-differential privacy. However, the following
question can be raised: is there any sequence of adaptive queries (q1, · · · , qd) and a
way to combine the responses to this sequence that allows an attacker to obtain an
estimator of f(D) that does not satisfy ε-differential privacy?
We show that such an attack cannot succeed. Our proof is completely general; it
does not depend on the access mechanism used to attain differential privacy. Let
F : Rd → R be the function used by the attacker to combine the responses to
q1, . . . , qd; let these responses be samples of the random vector Kf1(D), · · · , Kfd(D).
The attacker computes F (Kf1(D), · · · , Kfd(D)) and takes it as the response to
f(D). We are not interested in determining F or even in determining whether
F (Kf1(D), · · · , Kfd(D)) is a good estimate for f(D). The following result will suf-
fice.
Proposition 5. For any function F , if (Kf1(D), · · · , Kfd(D)) satisfies ε-differential
privacy, then F (Kf1(D), · · · , Kfd(D)) also satisfies ε-differential privacy.
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Proof. We need to check that, for each pair of data sets D and D′ that differ in a
single individual and for each set S ∈ Range(F (Kf1 , · · · , Kfd)), it holds that
P (F (Kf1(D), · · · , Kfd(D))) ∈ S)
P (F (Kf1(D′), · · · , Kfd(D′))) ∈ S)
≤ eε
Since P (F ◦X ∈ S) = P (X ∈ F−1(S)), we can express the previous inequality as
P ((Kf1(D), · · · , Kfd(D)) ∈ F−1(S))
P ((Kf1(D′), · · · , Kfd(D′)) ∈ F−1(S))
≤ eε
which holds because (Kf1(D), · · · , Kfd(D)) satisfies ε-differential privacy.
The following corollary follows from the previous proposition.
Corollary 2. Whatever the attacker’s strategy, her estimate for f(D) always satis-
fies ε-differential privacy.
5.5 Quality of the response to individual queries
We have defined an individual query, f , to be one that depends on a single individual.
We can think of it as a query that returns the value of some attribute for some specific
individual.
Typical differential privacy mechanisms based on noise addition provide low data
quality responses for individual queries. The reason is that, as any individual
can take any value in Range(f), the sensitivity of the query equals the length of
Range(f). When using knowledge refinement, the quality of the response depends
to a great extent on the prior knowledge available.
In this section, we provide some data quality comparisons between Laplace noise
addition and knowledge refinement for individual queries. Comparisons will be based
of specific query functions. The first one is based on a query function that returns a
Boolean value; we show how the distribution for the differentially private response
gets closer to the real response by refining prior knowledge than by adding Laplace
noise. The second comparison is based on a continuous function with range [0, 1];
we show that, even if we have no prior knowledge, knowledge refinement provides
better data quality for individual queries.
5.5.1 Data quality for a Boolean attribute
Consider a simple database D with two attributes: an identifier ID and a Boolean
attribute B that may take values 0 and 1. We assume that B is very sensitive and
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that, to limit the disclosure risk, access to the database must be mediated by a query-
response mechanism satisfying differential privacy, with ε = 1. Let f : D → {0, 1}
be a query that asks the value of attribute B for a specific individual.
To achieve differential privacy via Laplace noise addition, we must first compute the
sensitivity of function f . Assuming that f returns 1/2 if the individual is not in the
database, the L1-sensitivity of f is 1/2. Therefore, to achieve differential privacy for
ε = 1, we must add a Laplace distribution L(0, 1/2) to the true value of the query
response. Figure 5.5 shows the distribution of the responses for both possible values
of B, 0 and 1.
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Figure 5.5: Response distributions with Laplace noise addition
Assuming that the user is only interested in a 0/1 response, any value below 1/2 is
taken as 0, and any value above 1/2 as 1. The distribution for the response thus
obtained is:
Kf (D) =
0 if f(D) + L(0, 1/2) < 0.51 otherwise.
If f(D) equals 0, Kf (D) follows a Bernoulli distribution with parameter 0.184. If
f(D) equals 1, the distribution of Kf (D) is a Bernoulli with parameter 0.816. Note
that this is completely independent from the true distribution of attribute B, and
from any previous knowledge that the user might have on it. Hence, differential
privacy via Laplace noise addition does not let the user exploit prior knowledge.
Let us assume that attribute B is 1 only with probability 0.01. For a user with this
information, using the response obtained from the differential privacy mechanism is
actually misleading, as the result will be 1 with probability
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P (Kf (D) = 1) =
P (Kf (D) = 1|f(D) = 0)P (f(D) = 0) + P (Kf (D) = 1|f(D) = 1)P (f(D) = 1)
= 0.184 · 0.99 + 0.816 · 0.01 = 0.19
We could increase the parameter ε to get a more accurate response. However, by
doing so we would be reducing the privacy guarantees.
Now, we turn to the refinement mechanism and, same as before, we assume that
the user knows that B equals 1 with probability 0.01. Take αu = eε = e and
αd = e−ε = e−1. Hence,
P (Kf (D) = 1|f(D) = 0) = P (f(D) = 1) · αd = 0.003678
P (Kf (D) = 0|f(D) = 0) = 1− 0.003678 = 0.9963222
P (Kf (D) = 1|f(D) = 1) = P (f(D) = 1)) · αu = 0.027182
P (Kf (D) = 0|f(D) = 1) = 1− 0.027182 = 0.972817
Note that, as this is not an absolutely continuous distribution, we had to do some
adjustment to have a total probability mass equal to one: instead of adjusting αu
and αd, we directly adjusted P (Kf (D) = 0|f(D) = 0) and P (Kf (D) = 0|f(D) =
1). Figure 5.6 depicts the distribution of the response for both possible values of
attribute B and for the prior knowledge.
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Figure 5.6: Response distribution with prior knowledge refinement
Now, the probability of obtaining a response 1 is
P (Kf (D) = 1) =
= P (Kf (D) = 1|f(D) = 0)P (f(D) = 0) + P (Kf (D) = 1|f(D) = 1)P (f(D) = 1)
= 0.003678 · 0.99 + 0.02182 · 0.01 = 0.003912
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As 0.003912 is much closer to 0.01 than 0.19, we conclude that, despite both mech-
anisms providing the same level of privacy, the output distribution is much closer
to the actual distribution of the attribute when using the mechanism based on
knowledge refinement. Therefore, knowledge refinement outperforms Laplace noise
addition for Boolean attributes released under differential privacy.
5.5.2 Data quality for a continuous attribute
Let f : D → [0, 1] be a query function that returns a value in the interval [0, 1]. We
have fixed the range of f to be able to obtain some numerical results, but a similar
comparison can be done for other ranges. We compare the response obtained by
using Laplace noise addition and knowledge refinement with a uniform U [0, 1] prior
knowledge.
When using Laplace noise addition, the response to f(D) is Kf (D) = f(D) +
Laplace(0, 1/ε). When using knowledge refinement, the prior knowledge is modified
by increasing the probability of the set Uu containing the points closer to f(D) by
a factor αu, and decreasing the probability of the rest by a factor αd. We saw in
Section 5.2 that Uu must satisfy Pf (Uu) = (αu − 1)/(αu − αd), which in the case
of a uniform prior knowledge within the interval [0, 1] coincides with the size of Uu.
We also saw (Table 5.2) that, for an individual query, the factors are αu = eε and
αd = e−ε.
Table 5.5 shows a comparison of the distribution for the response to f(D) for several
values of ε when f(D) = 0.5. For Laplace noise addition, we have computed the
variance of the response, as well as the probability for the response to be within
the range [0, 1]. For knowledge refinement, we have computed the variance of the
response, the size of Uu, and the probability for the response to be in Uu. The results
in the table show that knowledge refinement behaves much better than Laplace noise
addition, but perhaps this is better observed by comparing the actual distributions.
Figure 5.7 shows the distributions for the response when using Laplace noise addition
and knowledge refinement with the same values of ε used in the table.
Table 5.5: Comparison between the distribution of the response to f(D) for
Laplace noise addition and knowledge refinement for several values of ε when
f(D) = 0.5
Laplace noise addition Knowledge refinement
ε Variance P (Kf (D) ∈ [0, 1]) Variance size(Uu) P (Kf (D) ∈ Uu)
0.1 200 0.476 0.077 0.475 0.525
ln(2) 4.16 0.549 0.046 0.333 0.667
1 2 0.607 0.034 0.269 0.731
2 0.5 0.684 0.012 0.119 0.881
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Figure 5.7: Distribution for the response to f(D), when f(D) = 0.5, for Laplace
noise addition (distribution with unbounded support) and knowledge refinement
(distribution with support [0, 1]) for ε = 0.1 (top left), ε = ln(2) (top right), ε = 1
(bottom left), and ε = 2 (bottom right)
5.6 Discussion
In previous sections we have highlighted that the knowledge refinement mechanism
lets the database user exploit her prior knowledge to obtain a more accurate re-
sponse. In Section 5.5 we saw that, for the case of individual queries, knowledge
refinement provides a much more accurate response even when there is no prior
knowledge.
Other advantages of prior knowledge refinement are:
• Simplicity. Mechanisms such as Laplace noise addition are based on the ad-
dition of a random noise whose magnitude depends on the variation of the
query function across neighbor data sets, also known as sensitivity. To cal-
ibrate the random noise, the sensitivity of the function must be computed,
which may be quite complex. The mechanism based on the refinement of
the prior knowledge only depends on the prior knowledge (it is independent
from the sensitivity of the query function), and thus it is easier to implement,
especially in a non-supervised environment.
• Generality. As said above, Laplace noise addition requires computing the
sensitivity of the query function, and this can only be done if the query func-
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tion takes values in a metric space. This introduces some complexities when
the function returns categorical information. The mechanism based on prior
knowledge refinement does not impose any requirement on the query func-
tion, and thus it can be applied without extra overhead to functions returning
categorical information.
• Consistency. Knowledge refinement lets the database user easily restrict the
response to a set of values consistent with the query function, by having the
prior knowledge assign a probability mass of zero to the set of inconsistent val-
ues. For example, in Table 5.5 we saw that Laplace noise sends the response
outside the query function range [0, 1] with great probability, while knowl-
edge refinement always keeps the response within range. Querying categorical
attributes is another example. It is usual to have some combinations of cate-
gories that do not make sense. For example, if the attributes are “employed”
(Y/N), and “unemployment benefits” (Y/N), a response Y for both attributes
does not make sense. When using a noise addition mechanism, there is no way
to avoid that combination of values, while, when using knowledge refinement,
to avoid that combination we only have to use a prior knowledge distribution
that assigns zero probability mass to it.
Despite the advantages listed above, there are some situations for which the proposed
mechanism is not appropriate. If the range of values that the function may return
is large compared to the variability between neighbor data sets, and the database
user does not have precise knowledge of the response, then a method based on noise
addition produces better data quality. This may be the case of statistical queries
where the user has no prior knowledge of the result. However, when querying about
a specific individual, the proposed method results in much greater response quality.
5.7 Conclusions
We have introduced a novel mechanism to attain differential privacy. This mech-
anism is based on refining the prior knowledge that the user may have about the
query response. This refinement is performed taking into account the constraints
imposed by differential privacy.
The refinement mechanism presents several advantages over the usual noise addition
mechanism. It is easier to implement, especially in a non-supervised environment,
as it does not require potentially complex computations (such as determining the
sensitivity of the query function). The fact that it lets users exploit their prior knowl-
edge may lead to a level of data quality not reachable by mechanisms independent
of the user knowledge. For example, we showed in the examples of Section 5.5 that
the distribution of the response was closer to the real distribution when using the
refinement mechanism. For query functions with great sensitivity, the amount of
noise added by noise addition mechanisms, such as [42], may render the response
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useless. In contrast, the data quality that results from our proposal is independent
from the sensitivity of the query function; yet this has the drawback that, for small
sensitivities, our approach may be inferior to noise addition.
We have also analyzed the behavior of our approach for multicomponent queries.
A generic property of differential privacy guarantees that, if a εi-differentially pri-
vate response is provided for a query fi, for i = 1 to n, a
∑
εi-differentially private
response is provided for the query (f1, . . . fn). We have seen that this can be im-
proved if each query fi refers to a disjoint set of individuals. In this case, we achieve
max{εi}-differential privacy, instead of ∑ εi-differential privacy. Interactive mecha-
nisms for Laplace noise addition and knowledge refinement have also been described.
Such interactive mechanisms take as input parameter the maximum level of leak-
age ε allowed by the database holder, and queries are answered until that level of
leakage is reached. The knowledge refinement interactive mechanism is superior to
the Laplace noise interactive mechanism in that it does not need to compute sen-
sitivities. We have shown that any interactive mechanism providing ε-differential
privacy is safe against adaptive attacks; whatever the strategy used by an attacker
to combine query responses, ε-differential privacy holds.
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Algorithm 5.1 Knowledge refinement algorithm to respond to query f(D) for a
general prior knowledge
Input parameters: query f , prior knowledge Pf of the database user, distance func-
tion d, factors αu and αd from the database holder.
1. Compute the actual value of the query response, f(D).
2. Modify Pf to adjust it to f(D) as much as possible, given the constraints
imposed by differential privacy. This is done as follows:
a) Let pu = (αu − 1)/(αu − αd).
b) Let pd = (1− αd)/(αu − αd).
c) if there exists a set Uu of the form U1f(D),r or U2f(D),r (see Expression 5.1)
with Pf (Uu) = pu then
Build the distribution of the response to f(D) by applying the factor
αu to Uu, and αd to Range(f) \ Uu.
else
i. Find the maximal set U ′u of the form U1f(D),r or U2f(D),r with Pf (U ′u) <
pu.
ii. Find the maximal set U ′d of the form Range(f)\U1f(D),r or Range(f)\
U2f(D),r with Pf (U ′d) < pd.
iii. Let pud = 1 − Pf (U ′u) − Pf (U ′d) be the probability of the points not
in U ′u ∪ U ′d
iv. Let αud = (1−αupu−αdpd)/(1− pu− pd) be the factor to be applied
to Range(f) \ (U ′u ∪ U ′d)
v. Build the distribution of the response to f(D) by applying:
• factor αu to points in U ′u
• factor αd to points in U ′d
• factor αud to points in Range(f) \ (U ′u ∪ U ′d).
3. Randomly sample the distribution resulting from the previous step, and return
the sampled value as the response to f evaluated at D.
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Protocol 1 Interactive Laplace noise addition mechanism
1. The database holder initializes the access mechanism with the following pa-
rameters:
• ε, the maximum level of leakage allowed;
• λ, the amount of noise to be added to every response (λ is the parameter
of the Laplace noise distribution); for fixed ε, the greater λ, the more
queries the access mechanism will be able to answer.
2. Let i := 1.
3. while queries are answered by the access mechanism do
a) The user submits a query fi (for i > 1, fi may depend on responses to
previous queries (f1, · · · , fi−1)).
b) if ∆(f1, · · · , fi)/λ ≤ ε then the access mechanism returns fi(D) +
Laplace(λ) as response; else it returns nothing.
c) i := i+ 1
Protocol 2 Interactive mechanism for knowledge refinement
1. The database holder initializes the access mechanism with ε, the maximum
level of leakage allowed.
2. Let i := 1.
3. while queries are answered by the access mechanism do
a) The user submits a query qi = (fi, Pfi , di, εi), where fi is the query func-
tion, Pfi is the prior knowledge distribution for the query, di is the dis-
tance function to be used and εi is the desired level of leakage (for i > 1,
qi may depend on responses to previous queries (q1, · · · , qi−1)).
b) if ∑ij=1 εj ≤ ε then the access mechanism returns a response to fi result-
ing from applying knowledge refinement to Pfi with distance di so that
εi-differential privacy is guaranteed; else it returns nothing.
c) i := i+ 1
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6 Enhancing data utility in
differential privacy via
microaggregation-based
k-anonymity
It is not uncommon in the data anonymization literature to oppose the “old” k-
anonymity model to the “new” differential privacy model, which offers more robust
privacy guarantees. Yet, it is often disregarded that the utility of the masked results
provided by differential privacy is quite limited, due to the amount of noise that
needs to be added to the output, or because utility can only be guaranteed for a
restricted type of queries. This is in contrast with the general-purpose anonymized
data resulting from k-anonymity mechanisms, which also focus on preserving data
utility. In this chapter, we show that a synergy between differential privacy and k-
anonymity can be found: k-anonymity can help improving the utility of differentially
private query responses. We devote special attention to the utility improvement of
differentially private published data sets. Specifically, we show that the amount
of noise required to fulfill ε-differential privacy can be reduced if noise is added to
a k-anonymous version of the data set, where k-anonymity is reached through a
specially designed microaggregation of all attributes. As a result of noise reduction,
the analytical utility of the anonymized output is increased. The theoretical benefits
of our proposal are illustrated in a practical setting with an empirical evaluation on
a pair of reference data sets.
The contents of this chapter have been accepted for publication in [93].
6.1 Introduction
Publishing microdata (e.g., responses to polls, census information, healthcare
records) collected by organizations such as statistical agencies is of great interest
for the data analysis community. At the same time, microdata may contain confi-
dential information about individuals. To overcome this privacy threat, data should
be anonymized before making them available for secondary use [52].
In the last two decades, several models for data anonymization have been proposed
in the literature. One of the best-known and widely used is k-anonymity [78], which
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aims at making each record indistinguishable from, at least, k−1 other records. The
usual computational procedure to reach k-anonymity is a combination of attribute
generalization and local suppression [76, 97]. An alternative procedure, especially
suitable for attributes with no obvious generalization hierarchy (like the numer-
ical ones), is microaggregation [35, 30]. Whatever the computational procedure,
k-anonymity assumes that identifiers are suppressed from the data to be released
and it focuses on masking quasi-identifier attributes; these are attributes (e.g., Age,
Gender, Zipcode and Race) that may enable re-identifying the respondent of a record
because they are linkable to analogous attributes available in external identified data
sources (like electoral rolls, phone books, etc.). k-Anonymity does not mask confi-
dential attributes (e.g., salary, health condition, political preferences, etc.) unless
they are also quasi-identifiers. While k-anonymity has been shown to provide rea-
sonably useful anonymized results, especially for small k, it is also vulnerable to
attacks based on the possible lack of diversity of the non-anonymized confidential
attributes or on additional background knowledge available to the attacker [36].
On the other hand, ε-differential privacy [39] is a more recent and rigorous privacy
model that makes no assumptions about the attacker’s background knowledge. In a
nutshell, it guarantees that the anonymization output is insensitive (up to a factor
dependent on ε) to modifications of individual input records. In this way, the privacy
of an individual is not compromised by her presence in the data set, which is a
much more robust guarantee than the one offered by k-anonymity model. To do
so, ε-differential privacy requires adding an amount of noise to the anonymization
output that depends on the variability of the actual non-anonymized values. ε-
Differential privacy was originally proposed for the interactive scenario, in which,
instead of releasing a masked version of the data, the anonymizer returns noise-added
answers to interactive queries. Compared to the unrestricted and general-purpose
data publication offered by k-anonymity, the interactive scenario of ε-differential
privacy severely limits data analysis, because it only allows answering queries whose
number and type are limited. Otherwise, an adversary could reconstruct some of
the original data [22].
It is pointed out in [18] that the previous limitation can be circumvented by al-
lowing an ε-differentially private data publication (i.e., a non-interactive setting),
which supports answering an unlimited number of potentially heterogeneous queries.
However, since ε-differential privacy should ensure that the probability distribution
of the published records is not changed by any modification of a single input record,
the amount of noise that needs to be added to the published data in such a general
setting is so large that it would severely hamper data utility [22]. This problem can
be minimized in specific scenarios, but at the expense of preserving usefulness only
for restricted classes of queries [18, 43, 51].
In summary, we can conclude that k-anonymity enables general-purpose data pub-
lication with reasonable utility at the cost of some privacy weaknesses. On the
contrary, ε-differential privacy offers a very robust privacy guarantee at the cost of
substantially limiting the utility of anonymized outputs.
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We show here that a synergy between both privacy models can be found in order
to achieve ε-differential privacy: k-anonymity can help increasing the utility of dif-
ferentially private query outputs. Specifically, we show that the amount of noise
required to fulfill ε-differential privacy can be greatly reduced if the query is run
over a k-anonymous version of the data set obtained through microaggregation of
all attributes (instead of running it on the raw input data). The rationale is that the
microaggregation performed to achieve k-anonymity helps reducing the sensitivity
of the input versus modifications of individual records; hence, it helps reducing the
amount of noise to be added to achieve ε-differential privacy. As a result, data utility
can be improved without renouncing the strong privacy guarantee of ε-differential
privacy.
Section 6.2 discusses the use of a k-anonymous microaggregation step prior to the
evaluation of a query function as a means to reduce the query sensitivity, thereby
reducing the noise required to attain differential privacy. Section 6.3 proposes a
general algorithm for generating ε-differentially private data sets that employs the
k-anonymous microaggregation procedure described earlier. Implementation details
for data sets with numerical and categorical attributes are given. Section 6.4 reports
on an empirical evaluation of the differentially private outputs obtained from a pair
of reference data sets via k-anonymous microaggregation; the output is compared
against standard k-anonymity and ε-differential privacy mechanisms regarding data
utility and disclosure risk. Section 6.5 presents the conclusions and proposes some
lines of future research.
6.2 Differential privacy through k-anonymous
microaggregation
Differential privacy and microaggregation offer quite different disclosure limitation
guarantees. Differential privacy is introduced in a query-response environment and
offers probabilistic guarantees that the contribution of any single individual to the
query response is limited, while microaggregation is used to protect microdata re-
leases and works by clustering groups of individuals and replacing them by the group
centroid. When applied to the quasi-identifier attributes, microaggregation achieves
k-anonymity. In spite of those differences, we can leverage the masking introduced
by microaggregation to decrease the amount of random noise required to attain
differential privacy.
Let X be a data set with attributes A1, . . . , Am, and X be a microaggregated X with
minimal cluster size k. Let M be a microaggregation function that takes as input
a data set, and outputs a microaggregated version of it: M(X) = X. Let f be an
arbitrary query function for which an ε-differentially private response is requested.
A typical differentially private mechanism takes these steps: capture the query f ,
compute the real response f(D), and output a masked value f(X) +N , where N is
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a random noise whose magnitude is adjusted to the sensitivity of f .
To improve the utility of an ε-differentially private response to f , we seek to minimize
the distortion introduced by the random noise N . Two main approaches are used in
the literature. In the first approach, a random noise is used that allows for a finer
calibration to the query f under consideration. For instance, if the variability of the
query f is highly dependent on the actual data set X, using a data-dependent noise
(such as in [71]) would probably reduce the magnitude of the noise. In the second
approach, the query function f is modified so that the new query function is less
sensitive to modifications of a record in the data set (the abovementioned paper [67]
exemplifies this approach).
Our proposal falls into the second approach: we replace the original query function
f by f ◦M , that is, we run the query f over the microaggregated data set X. For
our proposal to be meaningful, the function f ◦M must be a good approximation of
f . Our assumption is that the microaggregated data set X preserves the statistical
information contained in the original data set X; therefore, any query that is only
concerned with the statistical properties of the data in X can be run over the mi-
croaggregated data set X without much deviation. The function f ◦M will certainly
not be a good approximation of f when the output of f depends on the properties
of specific individuals; however, this is not our case, as we are only interested in the
extraction of statistical information.
Since the k-anonymous data set X is formed by the centroids of the clusters (i.e.,
the average records), for the sensitivity of the queries f ◦M to be effectively reduced
the centroid must be stable against modifications of one record in the original data
set X. This means that modification of one record in the original data set X should
only slightly affect the centroids in the microaggregated data set. Although this will
hold for most of the clusters yielded by any microaggregation algorithm, we need it
to hold for all clusters in order to effectively reduce the sensitivity.
Not all microaggregation algorithms satisfy the above requirement; for instance, if
the microaggregation algorithm could generate a completely unrelated set of clusters
after modification of a single record in X, the effect on the centroids could be large.
As we are modifying one record in X, the best we can expect is a set of clusters that
differ in one record from the original set of clusters. Microaggregation algorithms
with this property lead to the greatest reduction in the query sensitivity; we refer
to them as insensitive microaggregation algorithms.
Definition 12 (Insensitive microaggregation). Let X be a data set, M a microag-
gregation algorithm, and let {C1, . . . , Cn} be the set of clusters that result from
running M on X. Let X ′ be a data set that differs from X in a single record, and
{C ′1, . . . , C ′n} be the clusters produced by running M on X ′. We say that M is
insensitive to the input data if, for every pair of data sets X and X ′ differing in a
single record, there is a bijection between the set of clusters {C1, . . . , Cn} and the
set of clusters {C ′1, . . . , C ′n} such that each pair of corresponding clusters differs at
most in a single record.
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Figure 6.1: MDAV clusters and centroids with k = 5. Left, original data set X;
right, data set after modifying one record in X.
Since for an insensitive microaggregation algorithm corresponding clusters differ at
most in one record, bounding the variability of the centroid is simple. For instance,
for numerical data, when computing the centroid as the mean, the maximum change
for each attribute equals the size of the range of the attribute divided by k. If
the microaggregation was not insensitive, a single modification in X might lead to
completely different clusters, and hence to large variability in the centroids.
The output of microaggregation algorithms is usually highly dependent on the input
data. On the positive side, this leads to greater within-cluster homogeneity and
hence less information loss. On the negative side, modifying a single record in the
input data may lead to completely different clusters; in other words, such algorithms
are not insensitive to the input data as per Definition 12. We illustrate this fact
for MDAV. Figure 6.1 shows the clusters generated by MDAV for a toy data set
X consisting of 15 records with two attributes, before and after modifying a single
record. In MDAV, we use the Euclidean distance and k = 5. Two of the clusters in
the original data set differ by more than one record from the respective most similar
clusters in the modified data set. Therefore, no mapping between clusters of both
data sets exists that satisfies the requirements of Definition 12. The centroids of
the clusters are represented by a cross. A large change in the centroids between the
original and the modified data sets can be observed.
We want to turn MDAV into an insensitive microaggregation algorithm, so that it
can be used as the microaggregation algorithm to generate X. MDAV depends on
two parameters: the minimal cluster size k, and the distance function d used to
measure the distance between records. Modifying k does not help making MDAV
insensitive: similar examples to the ones in Figure 6.1 can easily be proposed for
any k > 1; on the other hand, setting k = 1 does make MDAV insensitive, but it is
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equivalent to not performing any microaggregation at all. Next, we see that MDAV
is insensitive if the distance function d is consistent with a total order relation.
Definition 13. A distance function d : X × X → R is said to be consistent with
an order relation ≤X if d(x, y) ≤ d(x, z) whenever x ≤X y ≤X z.
Proposition 6. Let X be a data set equipped with a total order relation ≤X . Let
d : X ×X → R be a distance function consistent with ≤X . MDAV with distance d
satisfies the insensitivity condition (Definition 12).
Proof. When the distance d is consistent with a total order, MDAV with cluster size
k reduces to iteratively taking sets with cardinality k from the extremes, until less
than k records are left; the remaining records form the last cluster. Let x1, . . . , xn
be the elements of X sorted according to ≤X . MDAV generates a set clusters of the
form:
{x1, . . . , xk}, . . . , {xn−k+1, . . . , xn}
We want to check that modifying a single record of X leads to a set of clusters that
differ in at most one element. Suppose that we modify record x by setting it to x′,
and let X ′ be the modified data set. Without loss of generality, we assume that
x ≤X x′; the proof is similar for the case x′ ≤X x.
Let C be the cluster of X that contains x, and C ′ the cluster of X ′ that contains
x′. Let m be the minimum of the elements in C, and let M be the maximum of the
elements in C ′. As MDAV takes groups of k records from the extremes, the clusters
of X whose elements are all inferior to m, or all superior to M remain unmodified
in X ′. Therefore, we can assume that x belongs to the leftmost cluster of X, and x′
belongs to the rightmost cluster in X ′.
Let C1, . . . , Cm and C ′1, . . . , C ′m be, respectively, the clusters of X and X ′, ordered
according to ≤X . Let xi1 and xiji be the minimum and the maximum of the elements
of Ci: Ci = {z ∈ X|xi1 ≤ z ≤ xiji}. Cluster C ′1 contains the same elements as C1
except for x that has been removed from C ′1 and for x21 that has been added to
C ′1, C ′1 = (C1 ∪ {x21}) \ {x}. Clusters C ′2, . . . , C ′m−1 contain the same elements as
the respective cluster C2, . . . , Cm−1, except for xi1 that has been removed from C ′i
and xi+11 that has been added to C ′i. Cluster C ′m contains the same elements as Cm
except for xm1 that has been removed from C ′mand x′ that has been added to C ′m.
Therefore, clusters Ci and C ′i differ in a single record for all i, which completes the
proof.
We have seen that, when the distance function is consistent with a total order rela-
tion, MDAV is insensitive. Now, we want to determine the necessary conditions for
an arbitrary microaggregation algorithm to be insensitive. Algorithm 6.1 describes
the general form of a microaggregation algorithm with fixed cluster size k. Essen-
tially it keeps selecting groups of k records, until less than 2k records are left; the
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remaining records form the last cluster, whose size is between k and 2k− 1. Gener-
ating each cluster requires a selection criterion to prioritize some elements over the
others. We can think of this prioritization as an order relation ≤i, and the selection
criterion for constructing the cluster Ci to be “select the k smallest records according
to ≤i”. Note that the prioritization used to generate different clusters need not be
the same; for instance, MDAV selects the remaining element that is farthest from
the average of remaining points, and prioritizes based on the distance to it.
Algorithm 6.1 General form of a microaggregation algorithm with fixed cluster
size
let X be the original data set
let k be the minimal cluster size
set i := 0
while |X| ≥ 2k do
Ci ← k smallest elements from X according to ≤i
X := X \ Ci
i := i+ 1
end while
X ←Replace each record r ∈ X by the centroid of its cluster
return X
Let X and X ′ be a pair of data sets that differ in one record.For Algorithm 6.1 to
be insensitive, the sequence of orders ≤i must be constant across executions of the
algorithm; to see this, note that if one of the orders ≤i changed, we could easily
construct data sets X and X ′ such that cluster Ci in X would differ by more than
one record from its corresponding cluster in X ′, and hence the algorithm would not
be insensitive.
Another requirement for Algorithm 6.1 to be insensitive is that the priority assigned
by ≤i to any two different elements must be different. If there were different elements
sharing the same priority, we could end up with clusters that differ by more than
one record. For instance, assume that the sets X and X ′ are such that X ′ =
(X \ {x}) ∪ {x′}, and assume that x belongs to cluster Ci and x′ belongs to cluster
C ′i. Clusters Ci and C ′i already differ in one element, so for the clustering to be
insensitive all the other records in these clusters must be equal. If there was a pair
of elements, y 6= y′, with the same priority, and if only one of them was included in
each of the clusters Ci and C ′i, then, as there is no way to discriminate between y
and y′, we could, for instance, include y in Ci, and y′ in C ′i. In that case the clusters
Ci and C ′i would differ by more than one record. Therefore, for the microaggregation
to be insensitive ≤i must assign a different priority to each element; in other words,
≤i must be a total order.
A similar argument to the one used in Proposition 6 can be used to show that when
the total order relation is the same for all the clusters —in other words, when ≤i
and ≤j are equal for any i and j—, then Algorithm 6.1 is insensitive to the input
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data. However, we want to show that even when the total orders ≤i are different,
insensitivity still holds. In fact, Proposition 7 provides a complete characterization
of insensitive microaggregation algorithms of the form of Algorithm 6.1.
Proposition 7. Algorithm 6.1 is insensitive to input data if and only if {≤i}i∈N is
a fixed sequence of total order relations defined over the domain of X.
Proof. In the discussion previous to Proposition 7 we have already shown that if
Algorithm 6.1 is insensitive, then {≤i}i∈N must be a fixed sequence of total order
relations. We show now that the reverse implication also holds: if {≤i}i∈N is a fixed
sequence of total order relations, then Algorithm 6.1 is insensitive to input data.
Let X and X ′ be, respectively, the original data set and a data set that differs from
X in one record. Let Ci and C ′i be, respectively, the clusters generated at step i for
the data sets X and X ′. We want to show, for any i, that Ci and C ′i differ in at
most one record.
An argument similar to the one in Proposition 6 shows that the clusters C0 and C ′0
that result from the first iteration of the algorithm differ in at most one record. To
see that Algorithm 6.1 is insensitive, it is enough to check that the sets X \C0 and
X ′ \C ′0 differ in at most one record; then, we could apply the previous argument to
X \ C0 and X ′ \ C ′0 to see that C1 and C ′1 differ in one record, and so on.
Let x1, . . . , xn be the elements of X ordered according to ≤0, so that C0 =
{x1, . . . , xk}. Assume that X ′ has had element x replaced by x′: X ′ = {x1, . . . ,
xn, x
′} \ {x}. We have the following four possibilities. (i) If neither x belongs to C0
nor x′ belongs to C ′0, then C0 and C ′0 must be equal; therefore, X \ C0 and X ′ \ C ′0
differ, at most, in one record. (ii) If both x belongs to C0 and x′ belong to C ′0, then
X \ C0 and X ′ \ C ′0 are equal. (iii) If x belongs to C0 but x′ does not belong to C ′0,
we can write C ′0 as {x1, . . . , xk+1} \ {x}; the set X ′ \ C ′0 is {xk+2, . . . , xn, x′}, which
differs in one record from X \ C0 = {xk+1, . . . , xn}; and (iv) If x is not in C0 but x′
is in C ′0, we can write C ′0 as {x1, . . . , xk−1, x′}; the set X ′ \C ′0 is {xk, . . . , xn} \ {x},
which differs in one record from X \ C0 = {xk+1, . . . , xn}. Therefore, we have seen
that X \C0 and X ′ \C ′0 differ in at most one record, which completes the proof.
Using multiple order relations in Algorithm 6.1, as allowed by Proposition 7, in con-
trast with the single order relation used to turn MDAV insensitive in Proposition 6,
allows us to increase the within-cluster homogeneity achieved in the microaggrega-
tion (see Section 6.4 for an empirical evaluation).
The modification of the query function f to f ◦M by introducing a prior microaggre-
gation step is intended to reduce the sensitivity of the query function. Assume that
the microaggregation function f computes the centroid of each cluster as the mean
of its components. We analyze next how microaggregation affects the L1-sensitivity
of the query function f .
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Definition 14 ((L1-Sensitivity)). The L1-sensitivity of a function f : Dn → Rd is
the smallest number ∆(f) such that for all X,X ′ ∈ Dn which differ in a single entry,
‖f(X)− f(X ′)‖1 ≤ ∆(f)
The L1-sensitivity of f , ∆(f), measures the maximum change in f that results
from a modification of a single record in X. Essentially, the microaggregation step
M in f ◦M distributes the modification suffered by a single record in X among
multiple records in M(X). Consider, for instance, the data sets X and X ′ depicted
in Figure 6.2. The record at the top right corner in X has been moved to the bottom
left corner in X ′; all the other records remain unmodified. In the microaggregated
data sets M(X) and M(X ′) —the crosses represent the centroids— we observe
that all the centroids have been modified but the magnitude of the modifications
is smaller: the modification suffered by the record at the top right corner of X has
been distributed among all the records in M(X).
When computing the centroid as the mean, we can guarantee that the maximum
variation in any centroid is at most 1/k of the variation of the record inX. Therefore,
we can think of the L1-sensitivity of f ◦M as the maximum change in f if we allow
a variation in each record that is less than 1/k times the maximal variation. In fact,
this is a very rough estimate, as only a few centroids can have a variation equaling
1/k of the maximal variation in X, but it is useful to analyze some simple functions
such as the identity. The identity function returns the exact contents of a specific
record, and is used extensively in later sections to construct ε-differentially private
data sets. The sensitivity of the identity functions depends only on the maximum
variation that the selected record may suffer; therefore, it is clear that distributing
the variation among several records lowers the sensitivity. This is formalized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 8. Let X ∈ Dn be a data set with numerical attributes only. Let M be
a microaggregation function with minimal cluster size k that computes the centroid
by taking the mean of the elements of each cluster. Given a record r ∈ X, let Ir()
be the function that returns the attribute values contained in record r of X. Then
∆(Ir ◦M) ≤ ∆(Ir)/k.
Proof. The function Ir ◦M returns the centroid of M(X) that corresponds to the
record r in X. It was shown in the discussion that precedes the proposition that,
for a data set that contains only numerical attributes, if the centroid is computed
as the mean of the records in the cluster, then the maximum change in any centroid
is, at most, ∆(Ir)/k; that is, ∆(Ir ◦M) ≤ ∆(Ir)/k.
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6.3 Differentially private data sets through
k-anonymity
Assume that we have an original data set X and that we want to generate a data
set Xε —an anonymized version of X— that satisfies ε-differential privacy. Even if
differential privacy was not introduced with the aim of generating anonymized data
sets, we can think of a data release as the collected answers to successive queries for
each record in the data set. Let Ir() be as defined in Proposition 8. We generate
Xε, by querying X with Ir(X), for all r ∈ X. If the responses to the queries Ir()
satisfy ε-differential privacy, then, as each query refers to a different record, by the
parallel composition property Xε also satisfies ε-differential privacy.
The proposed approach for generating Xε is general but naive. As each query Ir()
refers to a single individual, its sensitivity is large; therefore, the masking required
to attain ε-differential privacy is quite significant, and thus the utility of such a Xε
very limited.
To improve the utility of Xε, we introduce a microaggregation step as discussed in
Section 6.2: (i) from the original data set X, we generate a k-anonymous data set X
—by using a microaggregation algorithm with minimum cluster size k, like MDAV,
and assuming that all attributes are quasi-identifiers—, and (ii) the ε-differentially
private data set Xε is generated from the k-anonymous data set X by taking an
ε-differentially private response to the queries Ir(X), for all r ∈ X.
By constructing the k-anonymous data set X, we stop thinking in terms of individ-
uals, to start thinking in terms of groups of k individuals. Now, the sensitivity of
the queries Ir(X) used to construct Xε reflects the effect that modifying a single
record in X has on the groups of k records in X. The fact that each record in X
depends on k (or more) records in X is what allows the sensivity to be effectively
reduced. See Proposition 8 above.
Algorithm 6.2 details the procedure for generating the differentially private data set
Xε.
6.3.1 Achieving differential privacy with numerical attributes
For a data set consisting of numerical attributes only, generating the ε-differentially
private data set Xε as previously described is quite straightforward.
Let X be a data set with m numerical attributes: A1, . . . , Am. The first step to
construct Xε is to generate the k-anonymous data set X via an insensitive microag-
gregation algorithm. As we have seen in Section 6.2, the key point of insensitive
microaggregation algorithms is to define a total order relation over Dom(X), the
domain of the records of the data set X. The domain of X contains all the possible
values that make sense, given the semantics of the attributes. In other words, the
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Algorithm 6.2 Generation of an ε-differentially private data set Xε from X via
microaggregation
let X be the original data set
let M be an insensitive microaggregation algorithm with minimal cluster size k
let Sε() be an ε-differentially private sanitizer
let Ir() be the query for the attributes of record r
X ← microaggregated data set M(X)
for each r ∈ X do
rε ← Sε(Ir(X))
insert rε into Xε
end for
return Xε
domain is not defined by the actual records in X but by the set of values that make
sense for each attribute and by the relation between attributes.
Microaggregation algorithms use a distance function, d : Dom(X)×Dom(X) → R,
to measure the distances between records and generate the clusters. We assume that
such a distance function is already available and we define a total order with which
the distance is consistent. To construct a total order, we take a reference point
R, and define the order according to the distance to R. Given a pair of elements
x, y ∈ Dom(X), we say that x ≤ y if d(R, x) ≤ d(R, y). On the other hand, we
still need to define the relation between elements that are equally distant from R.
As we assume that the data set X consists of numerical attributes only, we can
take advantage of the fact that individual attributes are equipped with a total order
—the usual numerical order— and sort the records that are equally distant from R
by means of the alphabetical order: given x = (x1, . . . , xm) and y = (y1, . . . , ym),
with d(x,R) = d(y,R), we say that x ≤ y if (x1, . . . , xm) ≤ (y1, . . . , ym) according
to the alphabetical order.
Proposition 8 shows that, as a result of the insensitive microaggregation, one has
∆(Ir ◦M) = ∆(Ir)/k; therefore, ε-differential privacy can be achieved by adding
to X an amount of Laplace noise that would only achieve kε-differential privacy if
directly added to X.
6.3.2 Insensitive MDAV
According to Proposition 6, to make MDAV insensitive we must define a total order
among the elements in Dom(X). According to the previous discussion, this total
order is constructed by selecting a reference point. To increase within-cluster homo-
geneity, MDAV starts by clustering the elements at the boundaries. For our total
order to follow this guideline, the reference point R must be selected among the
elements of the boundary of Dom(X). For instance, if the domain of Ai is [aib, ait],
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Figure 6.2: Insensitive MDAV microaggregation with k = 5. Left, original data
set X; right, data set after modifying one record in X.
we can set R to be the point (a1b , . . . , amb ).
Figure 6.2 illustrates the insensitive microaggregation obtained by using MDAV with
the total order defined above. The original data set X and the modified data set
X ′ are the same of Figure 6.1. We also use k = 5 and the Euclidean distance for
insensitive MDAV. Let us take as the reference point for the above defined total
order the point R at the lower left corner of the grids. Note that now clusters
C1,C2, and C3 in X differ in a single record from C ′1,C ′2, and C ′3 in X ′, respectively.
By comparing Figures 6.1 and 6.2, we observe that the standard (non-insensitive)
MDAV results in a set of clusters with greater within-cluster homogeneity; however,
in exchange for the lost homogeneity, insensitive MDAV generates sets of clusters
that are more stable when one record of the data set changes.
6.3.3 General insensitive microaggregation
It was seen in Section 6.2 that each clustering step within microaggregation can use
a different total order relation, as long as the sequence of order relations is kept
constant. The advantage of using multiple total order relations is that it allows the
insensitive microaggregation algorithm to better mimic a standard non-insensitive
microaggregation algorithm, and thus increase the within-cluster homogeneity.
The sequence of total orders is determined by a sequence of reference points Ri. In
the selection of Ri we try to match the criteria used by non-insensitive microag-
gregation algorithms to increase within-cluster homogeneity: start clustering at the
boundaries, and generate a cluster that is far apart from the previously generated
cluster.
94
6.3 Differentially private data sets through k-anonymity
C0
C1
C2
C3
C4
C5
C6
C0
C1
C2
C3
C4
C5
C6
C7
Figure 6.3: Cluster formation. Left, using a single reference point; right, taking
each corner of the domain as a reference point.
Let the domain of Ai be [aib, ait]. Define the set R of candidate reference points at
those points in the boundaries of Dom(X), that is:
R = {(a1v1 , . . . , amvm)|vi ∈ {b, t} for 1 ≤ i ≤ m}
The first reference point R1 is arbitrarily selected from R; for instance, R1 =
(a1b , . . . , amb ). Once a point Ri has been selected, Ri+1 is selected among the still
unselected points in R so that it maximizes the Hamming distance to Ri —if
R1 = (a1b , . . . , amb ), then R2 = (a1t , . . . , amt )—. If several unselected points in R
maximize the Hamming distance to Ri, we select the one among them with greatest
distance to Ri−1, and so on.
Figure 6.3 shows the form of the clusters for a data set containing two numerical
attributes. The graphic on the left is for a single reference point —this is also the
form of the clusters obtained by insensitive MDAV, which uses a single total order
relation—. The graphic on the right uses four reference points, one for each edge of
the domain, which are selected in turns as described above.
6.3.4 Achieving differential privacy with categorical attributes
Many data sets contain attributes with categorical values, such as Race, Coun-
try of birth, or Job [16]. Unlike continuous-scale numerical attributes, categorical
attributes take values from a finite set of categories for which the arithmetical op-
erations needed to microaggregate and add noise to the outputs do not make sense.
In the sequel, we detail alternative mechanisms that are suitable for categorical
attributes in order to achieve differential privacy as detailed above.
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Let X be a data set with m categorical attributes: A1,. . ., Am. The first challenge
regards the definition of Dom(X). Unlike for numerical attributes, the universe of
each categorical attribute can only be defined by extension, listing all the possible
values. This universe can be expressed either as a flat list or it can be structured in a
hierarchic/taxonomic way. The latter scenario is more desirable, since the taxonomy
implicitly captures the semantics inherent to conceptualizations of categorical values
(e.g., disease categories, job categories, sports categories, etc.). In this manner,
further operations can exploit this taxonomic knowledge to provide a semantically
coherent management of attribute values [64].
Formally, a taxonomy τ can be defined as an upper semilattice ≤ς on a set of
concepts ς with a top element rootς . We define the taxonomy τ(Ai) associated to
an attribute Ai as the lattice on the minimum set of concepts that covers all values
in Dom(Ai). Notice that τ(Ai) will include all values in Dom(Ai) (e.g., “skiing”,
“sailing”, “swimming”, “soccer”, etc., if the attribute refers to sport names) and,
usually, some additional generalizations that are necessary to define the taxonomic
structure (e.g.,“winter sports”, “water sports”, “field sports”, and “sport” as the
root of the taxonomy).
If A1, . . ., Am are independent attributes, Dom(X) can be defined as the ordered
combination of values of each Dom(Ai), as modeled in their corresponding tax-
onomies τ(A1), . . ., τ(Am). If A1, · · · , Am are not independent, value tuples in
Dom(X) may be restricted to a subset of valid combinations.
Next, a suitable distance function d : Dom(X)×Dom(X) → R to compare records
should be defined. To tackle this problem, we can exploit the taxonomy τ(Ai)
associated to each Ai in X and the notion of semantic distance [82]. A seman-
tic distance δ quantifies the amount of semantic differences observed between two
terms (i.e., categorical values) according to the knowledge modeled in a taxonomy.
Section 6.3.5 discusses the adequacy of several semantic measures in the context
of differential privacy. By composing semantic distances δ for individual attributes
Ai, each one computed from the corresponding taxonomy τ(Ai), we can define the
required distance d : Dom(X)×Dom(X)→ R.
To construct a total order that yields insensitive and within-cluster homogeneous
microaggregation as detailed in Section 6.3.3, we need to define the boundaries of
Dom(X), from which records will be clustered. Unlike in the numerical case, this
is not straightforward since most categorical attributes are not ordinal and, hence,
a total order cannot be trivially defined even for individual attributes. However,
since the taxonomy τ(Ai) models the domain of Ai, boundaries of Dom(Ai), that is,
[aib, ait], can be defined as the most distant and opposite values from the “middle” of
τ(Ai). From a semantic perspective, this notion of centrality in a taxonomy can be
measured by the marginality model [27]. This model determines the central point of
the taxonomy and how far each value is from that center, according to the semantic
distance between value pairs.
The marginality m(·, ·) of each value aij in Ai with respect to its domain of values
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Dom(Ai) is computed as
m(Dom(Ai), aij) =
∑
ai
l
∈Dom(Ai)−{aij}
δ(ail, aij) (6.1)
where δ(·, ·) is the semantic distance between two values. The greater
m(Dom(Ai), aij), the more marginal (i.e., the less central) is aij with regard to
Dom(Ai).
Hence, for each Ai, one boundary aib ofDom(Ai) can be defined as the most marginal
value of Dom(Ai):
aib = arg max
aij∈Dom(Ai)
m(Dom(Ai), aij) (6.2)
The other boundary ait can be defined as the most distant value from aib in Dom(Ai):
ait = arg max
aij∈Dom(Ai)
δ(aij, aib) (6.3)
By applying the above expressions to the set of attributes A1, · · · , Am in X, the
set R of candidate reference points needed to define a total order according to the
semantic distance can be constructed as described in Section 6.3.3.
If no taxonomic structure is available, other centrality measures based on data distri-
bution can be used (e.g., by selecting the modal value as the most central value [35]).
However, such measures omit data semantics and result in significantly less useful
anonymized results [63].
Similarly to the numerical case, if several records are equally distant from the refer-
ence points, the alphabetical criterion can be used to induce an order within those
equidistant records.
At this point, records in X can be grouped using the insensitive microaggregation
algorithm, thereby yielding a set of clusters with a sensitivity of only one record per
cluster. The elements in each cluster must be replaced by the cluster centroid (i.e.,
the arithmetical mean in the numerical case) in order to obtain a k-anonymous data
set. Since the mean of a sample of categorical values cannot be computed in the
standard arithmetical sense, we rely again on the notion of marginality [27]: the
mean of a sample of categorical values can be approximated by the least marginal
value in the taxonomy, which is taken as the centroid of the set.
Formally, given a sample S(Ai) of a nominal attribute Ai in a certain cluster, the
marginality-based centroid for that cluster is defined in [27] as:
Centroid(S(Ai)) = arg min
aij∈τ(S(Ai))
m(S(Ai), aij) (6.4)
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where τ(S(Ai)) is the minimum taxonomy extracted from τ(Ai) that includes all
values in S(Ai). Notice that by considering as centroid candidates all concepts in
τ(S(Ai)), which include all values in S(Ai) and also their taxonomic generaliza-
tions, we improve the numerical accuracy of the centroid discretization inherent to
categorical attributes [63].
The numerical value associated to each centroid candidate aij corresponds to its
marginality value m(S(Ai), aij), which depends on the sample of values in the clus-
ter. Given a cluster of records with a set of independent attributes A1, · · · , Am,
the cluster centroid can be obtained by composing the individual centroids of each
attribute.
As in the numerical case, cluster centroids depend on input data. To fulfill differ-
ential privacy for categorical attributes, two aspects must be considered. On the
one hand, the centroid computation should evaluate as centroid candidates all the
values in the taxonomy associated to the domain of each attribute (τ(Ai)), and not
only the sample of values to be aggregated (τ(S(Ai))), since the centroid should be
insensitive to any value change of input data within the attribute’s domain. On
the other hand, to achieve insensitivity, uncertainty must be added to the centroid
computation. Since adding Laplacian noise to centroids makes no sense for cate-
gorical values, an alternative way to obtain differentially private outputs consists
in selecting centroids in a probabilistic manner. The general idea is to select cen-
troids with a degree of uncertainty that is proportional to the suitability of each
centroid and the desired degree of ε-differential privacy. To do so, the Exponential
Mechanism proposed by McSherry and Talwar [65] can be applied. Given a function
with discrete outputs t, the mechanism chooses the output that is close to the opti-
mum according to the input data D and quality criterion q(D, t), while preserving
ε-differential privacy. Each output is associated with a selection probability Pr(t),
which grows exponentially with the quality criterion, as follows:
Pr(t) ∝ exp(εq(D, t)2∆(q) )
In this manner, the optimal output or those that are close to it according to the
quality criterion will be more likely to be selected. Based on the above arguments,
ε-differentially private centroids can be selected as indicated in Algorithm 6.3.
Notice that the inversion of the marginality function has no influence on the relative
probabilities of centroid candidates, since it is achieved through a bijective linear
transformation.
With the algorithm we have the following result, which is parallel to what we saw
in the numerical case: if the input data are k-anonymous, the higher k, the less the
uncertainty that needs to be added to reach ε-differential privacy.
Proposition 9. Let X be a data set with categorical attributes. Let X be a k-
anonymous version of X generated using an insensitive microaggregation algorithm
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Algorithm 6.3 Computation of ε-differentially private centroids for clusters with
categorical attributes
let C be a cluster with at least k records
for each categorical attribute Ai do
Take as quality criterion q(·, ·) for each centroid candidate aij in τ(Ai) the additive
inverse of its marginality towards the attribute values S(Ai) contained in C, that is,
−m(S(Ai), aij);
Sample the centroid from a distribution that assigns
Pr(aij) ∝ exp(
ε× (−m(S(Ai), aij))
2∆(m(Ai))
) (6.5)
end for
M with minimum cluster size k. ε-Differential privacy can be achieved by using
Algorithm 6.3 to obtain cluster centroids in X with an amount of uncertainty that
decreases as k grows.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we can write the proof for a single attribute Ai.
The argument can be composed for multi-attribute data sets.
Let ∆(m(Ai)) be the sensitivity of the marginality function for attribute Ai. Accord-
ing to the insensitive microaggregation described earlier in Section 6.2, modifying
one record in the data set will induce a change of at most one value in the set
S(Ai) of values of Ai in a cluster. Considering that marginality measures the sum of
distances between a centroid candidate and all the elements in S(Ai), in the worst
case, in which all values in S(Ai) correspond to the same boundary of Dom(Ai)
(defined by either Equation (6.2) or Equation (6.3)), and one of these is changed
by the other boundary, the sensitivity ∆(m(Ai)) will correspond to the semantic
distance between both boundaries.
We have that: i) to compute the probabilities in Expression (6.5), the quality crite-
rion −m(S(Ai), aij) is combined with ε and ∆(m(Ai)), and the latter two magnitudes
are constant for Dom(Ai); ii) |S(Ai)| ≥ k; iii)m(S(Ai), aij) is a sum of, at least, k−1
terms. Hence, as the cluster size k grows, the marginalities m(S(Ai), aij) of values aij
in the cluster S(Ai) have more degrees of freedom and hence tend to become more
markedly diverse. Hence, as k grows, the probabilities computed in Expression (6.5)
tend to become more markedly diverse, and the largest probability (the one of the
optimum centroid candidate) can be expected to dominate more clearly; note that
probabilities computed with Expression (6.5) decrease exponentially as marginality
grows. Therefore, optimum centroids are more likely to be selected as k increases.
In other words, the amount of uncertainty added to the output to fulfill differential
privacy for categorical attributes decreases as the k-anonymity level of the input
data increases.
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6.3.5 A semantic distance suitable for differential privacy
As described above, the selection of differentially private outputs for categorical
attributes is based on the marginality value of centroid candidates that, in turn, is a
function of the semantic distance between centroids and clustered values. Moreover,
the total order used to create clusters also relies on the assessment of semantic
distances between attribute values. Hence, the particular measure used to compute
semantic distances directly influences the quality of anonymized outputs.
A semantic distance δ : o× o→ R is a function mapping a pair of concepts to a real
number that quantifies the difference between the concept meanings. A well-suited δ
to achieve semantic-preserving differentially private outputs should have the follow-
ing features. First, it should capture and quantify the semantics of the categorical
values precisely, so that they can be well differentiated, both when defining the total
order and also when selecting cluster centroids [63]. Second, from the perspective
of differential privacy, δ should have a low numerical sensitivity to outlying values,
that is, those that are the most distant to the rest of data. In this manner, the
sensitivity of the quality criterion, which is the semantic distance of the two most
outlying values of the domain, will also be low. This will produce less noisy and,
hence, more accurate differentially private outputs.
The accuracy of a semantic measure depends on the kind of techniques and knowl-
edge bases used to perform the semantic assessments [82]. Among those relying on
taxonomies, feature-based measures and measures based on intrinsic information-
theoretic models usually achieve the highest accuracy with regard to human judg-
ments of semantic distance [82]. The former measures [82, 73] quantify the distance
between concept pairs according to their number of common and non-common taxo-
nomic ancestors. The latter measures [81, 79, 74, 80] evaluate the similarity between
concept pairs according to their mutual information, which is approximated as the
number of taxonomic specializations of their most specific common ancestor. Both
approaches exploit more taxonomic knowledge and, hence, tend to produce more ac-
curate results, than well-known edge-counting measures [75, 102], which quantify the
distance between concepts by counting the number of taxonomic edges separating
them.
On the other hand, the sensitivity to outlying values depends on the way in which
semantic evidences are quantified. Many classical methods [75, 102] propose dis-
tance functions that are linearly proportional to the amount of semantic evidences
observed in the taxonomy (e.g., number of taxonomic links). As a result, distances
associated to outlying concepts are significantly larger than those between other
more “central” values. This leads to a centroid quality criterion with a relatively
high sensitivity, which negatively affects the accuracy of the Exponential Mech-
anism [65]. More recent methods [82, 74, 27] choose to evaluate distances in a
non-linear way. Non-linear functions provide more flexibility since they can implic-
itly weight the contribution of more specific [27, 59] or more detailed [82, 74, 81, 80]
concepts. As a result, concept pairs become better differentiated and semantic as-
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sessments tend to be more accurate [82]. We can distinguish between measures that
exponentially promote semantic differences [27, 59] and those that aggregate seman-
tic similarities [74, 81, 80] and differences [82] in a logarithmic way. Among these,
the latter one is best suited for the differential privacy scenario, since the logarith-
mic assessment of the semantic differences helps to reduce the relative numerical
distances associated to outlying concepts and, hence, to minimize the sensitivity of
the quality function used in the Exponential Mechanism.
Formally, this measure computes the distance δ : Ai × Ai → R between two cate-
gorical values ai1 and ai2 of attribute Ai, whose domain is modeled in the taxonomy
τ(Ai), as a logarithmic function of their number of non-common taxonomic ancestors
divided (for normalization) by their total number of ancestors [82]:
δ(ai1, ai2) = log2
1 + |φ(ai1) ∪ φ(ai2)| − |φ(ai1) ∩ φ(ai2)||φ(ai1) ∪ φ(ai2)|
 (6.6)
where φ(aij) is the set of taxonomic ancestors of aij in τ(Ai), including itself.
As demonstrated in [82] and [13], Expression (6.6) satisfies non-negativity, reflexivity,
symmetry and subadditivity, thereby being a distance measure in the mathematical
sense.
Moreover, thanks to the normalizing denominator, the above distance is insensitive
to the size and granularity of the background taxonomy. and it yields positive
normalized values in the [0, 1] range. Since the distance d : Dom(X)×Dom(X)→
R defined in Section 6.3.4 is the composition of semantic distances for individual
attributes and their domains may be modeled in different taxonomies, a normalized
output is desirable to coherently integrate distances computed from different sources.
6.3.6 Integrating heterogeneous attribute types
The above-described semantic measure provides us with a numerical assessment of
the distance between categorical attributes. As a result, given a data set X with
attributes of heterogeneous data types (i.e., numerical and categorical), the record
distance d : Dom(X)×Dom(X)→ R required for microaggregation can be defined
by composing numerically assessed distances for individual attributes, as follows:
d(x1,x2) =
√√√√(dist(a11, a12))2
(dist(a1b , a1t ))2
+ · · ·+ (dist(a
m
1 , a
m
2 ))2
(dist(amb , amt ))2
(6.7)
where dist(ai1, ai2) is the distance (either numerical or semantic) between the values
for the i-th attribute Ai in x1 and x2, and dist(aib, ait) is the distance between the
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boundaries of Dom(Ai), which is used to eliminate the influence of the attribute
scale.
It can be noticed that Expression (6.7) is similar to the normalized Euclidean dis-
tance, but replacing attribute variances, which depend on input data, by distances
between domain boundaries, which are insensitive to changes of input values. In
this manner, the record distance function effectively defines a total order that ful-
fills differential privacy.
6.4 Empirical evaluation
In this section we show some empirical results that illustrate how k-anonymous
microaggregation of input data reduces the amount of noise required to fulfill differ-
ential privacy and, hence, positively influences the utility of the anonymized outputs.
6.4.1 Evaluation data
The above-described mechanism has been applied to numerical and categorical at-
tributes of two reference data sets:
• “Census”, which contains 1,080 records with numerical attributes [19]. This
data set was used in the European project CASC and in [31, 25, 103, 55,
35, 32, 28]. Like in [28], we took attributes FICA (Social security retire-
ment payroll deduction), FEDTAX (Federal income tax liability), INTVAL
(Amount of interest income) and POTHVAL (Total other persons income).
To fulfill differential privacy, all four attributes were masked, i.e., they were
considered as quasi-identifiers in all our tests. The resulting records were
all different from each other. Since all attributes represent non-negative
amounts of money, we took as boundaries for the attribute domains aib = 0
and ait = 1.5 × max_attribute_value_in_the_dataset. The domain upper
bound ait is a reasonable estimate if the attribute values in the data set are
representative of the attribute values in the population, which in particular
means that the population outliers are represented in the data set. The dif-
ference between the bounds aib and ait defines the sensitivity of each attribute
and influences the amount of Laplace noise to be added to masked outputs,
as detailed in Section 6.3.1. Since the Laplace distribution takes values in the
range (−∞,+∞), for consistency, we bound noise-added outputs to the [aib, ait]
range defined above.
• “Adult”, a well-known data set from the UCI repository [47], which
has often been used in the past to evaluate privacy-preserving meth-
ods [64, 29, 49, 60]. Like in [64] we focused on two categorical at-
tributes: OCCUPATION and NATIVE-COUNTRY. According to the data
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set description Dom(OCCUPATION) includes 14 distinct categories, whereas
Dom(NATIVE-COUNTRY) covers 41. The taxonomies modeling attribute
domains, τ(OCCUPATION) and τ(NATIVE-COUNTRY), were extracted
from WordNet 2.1 [46], a general-purpose repository that taxonomically mod-
els more than 100,000 concepts. Mappings between attribute labels and Word-
Net concepts are those stated in [64]. Considering attribute categories and
their taxonomic ancestors, the resulting taxonomies contain 122 distinct con-
cepts for OCCUPATION and 127 for NATIVE-COUNTRY. As discussed in
Section 6.3.4, these higher figures enable a finer grained and more accurate
discretization of cluster centroids in comparison with approaches based on flat
lists of attribute categories. Domain boundaries for each attribute and sen-
sitivities for centroid quality criteria were set as described in Section 6.3.4.
For evaluation purposes, we used the training corpus from the Adult data set,
which consists of 30,162 records after removing records with missing values.
Due to the reduced set of attribute categories, the evaluation data contained
388 different record tuples, hence being a much more homogeneous data set
than Census.
6.4.2 Evaluation measures
The quality of the masked output for different combinations of k-anonymity and
ε-differential privacy levels has been evaluated from the perspectives of information
loss and disclosure risk:
• Information loss has been quantified by means of the well-known Sum of
Squared Errors (SSE), a measure used in a good deal of the anonymization
literature (e.g. [30]). For a given anonymized data set (i.e., a k-anonymous
data set X or an ε-differentially private data set Xε), SSE is defined as the
sum of squares of attribute distances between original records in X and their
versions in the anonymized data set, that is
SSE =
∑
xj∈X
∑
aij∈xj
(dist(aij, (aij)′))2,
where aij is the value of the i-th attribute for the j-th original record and (aij)′
represents its masked version. For numerical attributes, dist(·, ·) corresponds
to the standard Euclidean distance, whereas for categorical ones we used the
semantic distance defined in Equation (6.6). Hence, the lower is SSE, the lower
is information loss and the higher is the utility of the anonymized data.
• The disclosure risk has been evaluated as the percentage of records of the
original data that can be correctly matched from the anonymized data set,
that is, the percentage of Record Linkages (RL)
RL = 100×
∑
xj∈X Pr(x′j)
m
,
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where m is the number of original records and the record linkage probability
for an anonymized record (Pr(x′j)) is calculated as
Pr(x′j) =
{
0 if xj 6∈ G
1
|G| if xj ∈ G
where G is the set of original records that are at minimum distance from x′j.
The same distance functions as for SSE have been used. If the correct original
record xj is in G, then Pr(x′j) is computed as the probability of guessing xj
in G, that is, 1/|G|. Otherwise, Pr(x′j) = 0. The lower RL, the better is the
privacy of the anonymized output.
As baseline results, we have computed SSE and RL values for a standard k-
anonymity scenario in which all attributes are microaggregated by means of the
original MDAV algorithm [35], and also with its modified insensitive version with sev-
eral reference points (Algorithm 6.1). Furthermore, we also considered the straight-
forward ε-differential privacy scenario in which Laplace noise or the Exponential
Mechanism are directly applied to unaggregated inputs; this approach is equivalent
to applying our method with a k-anonymity level of k = 1.
The ε parameter for differential privacy has been set to ε= 0.01, 0.1, 1.0, 10.0, which
covers the usual range of differential privacy levels observed in the literature [40, 20,
21, 61]. The k-anonymity levels have been set between 1 and 100, except for the raw
sensitive and insensitive MDAV microaggregations, which start from k = 2, because
k = 1 would mean that input data are not modified.
Figure 6.4 depicts the SSE and RL values for the different parameterizations of k
and ε for the Census data set, whereas Figure 6.5 corresponds to the Adult data
set. Due to the broad ranges of the SSE and RL values, the Y-axes are represented
using a log10 scale. Each test involving Laplace noise shows the averaged results of
10 runs, for the sake of stability.
=
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Figure 6.4: SSE and RL values for different k (varying with step 1) and ε values
for the “Census” data set.
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Figure 6.5: SSE and RL values for different k (varying with step 5) and ε values
for the “Adult” data set.
To compare our method against baseline approaches regarding the balance between
information loss and disclosure risk, we also computed the relative improvement of
SSE and RL values for our approach (SSEk, RLk) over the baseline values (SSE0,
RL0) obtained with the original MDAV algorithm and with unaggregated differential
privacy. First, we computed the improvement factor of SSE values as follows:
SSEf =
√
SSE0√
SSEk
Then, the improvement factor of RL values was computed as:
RLf =
RL0
RLk
The final score that balances both dimensions was the ratio between SSE and
RL_factors:
Score = SSEf
RLf
Notice that SSE values have been square-rooted to provide a coherent linear inte-
gration of RL and SSE, and that Scores above 1.0 show a practical improvement
against baseline approaches.
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 show the SSEf and RLf factors and the resulting Scores for
different ε values and some k-anonymity degrees with respect to baseline approaches
for the Census data set. Tables 6.3 and 6.4 correspond to the Adult data set.
6.4.3 Discussion
Regarding the evolution of SSE values in Figures 6.4(a) and 6.5(a), we observe for
both data sets that the k-anonymous microaggregation of input records effectively
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Table 6.1: Census data set. SSEf and RLf factors, and Scores for different ε
values against standard MDAV microaggregation for several k-anonymity levels
MDAV  = 0.01  = 0.1  = 1.0  = 10.0
SSE0 RL0 SSEf RLf Score SSEf RLf Score SSEf RLf Score SSEf RLf Score
k = 2 3.07E+09 45.3 0.014 386.92 5.37 0.015 457.27 6.74 0.025 279.44 6.92 0.17 16.1 2.73
k = 5 1.20E+10 18.4 0.027 227.41 6.26 0.032 186.06 5.93 0.092 35.87 3.29 0.588 4.59 2.7
k = 15 2.41E+10 6.48 0.04 80.0 3.24 0.06 42.08 2.53 0.343 8.8 3.02 0.862 1.82 1.57
k = 30 4.00E+10 3.33 0.054 37.0 2.01 0.112 30.83 3.46 0.667 3.14 2.1 0.955 1.27 1.21
Table 6.2: Census data set. SSEf and RLf factors, and resulting Scores for differ-
ent ε values and k-anonymity degrees against straightforward ε-differential privacy
scenario (i.e., k = 1)
k = 1 k = 5 k = 15 k = 30
SSE0 RL0 SSEf RLf Score SSEf RLf Score SSEf RLf Score
 = 0.01 1.62E+13 0.036 1.01 0.44 0.45 1.05 0.44 0.47 1.10 0.40 0.44
 = 0.1 1.54E+13 0.108 1.14 1.09 1.24 1.52 0.70 1.07 2.20 1.00 2.20
 = 1.0 8.86E+12 0.218 2.49 0.42 1.06 6.57 0.30 1.95 9.92 0.21 2.04
 = 10.0 3.69E+11 2.09 3.26 0.52 1.70 3.37 0.59 1.98 2.90 0.79 2.30
reduces the required amount of noise and hence the loss of information, compared
to a straightforward implementation of ε-differential privacy (with no prior microag-
gregation, i.e., k = 1). The relative improvement directly depends on the value of
ε and the best results are obtained for ε = 1.0. As shown in Tables 6.2 and 6.4,
for k = 30 and ε = 1.0, the relative improvement SSEf is around one order of
magnitude for the Census data set and is around 3 for the Adult data set.
Looking at Figures 6.4(a) and 6.5(a) we observe different effects depending on the
value of ε for both data sets:
• For small ε (that is, 0.01 or 0.1), the larger k, the smaller is SSE, because
the noise reduction at the ε-differential privacy stage more than compensates
the noise increase at the microaggregation stage due to greater aggregation.
Anyway, the amount of noise involved for these values of ε is so high that even
with the aforementioned noise reduction, the output data are hardly useful.
• For very large ε (that is, 10), there is a sharp decline of SSE for low k values
(around 5); however, for larger k (above 10), there is a new and slow increase
in SSE, because the noise added by ε-differential privacy being low, it is dom-
inated by the noise added by prior microaggregation in larger clusters. This
is more noticeable for the Census data set, since SSE values are more similar
to those of standard microaggregation.
• For medium ε (that is, 1), there is a substantial decline of SSE for low k
(below 30) and, for larger k, SSE stays nearly constant and reasonably low.
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Table 6.3: Adult data set. SSEf and RLf factors, and resulting Scores for differ-
ent ε values against standard MDAV microaggregation for several k-anonymity
levels
MDAV  = 0.01  = 0.1  = 1.0  = 10.0
SSE0 RL0 SSEf RLf Score SSEf RLf Score SSEf RLf Score SSEf RLf Score
k = 2 1.01 0.95 0.019 343.13 6.53 0.019 497.53 9.52 0.02 127.49 2.60 0.054 6.33 0.34
k = 5 3.33 0.59 0.034 123.31 4.27 0.035 89.48 3.14 0.042 42.21 1.77 0.164 3.69 0.61
k = 15 8.93 0.3 0.057 56.49 3.22 0.059 163.06 9.73 0.118 6.66 0.78 0.263 3.0 0.79
k = 30 14.6 0.19 0.073 48.55 3.53 0.08 23.72 1.92 0.25 3.73 0.93 0.32 2.71 0.87
Table 6.4: Adult data set. SSEf and RLf factors, and resulting Scores for differ-
ent ε values and k-anonymity degrees against straightforward ε-differential privacy
scenario (i.e., k = 1)
k = 1 k = 5 k = 15 k = 30
SSE RL SSEf RLf Score SSEf RLf Score SSEf RLf Score
 = 0.01 2.78E+04 0.0029 1.00 0.60 0.60 1.01 0.54 0.54 1.00 0.73 0.74
 = 0.1 2.77E+04 0.0021 1.01 0.32 0.32 1.05 1.14 1.20 1.11 0.26 0.29
 = 1.0 2.61E+04 0.0019 1.18 0.14 0.16 2.01 0.04 0.09 3.34 0.04 0.13
 = 10.0 1.02E+04 0.09 2.89 0.56 1.62 2.83 0.90 2.54 2.70 1.29 3.48
In this case, the noise added by prior microaggregation in larger clusters is
compensated by the noise reduced at the ε-differential privacy stage due to
decreased sensitivity with larger k.
Notice also that insensitive MDAV microaggregation incurs a higher SSE than stan-
dard MDAV microaggregation. Indeed, the clusters formed by insensitive microag-
gregation are less homogeneous, due to the total order enforced for input records.
Particularly, the Adult data set shows a more noticeable increase of SSE figures.
This is coherent with the criterion detailed in Section 6.3.3 to define a total order,
which alternatively picks combinations of attribute domain boundaries as reference
points to create clusters. Since the evaluated Adult data set consists of two at-
tributes, four different reference points can be defined. This contrasts with the
four attributes considered for the Census data set, which provide 16 different com-
binations of domain boundaries, giving more degrees of freedom and producing a
more accurate clustering of input data. Moreover, since the Adult data set consists
of categorical attributes with a limited set of possible categories (in comparison
with continuous scale numerical ranges defined by the Census attributes), the im-
perfections introduced by the insensitive aggregation are amplified by the need to
discretize cluster centroids. In any case, the SSE increase caused by insensitive mi-
croaggregation is around an order of magnitude smaller than the noise reduction
this microaggregation enables when used as a prior step to ε-differential privacy.
RL values shown in Figures 6.4(b) and 6.5(b) behave the other way round as SSE.
107
Chapter 6 Enhancing utility in differential privacy via k-anonymity
First, we notice that the standard MDAV algorithm results in the highest percentage
of linkages. For the Census data set, a k-anonymity level k ≥ 20 is needed to attain
a percentage of linkages below 5%. For Adult, RL is much lower because the number
of distinct records is limited by the set of categories of each attribute (i.e., only 388
distinct tuples for Adult, whereas all 1,080 records are different for Census), and
because the number of records is much higher (i.e., 30,162 for Adult vs. 1,080 for
Census). As a result, the probability of correct record linkage is much lower (i.e.,
below 1% from k = 2). Insensitive MDAV yields slightly more privacy than MDAV
for the Census data set and significantly more privacy (less percentage of record
linkages) for the Adult data set. The superior RL reduction in Adult w.r.t. Census
is coherent with the differences in information loss observed in SSE values, which
were caused by the less homogeneous clusterization in Adult. In both data sets,
the RL values of insensitive microaggregation are very similar to the ones obtained
with ε-differential privacy with ε = 10. For ε values of 0.01 and 0.1, the RL values
hardly vary when the k-anonymity level increases, because they are very low already
with k = 1 (no prior microaggregation). Note that, for such low ε-values, the RL
values stay around 0.1% for Census data, which, considering the data set size of
1,080 records, corresponds to the probability of successful random record linkage
(i.e., 1/1,080). The fact that records are almost randomly matched is reflected by
the large spikes of the plot. For the Adult data set, RL behaves similarly but it
shows a much lower matching probability (i.e., around 0.0033%, that is, 1/30,162),
because of the larger cardinality of the data set. It can also be seen that the top level
of privacy offered by standard ε-differential privacy (k = 1) for low ε is basically
maintained when using prior microaggregation (k > 1); hence, the reduction in
information loss achieved by using microaggregation prior to noise addition does
not entail appreciable privacy penalties.
For ε = 1, the RL results are more interesting. For the Census data set, they
show an increase of the percentage of record linkages from 0.2% for k = 1 (no prior
microaggregation) to around 1% for k = 25. For the Adult data set, RL rises from
0.02% for k = 1 to around 0.05% for k ≥ 20. This is the other side of the very
noticeable improvement of SSE values.
In all cases, as shown by RLf in Tables 6.1 and 6.3, ε-differential privacy reduces
RL versus standard k-anonymity from around 2 orders of magnitude (for ε = 0.01
or 0.1) to 1 order (for ε = 1.0 or 10.0), for the considered k-anonymity levels. This
illustrates the practical privacy improvement that ε-differential privacy brings as a
result of the more strict theoretical privacy guarantees.
By analyzing the balance (Score) between the SSE and RL figures summarized in
Tables 6.1, 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4, we can conclude that:
• Scores with respect to the standard MDAV algorithm (Tables 6.1 and 6.3)
are above 1.0 in all cases for the Census data set and for Adult when ε = 0.01
or 0.1. This shows that the improved disclosure risk brought by ε-differential
privacy more than compensates the relative increase of information loss caused
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by noise. Scores for the Adult data set are lower than for Census because
baseline RL0 figures for Adult were so low that the improvements brought
by differential privacy are less noticeable when evaluating disclosure risk. For
the same reason, Scores also tend to decrease as the microaggregation level k
increases.
• Scores with respect to standard ε-differential privacy (i.e., k = 1, Tables 6.2
and 6.4) tend to increase as both ε and k grow. In fact, values of k and ε over a
threshold are needed for the balance to show improvement (i.e., Score > 1.0).
We observe that for k ≥ 15 and ε ≥ 1.0, the very substantial information
loss reduction obtained by using k-anonymous microaggregation prior to ε-
differential privacy more than compensates the small increase in the percentage
of record linkages with respect to standard ε-differential privacy.
The above observations suggest that, given a desired level ε of differential privacy
and a specific data set, a k-anonymity level can be determined that optimizes the
improvement of data utility and/or privacy.
6.4.4 Statistical analysis of anonymized results
To complement the above evaluation, in this section we provide an attribute-level
analysis of several statistics for the numerical data set (Census). As in [28], Θ and
Θ′ denote the same statistic (e.g., attribute mean, attribute variance, etc.) for each
attribute over the original data set and its masked version (by means of k-anonymity
and/or ε-differential privacy), respectively, we computed the variation of the statistic
introduced by the anonymization process as:
∆(Θ) = | Θ
′ −Θ |
| Θ |
Variations were computed for the mean of each attribute (named ∆(mX) for FED-
TAX, ∆(mP ) for POTHVAL, ∆(mI) for INTVAL and ∆(mF ) for FICA) and also
for their variances (∆(σX) for FEDTAX, ∆(σP ) for POTHVAL, ∆(σI) for INT-
VAL and ∆(σF ) for FICA). In both cases, the smaller the variations, the less is the
information loss and the better is the data utility. Results are reported in Table 6.5.
The variations of the attribute means directly depend on the amount of noise added
to the anonymized output. Hence, for the two k-anonymous MDAV implementa-
tions, attribute means are perfectly preserved in the masked output since centroids
are the exact means of clustered values. Regarding differentially privacy imple-
mentations, we observe a monotonic decrease for the variations of the mean for all
attributes as the k-anonymity factor applied to input data increases from k = 1 to
k = 30. This shows the benefits that data microaggregation brings at reducing the
amount of noise needed to fulfill differential privacy. For fixed ε, the sharpness of
this monotonic decrease is similar for all attributes. However, as ε increases from
0.01 to 10.0, the decrease becomes sharper and sharper for all attributes. Indeed,
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for ε = 0.01 the decrease factor for the variation of the mean is around 1.1 for all
attributes (quotient of the variations of the mean for k = 1 and k = 30), whereas
for ε = 10.0 the decrease factor reaches around 200. Hence, we see that ε > 0.1
is needed to significantly reduce baseline variations of the mean for all attributes
(we take as baseline the variations for k = 1, that is for plain ε-differential privacy
without prior microaggregation).
The variations of the attribute variances increase for the two MDAV implementa-
tions as the k-anonymity level grows, since output record values tend to be more
homogeneous and thereby suppress more variance as a result of the data aggregation
process. The growth factor is larger for the standard MDAV algorithm in comparison
with its insensitive version, since the latter tends to produce less homogeneous clus-
ters. Differential privacy implementations behave the other way round. For ε ≤ 1.0,
the variations of attribute variances decrease as the k-anonymity level grows, for all
attributes. This suggests that prior microaggregation helped to decrease the large
variance introduced by the noise added to fulfill differential privacy. Similarly to
what happened for variations of means, decrease factors for variations of variances
are larger for higher ε values. Results with ε = 10.0 are worth noting. In this case,
variances tend to increase for k values above 5. As discussed in the previous section,
the noise added for such a high ε value is so low that the effect of the prior mi-
croaggregation dominates in larger clusters. In other words, prior microaggregation
followed by 10-differential privacy behaves similarly to microaggregation alone.
The results of the above analysis of attribute-level statistics are coherent with the
results based on SSE presented in previous sections. It becomes clear that prior
microaggregation helps differentially private data to retain the utility of original
data much like standard k-anonymity does.
6.5 Conclusions
We have presented an approach that combines k-anonymity and ε-differential privacy
in order to reap the best of both models: namely, the reasonably low information
loss incurred by k-anonymity and the high privacy level guaranteed by ε-differential
privacy. In our approach, we use a newly defined insensitive microaggregation to
obtain a k-anonymous data set by considering all attributes as quasi-identifiers; then
we take the k-anonymous microaggregated data set as an input to which uncertainty
is added in order to reach ε-differential privacy. We have also described how our
approach can be applied to numerical and categorical attributes and also to records
combining heterogeneous attribute types.
In addition to a theoretical proposal, we have presented empirical results for het-
erogeneous data sets which show that our approach reduces the information loss
of standard differential privacy by several orders of magnitude, while preserving its
theoretical privacy guarantee and improving the practical privacy (percentage of
record linkages) versus standard k-anonymity.
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Future work will involve at least the following research lines:
• Even though special care has been exerted to avoid damaging within-cluster
homogeneity when making microaggregation insensitive, there is still room
for improvement, especially for categorical data. New criteria to define total
orders are conceivable, such as fixing sampling and sorting strategies of data
spaces, so that the within-cluster homogeneity reaches levels more similar to
the ones achieved by standard microaggregation.
• It would also be interesting to define a methodology that, given a data set,
a target privacy level ε and fixed utility and privacy measures, determines
the most suitable k for the prior k-anonymous microaggregation, in view of
optimizing the data utility and/or disclosure risk.
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Table 6.5: Census data set. Variation for several statistics between the original
data set and data sets anonymized with methods using different values of k and ε.
Methods include ε-differential privacy with prior k-anonymous microaggregation
(k = 1 amounts to plain ε-differential privacy), insensitive MDAV microaggrega-
tion and plain MDAV microaggregation.
Statistic k ε = 0.01 ε = 0.1 ε = 1.0 ε = 10.0 Insensit. MDAV MDAV
∆(mX) 1 1.0947 1.0356 0.6925 0.0500 0.0 0.0
2 1.1065 1.0088 0.4421 0.0134 0.0 0.0
5 1.1030 0.8743 0.1461 0.0024 0.0 0.0
15 1.0063 0.5171 0.0202 0.0003 0.0 0.0
30 0.9677 0.2841 0.0030 0.0001 0.0 0.0
∆(mP ) 1 14.5160 13.7959 9.0362 1.2125 0.0 0.0
2 14.4279 12.9546 6.2642 0.5245 0.0 0.0
5 14.0466 11.4310 2.6323 0.1670 0.0 0.0
15 13.4838 7.2579 0.7462 0.0302 0.0 0.0
30 12.5205 4.4492 0.2970 0.0034 0.0 0.0
∆(mI) 1 25.4754 24.6380 15.9486 2.2799 0.0 0.0
2 24.8984 23.0202 10.9231 1.0192 0.0 0.0
5 24.5284 19.3688 4.7766 0.3356 0.0 0.0
15 23.6351 12.6533 1.4402 0.0656 0.0 0.0
30 21.9726 7.7496 0.6244 0.0152 0.0 0.0
∆(mF ) 1 1.0126 0.9648 0.6151 0.0270 0.0 0.0
2 1.0275 0.9225 0.4194 0.0090 0.0 0.0
5 0.9927 0.8061 0.1304 0.0010 0.0 0.0
15 0.9140 0.4945 0.0117 0.0004 0.0 0.0
30 0.8812 0.2678 0.0026 0.0002 0.0 0.0
∆(σX) 1 9.5299 9.2111 6.4855 0.5122 0.0 0.0
2 9.4974 8.8891 4.3752 0.1067 0.0447 0.0053
5 9.3824 7.8526 1.5560 0.0584 0.0804 0.0156
15 9.0318 5.2659 0.1527 0.0972 0.1015 0.0398
30 8.5521 2.9454 0.0461 0.1241 0.1254 0.0639
∆(σP ) 1 69.3473 67.3757 45.9873 2.1168 0.0 0.0
2 69.1904 64.9683 29.3618 0.4549 0.0697 0.0247
5 68.5536 57.7628 8.0984 0.0597 0.1268 0.0991
15 66.2145 35.8830 0.7419 0.2365 0.2429 0.1967
30 62.0932 18.9228 0.0958 0.3370 0.3416 0.3214
∆(σI) 1 96.3225 93.3506 64.2854 3.0044 0.0 0.0
2 96.0339 90.2298 40.5087 0.5915 0.0950 0.0349
5 95.2261 79.1174 11.0832 0.0411 0.1358 0.1327
15 91.7395 49.0829 1.1650 0.2330 0.2362 0.2614
30 86.7387 24.3520 0.1243 0.4433 0.4476 0.4729
∆(σF ) 1 16.3302 15.7698 11.3811 0.9712 0.0 0.0
2 16.2702 15.2505 7.8828 0.2338 0.0593 0.0067
5 16.1054 13.6669 3.0073 0.0625 0.1117 0.0224
15 15.4965 9.3544 0.3439 0.1580 0.1634 0.0670
30 14.7710 5.4324 0.0423 0.1780 0.1797 0.1060112
7 Differential privacy via t-closeness
in data publishing
k-Anonymity and ε-differential privacy are two mainstream privacy models origi-
nated within the computer science community. Their approaches towards disclosure
limitation are quite different: k-anonymity is a model for releases of microdata
(i.e. individual records) that seeks to prevent record re-identification by hiding
each original record within a group of k indistinguishable anonymized records, while
ε-differential privacy originated as a model for interactive databases and seeks to
limit the knowledge that users obtain from query responses. Both models are often
presented as antagonistic: ε-differential privacy supporters view k-anonymity as an
old-fashioned privacy notion that offers only poor disclosure limitation guarantees,
while ε-differential privacy detractors criticize the limited utility of ε-differentially
private outputs and the cumbersomeness of not having access to the data set.
We show that for data set anonymization, the t-closeness extension of k-anonymity
is closely related to ε-differential privacy. This relation is demonstrated both versus
uninformed intruders (having access only to the released data set) and informed
intruders (having also background knowledge). For uninformed intruders we prove
that exp(ε)-closeness is equivalent to ε-differential privacy. For informed intruders,
the strict equivalence we obtain for uninformed intruders does not hold; however,
we show that exp(ε)-closeness can be seen as a good approximation to ε-differential
privacy. Our approach is a constructive one: we specify a computational procedure
based on bucketization that, given an original data set, builds a t-close version of
it. In the case of uninformed intruders, this version turns out to be differentially
private as well; in the case of informed intruders, it is approximately differentially
private.
Section 7.1 reviews partitioning strategies used to achieve k-anonymity and its ex-
tensions, including t-closeness. Specifically, we first examine the shortcomings of
achieving k-anonymity and t-closeness in the classical sense, that is, by modifying
the quasi-identifier attributes to create groups of at least k indistinguishable records.
We then review two approaches which leave the quasi-identifier attributes unaltered
and which will be used as building blocks of our computational procedure to reach
t-closeness and ε-differential privacy. Section 7.2 develops in detail our proposed
construction to reach t-closeness. Section 7.3 shows that exp(ε)-closeness reached
with the previous construction implies: i) ε-differential privacy in the case of un-
informed intruders; ii) approximate ε-differential privacy in the case of informed
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intruders. Conclusions are summarized in Section 7.4.
The contents of this chapter have been accepted for publication in [91].
7.1 Partitioning strategies for k-anonymity
In k-anonymity and its extensions (including l-diversity and t-closeness), the parti-
tioning strategy to create groups of indistinguishable records is a key point for data
utility. Assume a data user who wants to analyze a group of individuals that has
been selected based on the value of the quasi-identifier attributes. The utility that
this user derives from the k-anonymous data depends on how well the target group
of individuals can be approximated by the groups of indistinguishable records. The
best utility is achieved when the target group of individuals can be approximated
as the union of groups of indistinguishable records.
As an example, consider a data set with 16 records, two quasi-identifier attributes
Q1 and Q2, and one confidential attribute C. Assume that Q1 and Q2 take val-
ues in the sets {A,B,C,D} and {P,Q,R, S}, respectively. Figure 7.1 represents
the projection of this data set on the quasi-identifier attributes; each point is the
projection of one record on the quasi-identifiers. In this case, we assume that each
possible combination of quasi-identifiers occurs in exactly one record. The dominant
approach towards k-anonymity uses generalization and suppression to partition the
data set into groups of k indistinguishable records. Assume that the generalization
hierarchies are those in Figure 7.2, and that we want to obtain a 4-anonymous data
set. Figure 7.3 depicts the 4-anonymous data sets produced by minimal generaliza-
tions. A data user interested in the group of individuals with Q1 = A would prefer
the 4-anonymous data set on the left, which still allows distinguishing that group.
On the contrary, the data set on the right of Figure 7.3 is the worst option for a
user interested in the individuals with Q1 = A, because all values of Q1 are lumped
together. However, a user interested in the group of individuals with Q2 = P would
prefer the 4-anonymous data set on the right of Figure 7.3.
Therefore, the selected partitioning of the records is essential for the protected data
set to deliver high utility. If the data collector is aware of the kind of analyses that
data users are interested in, then the collector can tailor the partitioning to those
analyses. However, most of the time the data collector is unaware of the intended use
of the data; thus, a customized partitioning is not feasible. Even if the data collector
knew the relevant analyses, different analyses may require different partitions, but
releasing several versions of the same data set using a different partition each is not
advisable, as it would endanger whatever anonymity is gained by partitioning.
Another problem of the generalization approach is related to the number of quasi-
identifiers. When there is a large number of quasi-identifiers, all of them need to be
generalized to satisfy k-anonymity, which results in a large information loss. This is
known as “the curse of dimensionality” [9].
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Figure 7.1: Projection of the records in the data set on the quasi-identifier at-
tributes Q1 and Q2
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Figure 7.2: Generalization hierarchies for attributes Q1 (left) and Q2 (right)
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Figure 7.3: Minimal 4-anonymous generalizations
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This section aims at a method to generate k-anonymous data sets that mitigates
the issues described above:
• We generate a partition of the records that preserves as much information as
possible. To construct such a partition, instead of partitioning based on the
quasi-identifiers, we will do it based on the confidential attribute.
• To avoid losing information on the quasi-identifier attributes, we replace gen-
eralization of the quasi-identifiers by an approach that preserves both the
quasi-identifiers and the confidential attributes. In particular, we propose to
use either the Anatomy [94] or the probabilistic k-anonymity [89] methods.
If our goal is to construct a k-anonymous data set, the Anatomy method is better, as
it preserves more information, namely the distribution of the confidential attribute
within each set in the partition. However, if our goal is to achieve t-closeness, we
will show that the probabilistic k-anonymity approach is preferable.
7.1.1 Partitioning based on the confidential attribute
We have argued above that customizing the k-anonymous partition to specific data
analysis requirements is not an option. Hence, the utility of the data depends on
the amount of variability of the confidential attribute. For instance, if we target a
specific individual, the quasi-identifiers allow us to determine a group of k records
that must contain that individual; thus, we know that each of the values of the
confidential attribute within the group has probability 1/k of corresponding to the
target individual. The amount of knowledge we get (and thus the utility) depends
on the variability of the confidential attribute within the group: the more similar the
confidential attribute values, the more knowledge for the user, but also the higher
the risk of attribute disclosure.
To limit the variability of the confidential attribute within groups of indistinguish-
able records, we propose to partition the records in the data set based on the value
of the confidential attribute. We focus on a numerical confidential attribute. Let
D be a data set with quasi-identifiers collectively denoted as QI, and a confidential
attribute C, as represented in Table 7.1.
For the sake of clarity, we take a single confidential attribute. If there are several
confidential attributes, we can treat them as a single compound confidential attribute
and partition the data set according to a proximity criterion that takes into account
all the components (e.g. microaggregation over confidential attributes [35]).
To minimize the variability of C, we sort the records by C, and generate the partition
by taking the k minimal and maximal records, iteratively (see Algorithm 7.1).
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Table 7.1: Data set with quasi-identifiers QI and a confidential attribute C
QI C
individual 1 q1 c1
... ... ...
individual N qN cN
Algorithm 7.1 Optimal partitioning based on the confidential attribute
let D = {(qi, ci)|i = 1, . . . , N} be the original data set
let P = ∅ the partition of D to be returned
let O = ((oq1, oc1), . . . , (oqN , ocN)) be the list of records of D ordered by ascending
values ci
while |O| ≥ 3k do
let Pmin be the set containing the first k records of O
insert Pmin into P
remove the first k records from O
let Pmax be the set containing the last k records of O
insert Pmax into P
remove the last k records from O
end while
if |O| ≥ 2k then
let Pmin be the set containing the first k records of O
insert Pmin into P
remove the first k records from O
end if
let Prest be the set with the records remaining in O
insert Prest into P
return P
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Table 7.2: Original de-identified medical data
Ethnicity Date of Birth Sex Problem
asian 09/27/64 female hypertension
asian 05/08/61 female obesity
asian 04/18/64 male chest pain
black 03/13/63 male hypertension
black 03/18/63 male shortness of breath
black 09/07/64 female obesity
white 05/14/61 male chest pain
white 05/08/63 male obesity
white 09/15/61 female shortness of breath
7.1.2 Anatomy: reducing information loss in quasi-identifiers
We have mentioned above the “curse of dimensionality” information loss problem
inherent to generalizations affecting many quasi-identifier attributes. The problem
may get even worse if we construct the partition based on the confidential attribute,
as proposed in the previous section. The values of the quasi-identifier attributes
in each group of the partition may span the whole domains of those attributes
(or substantial fractions of them). Therefore, replacing all values of each quasi-
identifier attribute within a group by a single generalized value would lead to a
great utility loss. Moreover, note that the generalized values for the quasi-identifiers
might coincide for different groups.
To overcome this difficulty, we propose to use the Anatomy approach to k-anonymity,
which preserves the original values of the quasi-identifiers. To dissociate (break
the relation between) quasi-identifiers and confidential attributes, two tables are
generated: the first one assigns a group identifier to the quasi-identifiers, and the
second one relates each group identifier to the confidential attributes. We illustrate
this in Tables 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4. Table 7.2 shows the original de-identified data.
Table 7.3 presents a 3-anonymous version of the data obtained by generalization of
the attributes Date of Birth and Sex. Note that we have used the greatest level of
generalization for those attributes, and thus the information loss is large. In contrast,
we observe in Table 7.4 that, by using a group identifier to relate quasi-identifier
attributes and confidential attributes, we achieve exactly what we wanted: we k-
anonymize the relation between quasi-identifiers and confidential attributes, while
preserving the values of quasi-identifier attributes and the confidential attribute. In
particular, the distribution of the confidential attribute within each group (records
sharing the same group identifier) is preserved.
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Table 7.3: 3-Anonymous data set
Ethnicity Date of Birth Sex Problem
asian [61,64] - hypertension
asian [61,64] - obesity
asian [61,64] - chest pain
black [61,64] - hypertension
black [61,64] - shortness of breath
black [61,64] - obesity
white [61,64] - chest pain
white [61,64] - obesity
white [61,64] - shortness of breath
Table 7.4: Left, relation between quasi-identifiers and group identifier. Right, re-
lation between group identifier and confidential attribute.
Ethnicity Date of Birth Sex ID
asian 09/27/64 female 1
asian 05/08/61 female 1
asian 04/18/64 male 1
black 03/13/63 male 2
black 03/18/63 male 2
black 09/07/64 female 2
white 05/14/61 male 3
white 05/08/63 male 3
white 09/15/61 female 3
ID Problem
1 hypertension
1 obesity
1 chest pain
2 hypertension
2 shortness of breath
2 obesity
3 chest pain
3 obesity
3 shortness of breath
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7.1.3 Comparison of partitioning strategies
When generating the partition based on the quasi-identifiers, small values of the
parameter k are typically used. Usually, the variability of the confidential attribute
thus obtained is large enough not to lead to attribute disclosure. However, when
basing the partition on the confidential attribute, small values of k will almost cer-
tainly lead to attribute disclosure, because in this case the within-group variability
of the confidential attribute is small.
However, constructing the partition based on the confidential attribute has one im-
portant advantage: it allows fixing the desired level of variability for the confidential
attribute. Indeed, parameter k can be increased to a value that provides effective
disclosure limitation guarantees. For instance, by setting k to 0.1 × N , we guar-
antee that the confidential attribute for any individual is hidden inside a group of
individuals that amount to a 10% of the actual sample.
Note that if partitioning is based on the quasi-identifiers, we cannot control the level
of variability of the confidential attribute inside each of the k-anonymous groups:
some of them may exhibit a large variability (which offers protection against at-
tribute disclosure, but poor data utility) and others may not (which offers good
data utility, but high risk of attribute disclosure). The underlying problem is the
impossibility of enforcing a predetermined amount of variability: variability increases
with k, but the relationship between k and the amount of variability of the confiden-
tial attribute is not clear. Usually, k must be small (if any utility is to be provided),
which results in poor disclosure limitation guarantees.
7.2 A bucketization construction to achieve
t-closeness
It has been argued above that when partitioning is based on the confidential at-
tribute, the value of k must be increased to provide effective disclosure limita-
tion. In this section we seek to enforce a stronger disclosure limitation criterion:
t-closeness. t-Closeness limits the knowledge gain that an intruder can derive from
the k-anonymous groups. The distribution of the confidential attribute within each
of the k-anonymous groups is required to be similar to the distribution of the con-
fidential attribute on the whole data set.
For t-closeness to be satisfied, the distance between the data set-level and the
group-level distribution of the confidential attribute must be less than t for any
group. When t-closeness was introduced, the Earth Mover’s distance (EMD) was
proposed [58]. The EMD measures the minimal amount of work required to trans-
form one distribution to another by moving probability mass between each other.
The kind of guarantee that t-closeness offers depends on the distance function used.
We aim at achieving an ε-differentially privacy-like guarantee, and this requires us
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to use a different distance. ε-Differential privacy guarantees that, for any two data
sets that differ in one individual, the probability for a query response computed on
either data set to belong to an arbitrary set S differs at most by a factor exp(ε).
The distance function we propose mimics the ε-differential privacy criterion.
Definition 15. Given two random distributions D1 and D2, we define the distance
between D1 and D2 as:
d(D1,D2) = max
S
{PrD1(S)PrD2(S)
,
PrD2(S)
PrD1(S)
}
where S is an arbitrary (measurable) set, and we take the quotients of probabilities
to be zero, if both PrD1(S) and PrD2(S) are zero, and to be infinity if only the
denominator is zero.
If the distributions D1 and D2 are discrete (as it is the case for the sampling dis-
tribution of the confidential attribute in a microdata set), computing the distance
between them is simpler: taking the maximum over the possible individual values
suffices.
Proposition 10. If distributions D1 and D2 take values in a discrete set {x1, . . . ,
xN}, then the distance d(D1,D2) can be computed as
d(D1,D2) = max
i=1,...,N
{PrD1(xi)PrD2(xi)
,
PrD2(xi)
PrD1(xi)
} (7.1)
To satisfy t-closeness, the groups in the partition must be selected such that the
distance of the distribution of the confidential attribute on the whole data set and the
distribution on each of the groups is less than t. When using the previously defined
distance, if we work with the sampling distribution of the confidential attribute
(assuming that at least one of the values of the confidential attribute has multiplicity
less than the cardinality of the partition), the distance is always infinity. The reason
is that the distance due to values of the confidential attribute that do not appear
within the group is infinity (according to Definition 15). To avoid this issue, instead
of working with the sampling distribution of the confidential attribute, we work with
a bucketized version of it, where several points are clustered into a set of buckets
B1, . . . , Bn. In Figure 7.4 the values of the confidential attribute in the original
data have been clustered in buckets B1, B2 and B3 that contain four points each.
From this step we get a distribution for the confidential attribute with diminished
granularity.
By using the proposed bucketization it is feasible to attain t-closeness for a finite
t. For instance, Figure 7.5 shows a 4-anonymous partition of the data set that
satisfies 1.5-closeness, according to the previously defined distance. The sampling
distribution of the original data assigns probability 1/3 to each of the buckets B1,
B2 and B3; hence, the bucket-level distribution D of the confidential attribute in
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Figure 7.4: Top, original confidential attribute values. Bottom, bucketized confi-
dential attribute values.
1/3 1/3 1/3
original data
1/2 1/4 1/4
group P1
1/21/4 1/4
group P2
1/4 1/4 1/2
group P3
Figure 7.5: Sample partition that satisfies 1.5-closeness
the original data set is Pr(B1) = Pr(B2) = Pr(B3) = 1/3. Each of the groups in the
partition (P1, P2, P3) takes either one or two points from each bucket. Hence, the
bucket-level distribution D(P1) of the confidential attribute for group P1 is Pr(B1) =
1/2 and Pr(B2) = Pr(B3) = 1/4; for group P2 the distribution, denoted by D(P2),
is Pr(B1) = Pr(B3) = 1/4 and Pr(B2) = 1/2; for group P3 the distribution, denoted
by D(P3), is Pr(B1) = Pr(B2) = 1/4 and Pr(B3) = 1/2. By using Equation (7.1) to
measure the distance between D and D(Pi), for all i, we conclude that the generated
partition satisfies 1.5-closeness. In Table 7.5 we have depicted both the original set
of values of the confidential attribute, and the generated buckets.
Let the points in the original data set depicted in Figure 7.5 be of the form (qii, ci),
where ci the value of the confidential attribute and ci ≥ cj for i ≥ j. According to
the Anatomy approach to k-anonymity, the 4-anonymous 1.5-close resultant data,
associated to partition {P1, P2, P3} in Figure 7.5 and bucketization {B1, B2, B3} in
Figure 7.4, consists of the two linked tables displayed in Table 7.5.
7.2.1 Bucketization of the original data
The selected bucketization of the confidential attribute has a large impact on data
utility: if the bucketization is too coarse, the information loss in the confidential
attribute is large; if the bucketization is too fine, it may not be possible to at-
tain t-closeness. In this section we seek to determine the optimal size (in terms of
probability mass) of the buckets.
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Table 7.5: 4-Anonymous 1.5-close data set associated to the partition {P1, P2, P3}
in Figure 7.5 and bucketization in Figure 7.4
QI qi1 qi2 qi3 qi4 qi5 qi6 qi7 qi8 qi9 qi10 qi11 qi12
Group Id P2 P1 P1 P3 P2 P3 P1 P2 P3 P3 P1 P2
Group Id P1 P1 P1 P1 P2 P2 P2 P2 P3 P3 P3 P3
Bucket B1 B1 B2 B3 B1 B2 B2 B3 B1 B2 B3 B3
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
Figure 7.6: Probability distributions satisfying 2-closeness with the distance of
Definition 15
Figure 7.6 illustrates two probability distributions: the uniform distribution repre-
sents the global distribution of the confidential attribute (over the whole data set),
and the other distribution corresponds to the confidential attribute restricted to a
group Pi. These two distributions satisfy 2-closeness with the distance of Defini-
tion 15: the density of the restriction to Pi equals 1/2 for all the range of values of
the confidential attribute, except for a range of values that has density 2.
When bucketizing the distributions in Figure 7.6, the range of values with density 2
should exactly correspond to a bucket or a union of buckets, in order to maximize
the utility of the data. This is illustrated in Figure 7.7, whose top row shows buck-
etized versions of the distributions of Figure 7.6 using three buckets: top left graph,
bucketized version of the global distribution; top right graph, bucketized version
of the restriction to Pi. Note that, for each of the buckets, the global probability
and the probability restricted to Pi differ by a multiplicative factor of two; that
is, we attain 2-closeness with equality for each of the buckets. The bottom row of
Figure 7.7 shows the bucketized versions of the distributions in Figure 7.6 using
two buckets. It can be seen that, with the two proposed buckets, both bucketized
distributions are identical; that is, we get 1-closeness, which is stronger than the in-
tended 2-closeness, but comes at the cost of data utility loss. Therefore, the number
and hence the probability mass of the optimal buckets is dependent on the level of
t-closeness that we want.
Let us now restate the bucketization process in an algorithmic way:
1. Let the number of records in the original data set be N .
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Figure 7.7: Bucketized distributions of the confidential attribute for the whole data
(left) and for a group Pi (right). Three buckets are considered in the top distri-
butions, and two in the bottom ones.
2. Cluster the N values of the confidential attribute in the original data set into
a number b of buckets in such a way that:
a) all buckets accumulate the same probability mass 1/b, that is, each bucket
contains [N/b] values;
b) values within a bucket are as similar as possible (e.g. for a numerical
confidential value, each bucket would contain [N/b] consecutive values).
In this way, we can view the bucketized distribution of the confidential at-
tribute in the original data set as being uniform.
3. Partition the records in the original data set into a number of groups, in such
a way that every group satisfies that:
a) it contains k (or more) records, in view of achieving k-anonymity;
b) no bucket contains a proportion of the confidential attribute values of the
group higher than t/b or lower than 1/(tb) (that is, so that the bucketized
distribution of the confidential attribute in the group is at distance less
than t from the bucketized distribution of the confidential attribute in
the overall data set, according to Definition 15).
In general, the smaller the number b of buckets, the easier it is to achieve t-closeness,
for any given t. In the extreme case b = 1, all bucketized distributions are 1-close
(e.g. there is a single bucketized distribution). In the other extreme case b = N
(no bucketization) it has been argued above (right after Proposition 10) that the
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distance between the distributions of the confidential attribute on the global data
set and on a particular group is infinity; hence, one can only achieve ∞-closeness.
Hence, at most b can be k, the number of values in each group, and buckets should
be large enough so that, when restricted to any group, any bucket contains at least
one value.
On the other hand, if the privacy requirement is t-closeness, for a certain t, it
seems reasonable to use up the allowed distance t between the global distribution
of the confidential attribute and the restriction of that distribution within each
group. Using up the allowed distance between the confidential attribute distributions
enables forming groups that are more homogeneous in terms of the quasi-identifiers,
and hence decreases information loss. We want each of the k-anonymous groups to
emphasize a specific bucket; that is, the probability distribution of the restriction to
the partition must differ from the global distribution by a factor of t for a specific
bucket, and by a factor of 1/t for the rest of buckets. Now, in the distribution of the
confidential attribute for the original data set each bucket accumulates probability
mass 1/b, and the total probability mass of the distribution restricted to a group
must add to 1. Hence, we have
t× 1/b+ (1/t)× (1− 1/b) = 1
which yields a number of buckets b = t+ 1.
7.2.2 t-Closeness construction
Consider the original data set D = {(qii, ci)|i = 1, . . . , N}, where qii refers to the
quasi-identifier attributes, and ci to the confidential attribute. We want to generate
a k-anonymous t-close data set D′.
According to Section 7.2.1, we need to reduce the granularity of the confidential
attribute. In particular, it was proposed to group the values of the confidential
attribute in buckets of [N/b] = [N/(t + 1)] records. Assuming that the records can
be ordered in terms of the confidential attribute ci (this is possible if ci is numerical
or ordinal) we can list the contents of the buckets as follows:
B1 = {c1, . . . , c[ Nt+1+0.5]}
B2 = {c[ Nt+1+0.5]+1, . . . , c[2× Nt+1+0.5]}...
Bt+1 = {c[t× Nt+1+0.5]+1, . . . , cN}
The k-anonymous t-close data set is generated as follows:
1. Replace the values of the confidential attribute in the original data set D by
the corresponding buckets, and call D¯ the resulting data set;
2. Partition D¯ in groups of k (or more) records.
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Table 7.6: Theoretical probability mass of the distribution of the confidential at-
tribute in each of the buckets corresponding to the discretization of the confidential
attribute.
B1 B2 . . . Bt+1
Original data 1/t+1 1/t+1 . . . 1/t+1
P1 t/t+1 1/t(t+1) . . . 1/t(t+1)
P2 1/t(t+1) t/t+1 . . . 1/t(t+1)
... ... ... ...
Pt+1 1/t(t+1) 1/t(t+1) . . . t/t+1
In the second step above, not all values of k are equally suitable. For instance, it
must be k ≥ t+ 1, because we showed in Section 7.2.1 that b ≤ k and b = t+ 1. In
fact, we can write:
k = N(t+ 1)l
where l ≥ 1 is a natural number that counts the number of groups that emphasize
each of the buckets. In fact, if we take into account the previous inequality k ≥ t+1,
we conclude that l belongs to the set {1, . . . ,
⌊
N
(t+1)2
⌋
}. Similarly to the discretization
of the confidential attribute, the value of k produced by the previous formula may
not be exact. In that case we need to adjust the size ki of each group Pi to
ki =
[
i
N
(t+ 1)l
]
−
[
(i− 1) N(t+ 1)l
]
Table 7.6 gives the theoretical probability mass of each bucket of the confidential
attribute for each of the groups. We assume that l = 1 and that group P1 emphasizes
bucket B1, P2 emphasizes bucket B2, and so on. The exact theoretical probability
masses may not be achievable due to the discrete nature of the data. First of all, it
may not be possible to obtain a discretization of the confidential attribute in buckets
with probability mass 1/(t + 1). Also, when generating the k-anonymous partition
P1, . . . , Pt+1, it may not be possible for each of the groups to contain exactly k
records. Let ki be the number of records in Pi and let pj be the probability that a
record in the original data set belongs to bucket Bj. For t-closeness to be achieved,
the following must hold for every group Pi: (i) at most bkipitc records must have
Bi as the value for the confidential attribute; and (ii) at least dkipj/te records must
have Bj as confidential attribute. For these conditions to hold, we can start selecting
dkipj/te records with confidential attribute Bj, for each j 6= i, and complete the
partition set with ki − t dkipj/te records with confidential attribute Bi.
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7.3 From t-closeness to ε-differential privacy
t-Closeness and ε-differential privacy take approaches towards disclosure limitation
that are essentially different. However, for microdata releases a link between them
can be found if we make some assumptions on the prior knowledge of intruders:
1. The marginal distribution of the confidential attribute is known to the intruder;
actually, this assumption is a requirement, because a t-close data release pre-
serves this marginal distribution.
2. The intruder knows whether an individual’s record is in the data set; this
is also a requirement, as either of the approaches proposed to generate the
t-close data set, Anatomy and probabilistic k-anonymity, preserves the quasi-
identifiers.
3. When regular k-anonymity is used, another assumption on the intruder’s
knowledge is required: the intruder’s knowledge about the confidential at-
tribute is limited to its marginal distribution.
We aim at showing that, in the case of a microdata release, exp(ε)-closeness implies
ε-differential privacy. In other words, we want to show that the information that an
intruder obtains from accessing the released exp(ε)-close microdata set (generated
as per Section 7.2) satisfies the ε-differential privacy condition.
Let I be a specific individual in the data set. Before accessing the data set, the
intruder views the value of the confidential attribute of individual I as being dis-
tributed according to the distribution of the confidential attribute over the whole
data set. Given the assumption that limits the prior knowledge to the marginal
distribution of the confidential attribute, that is the most precise information that
the intruder has about I. ε-Differential privacy guarantees that the knowledge gain
obtained from the response to a query that asks for I’s confidential attribute is at
most exp(ε); that is, the distribution of the response must differ at most by a factor
of exp(ε) from the assumed prior knowledge. Note that if we did not take into ac-
count the intruder’s prior knowledge (usual ε-differentially private mechanisms do
not assume any prior knowledge), the exp(ε)-differentially private distribution for
the confidential attribute of individual I’s would be different. However, the possi-
bility of using the available prior knowledge exists, and thus any distribution that
differs from it by a factor of exp(ε) satisfies exp(ε)-differential privacy.
t-Closeness is an improvement of k-anonymity. As such, it seeks to thwart record
re-identification by making each record indistinguishable from k − 1 other records
as far as the quasi-identifiers are concerned. Apart from that, t-closeness requires
that the sampling distribution of the confidential attribute within each of the k-
anonymous groups be similar to the sampling distribution over the whole data set.
Hence, t-closeness effectively limits the knowledge gain that the intruder obtains,
that is, it achieves differential privacy.
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7.3.1 Uninformed intruders
Consider an uninformed intruder. By inspecting the released exp(ε)-close k-
anonymous data set, the intruder associates a k-anonymous group of records to
individual I. In this way, the intruder learns the distribution of the confidential
attribute within the k-anonymous group P that contains I. As the intruder’s prior
knowledge is limited to the marginal distribution of the confidential attribute, after
accessing the data, the best the intruder can do is to associate the distribution of
the confidential attribute in P to individual I. As the released data set satisfies
exp(ε)-closeness (generated as per Section 7.2), the distribution of P differs at most
in a factor exp(ε) from the distribution of the whole data set; that is, it satisfies
ε-differential privacy.
7.3.2 Informed intruders
For an informed intruder (whose knowledge goes beyond the distribution of the
confidential attribute over the whole data set), in general t-closeness does not imply
differential privacy. To see this, consider an intruder who knows the value of the
confidential attribute for k−1 of the k individuals in one of the k-anonymous groups.
Such an intruder can determine (with certainty) the confidential attribute value for
the remaining individual in the group by simple inspection of the released data; in
differential privacy terms, access to the data set has produced a infinite knowledge
gain on the confidential attribute of that specific individual.
The above situation is unavoidable if, as k-anonymity does, we intend to preserve the
thruthfulness of the confidential attribute inside the k-anonymous groups. However,
as we showed in Section 7.1, by increasing k, the problem is mitigated. The greatest
mitigation is attained when k equals the number of records in the data set. In such
case, for the intruder to determine the confidential attribute value of any individual
with certainty, he should know the confidential attribute for all the other individuals
in the data set (strictly speaking, it would be enough to know that none of the other
individuals take one of the values in the released data set). The problem with such
a large k is that it is likely to severely damage utility.
The destruction of data utility can be mitigated if we hide the k-anonymous groups.
In this way, a smaller k can be used, thereby preserving the utility of the data,
and a protection equivalent to taking k equal to N is attained. Hiding the k-
anonymous groups is feasible if instead of regular k-anonymity, we enforce proba-
bilistic k-anonymity [89]. Probabilistic k-anonymity can be seen as an instance of
the Anatomy method for k-anonymity: instead of associating a sampling distribu-
tion to each of the groups, the values of the confidential attribute are permuted and
assigned to individual records. This process can be viewed as taking a sample of the
sampling distribution for each record. When using probabilistic k-anonymity, the
intruder cannot determine which records form each of the groups; thus, she cannot
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use the information about a specific individual to increase her knowledge on the
other individuals of the group.
7.4 Conclusions
We have shown that the k-anonymity family of models is powerful enough to achieve
ε-differential privacy in the context of data publishing. Specifically, using a suitable
construction, we have shown that exp(ε)-closeness implies ε-differential privacy for
uninformed intruders and approximate ε-differential privacy for informed intruders.
Our t-closeness construction based on bucketization is also a contribution in its own
right.
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8.1 Contributions
This thesis has dealt with disclosure limitation in data releases. Among the available
privacy criteria, we have focused on k-anonymity and ε-differential privacy. The
focus has primarily been placed on improving data utility, but we have also dealt with
the inherent limitations of k-anonymity, and with the combination of k-anonymity
(or t-closeness) and ε-differential privacy. More specifically, our contributions are:
• We have reviewed k-anonymity and some of its limitations. In particular,
we have shown that k-anonymity has a suboptimal behavior in presence of
informed intruders, due to the “curse of dimensionality”. To improve data
utility we have proposed a new privacy model, which relaxes the requirements
of k-anonymity by imposing only a probability of re-identification equal to
1/k. We have shown that our proposal offers equivalent disclosure limitation
guarantees to those of k-anonymity, and allows for improved data utility. The
improvement on data utility is chiefly due to the ability to use multiple parti-
tions of the data set. It allows us to offer improved privacy guarantees against
informed intruders and still keep the data useful.
• The Laplace distribution is the most commonly used data-independent noise
distribution to attain ε-differential privacy. We have shown that the Laplace
distribution is not optimal: another distribution exists which satisfies the ε-
differential privacy condition and has its probability mass more concentrated
around zero. For the univariate case, we have determined the form of and
constructed all optimal data-independent distributions. For the multivariate
case, we have shown that a specific family of distributions is optimal. Regard-
ing data utility, we have shown that for the univariate case the improvement
of the optimal distribution is small (and thus the Laplace distribution is near-
optimal), but for the multivariate case the improvement can be significant.
• ε-Differential privacy guarantees that the knowledge gain that can be extracted
from a query response is limited. As current methods to attain ε-differential
privacy do not let users specify their prior knowledge, zero knowledge is im-
plicitly taken as the base to compute the knowledge gain. We propose a mech-
anism to let users specify their prior knowledge on the response: each time
a user sends a query, the user’s prior knowledge is also sent. We show that
this mechanism improves data utility and, despite the increased interaction
between the database and the user, we show that it preserves privacy.
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• A synergy between k-anonymity and ε-differential privacy has been described
for privacy-preserving data publication, even if both models have quite differ-
ent origins. In particular we have shown that a specific kind of microaggrega-
tion (that results in a k-anonymous data set) can be employed to reduce the
sensitivity of identity queries by a factor of 1/k. As a result, the ε-differentially
private data set generated from the k-anonymous version offers improved data
utility.
• We have shown that the k-anonymity family of models is powerful enough to
achieve ε-differential privacy in the context of data publishing. Specifically,
using a suitable construction, we have shown that exp(ε)-closeness implies
ε-differential privacy for uninformed intruders and approximate ε-differential
privacy for informed intruders. Our t-closeness construction based on bucke-
tization is also a contribution in its own right. In particular, as ε-differential
privacy is attained through a method that provides t-closeness, the truthful-
ness of the data inside k-anonymous groups is preserved. This is a remarkable
advantatge over typical methods used to attain ε-differential privacy.
8.2 Publications
The publications supporting this thesis are:
• Jordi Soria-Comas and Josep Domingo-Ferrer. Probabilistic k-anonymity
through microaggregation and data swapping. In: IEEE International Con-
ference on Fuzzy Systems - FUZZ-IEEE 2012, pp. 1-8, 2012.
• Jordi Soria-Comas and Josep Domingo-Ferrer. Optimal data-independent
noise for differential privacy.Information Sciences (To appear).
• Jordi Soria-Comas and Josep Domingo-Ferrer. Differential privacy through
knowledge refinement. In: 4th IEEE International Conference on Privacy,
Security, Risk and Trust - PASSAT 2012, pp. 702-707, 2012.
• Jordi Soria-Comas and Josep Domingo-Ferrer. Sensitivity-independent differ-
ential privacy via prior knowledge refinement. International Journal of Un-
certainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-based Systems 20(6): 855-876, 2012.
• Jordi Soria-Comas, Josep Domingo-Ferrer and David Rebollo-Monedero. k-
Anonimato probabilístico. In: XII Reunión Española sobre Criptología y Se-
guridad de la Información - RECSI 2012.
• Jordi Soria-Comas and Josep Domingo-Ferrer. On differential privacy and
data utility in SDC. In 7th Joint UN/ECE-Eurostat Work Session on Sta-
tistical Data Confidentiality, 2011. http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/
stats/documents/ece/ces/ge.46/2011/24_Soria-Domingo.pdf
132
8.3 Future work
• Jordi Soria-Comas, Josep Domingo-Ferrer, David Sánchez and Sergio
Martínez. Improving the utility of differentially private data releases via k-
anonymity. In 12th IEEE International Conference on Trust, Security and Pri-
vacy in Computing and Communications -IEEE TrustCom 2013, Melbourne,
Australia, July 16-18, 2013 (to appear).
• Jordi Soria-Comas and Josep Domingo-Ferrer. Differential privacy via t-
closeness in data publishing. 11th International Conference on Privacy, Se-
curity and Trust-PST 2013, Tarragona, July 10-12, 2013 (to appear, IEEE
Digital Library).
8.3 Future work
The work presented in this thesis opens several avenues for new research:
• In Chapter 3 we reviewed some of the limitations of k-anonymity in presence
of informed intruders, and proposed a new privacy model, probabilistic k-
anonymity, that offers privacy guarantees equivalent to those of k-anonymity.
We showed that probabilistic k-anonymity may offer disclosure limitation
against informed intruders and still provide useful results. The proposed
method to attain probabilistic k-anonymity works by generating a different
partition (the optimal one) for each confidential attributs. As a result, the
risk of attribute disclosure is increased. To deal with this issue we proposed
to increase k, but the enforcement of additional criteria (e.g. l-diversity, t-
closeness) may be a better solution.
• The amount of noise added to attain ε-differential privacy is usually large,
which damages the utility of the output. One strategy to reduce query sensi-
tivity is based on applying some transformation to the query. Following this
strategy we have shown that for queries returning information about specific
individuals, a prior microaggregation step can reduce sensitivity by a factor of
1/k. It could be interesting to determine whether microaggregation can help
reducing the sensitivity of a generic queries.
• A common approach to the generation of ε-differentially private data sets is to
divide the range of possible values in fixed buckets and then count the number
of individuals within each bucket. This approach is not suitable for dealing
with sparse data: the number of buckets with small counts is large, and there-
fore the added noise may substantially change the properties of the data set.
A possible approach to make sure that the generated buckets have a similar
number of records is to use a microaggregation algorithm. Regular microag-
gregation algorithms do not fit in the ε-differential privacy environment, as
a change in a single point may change the cluster completely; however, the
insensitive microaggregation proposed in Chapter 6 guarantees a maximum
change of one record per cluster. By using this approach, the accuracy of the
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released data may be increased as, in practice, we avoid considering the sparse
regions.
• In Chapter 7 we presented a link between t-closeness and ε-differential pri-
vacy for numeric or ordinal attributes. Future research will include extending
the proposed approach for nominal confidential attributes, which cannot be
ordered. We will also provide a generalization to multiple confidential at-
tributes. Experimental work will be conducted to compare the utility of the
ε-differentially private data sets obtained via bucketized exp(ε)-closeness. The
very nature of our construction, based on k-anonymity, gives reasonable hopes
that more utility may be preserved than the one offered by the Laplace noise
addition typically used to achieve ε-differential privacy: for example, by de-
sign, our approach does not yield any off-range values, which may however
appear in noise addition procedures; in fact, the anonymized values we pro-
vide are truthful, even if coarsened by bucketization. We will also explore
the exact privacy guarantees offered by the approximate ε-differential privacy
obtained with our construction for the case of informed intruders.
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